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Introduction  
The notion of an environmental crisis has become a significant part of our 
political, scientific and public discourses. Its presence in media, literature, movies 
and conversation impacts our daily lives and generates worries, fears and debates. 
In short, the environmental crisis has become a central topic of conversation, and 
a central challenge for the wellbeing and prosperity of our societies. At the same 
time, the established knowledge on its human causes is growing, and offers 
considerable insights into the practical changes that could reduce natural 
degradation. Given the ubiquity of the issue and the knowledge of potential 
amendments, one could expect our societies to hasten towards significant 
improvements in order to ameliorate the ongoing environmental degradation. 
However, the development is going in the opposite direction. In spite of our 
increasing awareness of the dangers of rapid climatic changes, we seem unable or 
unwilling to change and adapt.  
Philosophers have taken this to indicate that our ethical convictions are out of 
date, and consequently that the solution of this crisis requires us to establish a 
new ethic. The philosophical effort to provide such an environmental ethic has 
been going on for several decades, but appears to have had little influence on our 
shared ethical convictions. In short, this philosophical project does not appear to 
be working in practice. After four decades of environmental philosophy, it is time 
to try another perspective.    
This thesis is an attempt to do so by abandoning the ideas of foundationalist 
environmental philosophy and substitute the perspective of Richard Rorty’s anti-
foundationalism. The question is not whether this is a sounder philosophical 
position than its alternatives, but whether Rorty’s writings can offer a more useful 
perspective on our failure to respond to the environmental challenge.  
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The research questions of this thesis read:  
How can we approach environmental ethics without philosophical foundations? 
What are the benefits of an anti-foundationalist conception of moral progress, 
and what kind of vocabularies does it promote?  
Environmental Ethics 
The emergence of the environment as a new matter of concern is reflected in a 
gradual environmental turn of the vocabularies – political, literary and 
philosophical – which deal with the ethical and normative aspects of our 
societies. Parallel to the increase of environmental knowledge and the 
development of an ecological perspective, the public discourse of the last decades 
has been increasingly centered on the divergence between our planet’s capacity 
and our ways of living. Although the problem at hand is generally accepted, and 
concrete solutions problem are within reach, those solutions have not been widely 
employed. In spite of our comprehension of environmental degradation and of 
what can be done to ameliorate it, our efforts so far have been vastly insufficient.  
Environmentally concerned writers have taken this observation to suggest that a 
solution to the environmental crisis requires that we change our cultures by 
revising our basic ethical convictions. The assumption behind this line of thought 
is that we would react stronger to the damage that threatens our planet if our 
ethical convictions were more in tune with it. In other words, the divergence 
between environmental knowledge and practical efforts is explained by the lack 
of environmental values in our cultures, values which could otherwise work as a 
bridge between our knowledge and the required efforts. A branch of 
environmental philosophers who adhere to this perspective address the problem 
at hand in ethical terms, and conceive of ethical problems as problems to be 
solved by philosophers. These philosophers perceive our value judgments and 
ethical convictions as expressions of a systematic ethic which can be replaced by 
a new system. As environmental philosophers, they commit themselves to provide 
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such a systematic ethic, and thereby to bring us closer to a solution to the 
environmental crisis. This is done through a replacement of the prevalent ethical 
system with a new, environmental ethic, backed up by philosophical arguments 
which are unbiased and free of speciesism. The attempt to provide an 
environmental ethic on the basis of philosophical arguments amounts to what I 
term environmental foundationalism.  
The various proponents of environmental foundationalism share the idea that the 
complex debate about our environmental responsibility can be resolved if we 
distinguish real values from those that are advocated from different contingent 
perspectives. They treat morality and values as matters of moral knowledge, and 
place their own profession at the top of the epistemological hierarchy. In this 
perspective, moral progress is a matter of increasing moral knowledge through 
philosophical analysis. The aim of environmental foundationalism is to promote 
the solution of the environmental crisis by providing us with an ethical system 
which shortens the distance between environmental information and concrete 
action.   
Philosophers who embrace this concept of philosophy and moral progress share 
the assumption that there is one answer to the question of value in nature. The 
acquisition of that answer is the common goal of these philosophers, and 
constitutes the raison d'être of environmental foundationalism. The challenge, 
however, is that the various philosophical analyses within this branch support 
different conclusions about the distribution of intrinsic value in nature, each 
position adding up to a particular “centrism” in contradiction to others. The 
diversity of positions within the discourse environmental foundationalism is at 
odds with the basic premise that there is one answer, one valid “centrism”, to be 
found. There is still a diversity of perspectives on what the perspective free 
environmental ethic should be. Perhaps as a result of this tension, the efforts of 
environmental foundationalists have been directed towards reaching agreement 
within their own discourse, rather than (or prior to) trying to communicate their 
insights to the public. However, such internal agreement has not emerged. 
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Without the unanimity which would give a new ethical system its philosophical 
justification, the discourse of environmental foundationalism seems to have 
stagnated.  
The failure to reach internal agreement, and the consequent introspective focus of 
environmental foundationalism, has led proponents of environmental pragmatism 
to conclude that the basic assumptions of environmental foundationalism are 
flawed. These philosophers maintain that the problem for environmental 
foundationalism is the insistence on moral monism – the idea that value in nature 
must have one particular location. Accordingly, they propose a new perspective 
on environmental ethics based on moral pluralism. In this view, value in nature is 
spread across different kinds of entities, depending on the context and situation in 
which they arise and prevail. Furthermore, environmental pragmatism rejects the 
clear distinction, central to various versions of environmental foundationalism, 
between intrinsic value (an entity’s value for its own sake) and instrumental value 
(an entity’s value for the sake of something else). These philosophers introduce 
the notion of a basic interconnectedness of the world which, evident in our daily 
experience of the world, implies that all value is relational. According to this 
view, therefore, the value of an entity relates both to other entities and to the 
human being that experiences it. The environmental pragmatists construe value as 
a property of relations rather than of entities. This perspective, they argue, 
amounts to an environmental ethic, without subscribing to a particular 
“centrism”: if all value is relational, then our natural environment – itself a web 
of relations – has value whenever we value something related to it.  
However, in spite of their efforts to resolve the stagnated and introspective 
condition of environmental ethics, it seems that their break with these tendencies 
is rather limited. Although they avoid the reduction of environmental value to the 
intrinsic value of one moral center, they fail to turn the philosophical discourse 
on the environment into a public contribution. Arguably, the similarities with 
foundationalism outnumber the differences. In fact, it seems that the significant 
difference between environmental pragmatism and environmental 
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foundationalism is the different philosophical principles which are applied, rather 
than the approach to ethical deliberation. In both cases, a philosophical system is 
used as a foundation for a certain conception of values in nature. It seems that the 
promise of a non-foundationalist perspective on environmental ethics was hard to 
keep. Environmental pragmatism may be a new perspective in the philosophy of 
environmental ethics, but as such, it appears to have generated another position 
within the stagnating and introspective debate, rather than offering a way out of 
it.  
Environmental vocabularies 
Although some positions have attained broad philosophical support within the 
discourse of environmental philosophy, it seems that their practical project – that 
of contributing to environmental solutions by changing our ethical convictions – 
has not succeeded. While philosophers are debating the benefits of 
“ecocentrism”, “biocentrism” and “weak anthropocentrism”, none of these ethical 
systems seems to have reached the common convictions of the public. It is hard to 
see how even a unanimous philosophical agreement on a given “centrism” would 
suddenly transform public opinion. If it is the case that a new ethic would help us 
resolve the crisis, and philosophy fails to provide us with one, then perhaps it is 
time to abandon the whole philosophical project of providing an ethic. As a 
practical problem, the environmental crisis requires us to direct ourselves towards 
that which might work in practice.  
The conception of moral progress as increasing moral knowledge, and of 
philosophical theory as the access to undistorted insights in morality, may well be 
philosophically justified. However, the efforts towards which these conceptions 
have directed us seem void of the practical significance they are aimed towards. 
The environmental crisis is too grave a problem to dogmatically protect 
philosophical axioms, no matter how convincing or universal their arguments are. 
We cannot afford to overlook other perspectives.  
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A perspective which breaks sharply with the conceptions and assumptions of 
foundationalist philosophy is that of Richard Rorty. His historicist account of 
truth and morality makes the idea of providing a foundation uninteresting, and 
brings about a perspective on moral progress which disconnects it from 
philosophical theory and argumentative justification. Rorty’s writings are 
motivated by a genuine doubt about the practical utility of the image of truth as 
representation. The idea that the aim of language is to “mirror” nature, along with 
the consequent thought that the pure language of philosophy can discover the 
“real” nature of things, has been a basic assumption of western philosophy since 
Plato. It is this epistemological conception of truth and language that has given 
philosophy the role of a meta-discipline with the ability to determine validity 
across all other disciplines. The epistemological hierarchy of knowledge is basic 
to the ability of philosophy to provide foundations for the insights of other 
disciplines.  
Rorty suggests that we abandon this representational conception of truth, 
language and philosophy, and replace it with a conception of languages as useful 
tools in coping with the world around us. In this view, to use a language is not a 
matter of representing reality “out there”, but of achieving practical goals. To be 
a language user is to learn the rules of a given language game. Concepts like 
truth, certainty and validity refer to these rules; rules which could have been 
different – and which are different in other language games. As means of 
adaptation rather than media of representation, the given language games we use 
are contingent. From this viewpoint, the vocabulary of foundationalist philosophy 
is simply another language game, with its own rules of truth and justification. 
Since the rules that determine truth and justification are internal to each language 
game, there is no truth to be discovered on their outside.  
From this perspective, the rules within the vocabulary of environmental 
philosophy are different from, and not foundational to, the rules of our public 
discourses. There are no rules on the “outside”, no universal meta-vocabulary that 
could distinguish between different vocabularies. Consequently, there is no pre-
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lingual truth about the moral value of nature to be discovered. To the extent that 
philosophical theory can reach objective insights into the domain of morality, this 
is simply a matter of providing broadly accepted summaries of the convictions we 
have in common. Like other language use, philosophical theories depend on 
social justification. To Rorty, objectivity is a mark of normal discourse – 
language use which subscribes to the shared frame of basic assumptions within a 
vocabulary. Consequently, for a theory to be objective implies that it is justified, 
by virtue of the conventions of the given vocabulary, as normal discourse.  
Abnormal discourse, on the other hand, is a matter of suggesting new 
vocabularies. Such language use does not relate to the accepted rules of a 
vocabulary, and so are metaphorical expressions rather than sentences with literal 
meaning. To Rorty, progress and change are not a matter of increasing our 
knowledge or achieving certainty, but rather of finding new perspectives, new 
ways of talking about the world – other tools that might be better suited to 
achieve our practical goals. Rorty calls this kind of language use redescription, 
and this is what his own writings are aiming towards. Rorty’s writings do not 
offer a philosophical system, but aim to create a new way of talking about 
ourselves and the world.   
Similarly, when this thesis brings Rorty into the discussion on environmental 
ethics, it is in no way an attempt to establish and provide validity for a new 
position within environmental ethics. Rather, the aim is to try out a new way of 
talking about environmental values and ethics, one which breaks completely with 
the (thus far) unfruitful framework of environmental foundationalism. A Rortyan 
perspective on environmental ethics is not a theory of environmental ethics, but a 
suggestion of a new vocabulary of ethics, moral progress and the environment. It 
is a perspective from which the topics of moral progress and environmental ethics 
can be approached without the intention of providing foundations, and without 
the restraining idea that justification of values must be universal. This is because, 
in contrast to the environmental foundationalists, Rorty conceives of values and 
ethics as social phenomena – as parts of contingent vocabularies that can be 
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replaced by other contingent vocabularies. With Rorty, we can replace the 
foundationalist question “how do we establish environmental values on solid 
ground” with questions like “given the need for more environmental practices, 
what ways of talking about nature and ourselves could get us closer to where we 
want to be”. The foundationalist way of framing the topic concerns how the 
discipline of philosophy should go about solving the puzzle of the environmental 
ethic. The relation to public discourses and established convictions is somewhat 
unclear. The Rortyan question, on the other hand, addresses our public discourse 
directly, and takes our shared convictions as starting point. In contrast to the 
foundationalist approach to environmental ethics, Rorty’s perspective does not 
theorize the question at hand, but focuses on that which can make a difference in 
practice.  
Rorty’s vocabulary opens up a new perspective – one in which moral progress is 
not a matter of foundations and moral knowledge, but of extending our loyalties 
through experiencing the sufferings of new groups of beings. Such experiences 
have little to do with ethical theory, and more to do with narrative and poetic 
works of literature. In contrast to philosophical and scientific literature, these 
genres have the advantage of telling stories rather than argument, theories and 
explanations. Although theories and arguments have their value, it is a privilege 
of the narrative and poetic to expose us emotionally to the sufferings, 
perspectives and needs of those of which we were previously ignorant.  
This thesis follows this line of thought by turning away from environmental 
theory and towards narrative and poetic nature-writing. If the solution of the 
environmental crisis requires that we extend our ethical boundaries towards the 
inclusion of nonhuman nature, then literary redescriptions of ourselves and the 
world, which challenge the limits of our current ethical convictions, may provide 
efficient tools for approaching that aim. The writings of Aldo Leopold and 
Wislawa Szymborska serve as good examples of literature that redescribes nature 
and our relation to it, opening up perspectives that conflict with consumptive and 
careless attitudes towards nature. The reductionist conception of these writings as 
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artistic expressions and formulations of philosophical ideas is replaced by a 
reading which conceives of them as attempts to abandon some of our old 
vocabularies, and to suggest new ways of talking which might bring us closer to 
the inclusion of non-human nature.  
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that such environmental narratives will make us 
more environmentally responsible, or render our practices sustainable. This thesis 
offers no empirical evidence of the tendency of narratives to further moral 
progress. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to suggest a new way of approaching a 
practical problem, a problem to which our current approaches are not working as 
we would like them to. As such, it offers one possible description among many 
others. The question is not if Rorty’s perspective is the right perspective, but 
whether it can offer helpful tools for the aims we set for ourselves. A Rortyan 
understanding of environmental moral progress has the advantage of playing 
down the distinction between humanistic and environmental ethics. Leaving the 
language of ultimate justification behind, we can approach environmental ethics 
and values as a practical problem, without leaving the field of concrete action. As 
there are no “given” limits to our loyalty and solidarity, the emergence of an 
environmental ethic is simply a matter of continuously suggesting new 
metaphors, and of hoping that the metaphors of a more inclusive moral 
community turn into new vocabularies of morality and solidarity.  
However, although narrative and poetic literature may be an efficient tool in the 
work towards moral progress, it cannot guarantee that new convictions are 
reflected in new practices. As Rorty himself acknowledges, changes in our 
societies depend not only on moral progress, but also on the efficiency of the 
public discourse as a tool for achieving changes in practice. Different aims call 
for different tools. If moral progress is a matter of metaphorical literature 
suggesting new perspectives and ideals, it is a challenge for our public discourse 
to achieve our common perspectives and ideals. In contrast to tools of moral 
progress, the achievement of our common environmental ideals depends on our 
public environmental discourse to be efficient as normal discourse, as 
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argumentative exchange on the basis of common premises. To paraphrase Rorty, 
we need a public discourse where our common environmental premises can be 
realized through argumentative exchange and policy-directed debate.  
Such a realization, however, seems to be hindered by the immense grandeur and 
complexity by which environmental problems are described. Perhaps we can 
speed up the process and narrow the gap between intentions and actions, if we try 
to adapt these descriptions to the frames of our perspectives and comprehension. 
If the public vocabulary of a global, catastrophic and impending crisis is 
paralyzing, it may not be the best tool for the achievement of our ideals. Perhaps, 
then, we should replace it with an environmental vocabulary which focuses on 
more local and concrete problems and efforts. A vocabulary where the “we” that 
needs to change is smaller, and where the potential consequences are less 
apocalyptic, might narrow the gap between our increasingly environmental 
intentions and the practical changes towards which they point us.  
Methods - Vocabularies and literary criticism  
This thesis is written from a philosophical point of view. As a philosophical 
contribution to the debate on environmental ethics, it revolves around the various 
perspectives and arguments that make up the philosophical discourse of 
environmental ethics, and the prospects of a new perspective influenced by 
Rorty’s writings. However, these positions are not discussed in terms of 
philosophical justification or validity, but in terms of the practical implications of 
their way of framing the problem at hand. To enter into argumentative discussion 
with the various proponents of environmental philosophy is only meaningful if 
one accepts the basic premises of that discourse. The starting point of this thesis, 
however, is the observation that this discourse as a whole appears to have lost 
touch with the practical circumstance to which it is a reaction. The problem for 
environmental foundationalism, accordingly, is not that its philosophical 
arguments are unsound, but that they are philosophical arguments directed 
towards philosophical justification. To approach our values at a “deeper” level is 
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uncontroversial within philosophy, but does not seem to have changed anything 
on its outside.  
This thesis, therefore, relates to the discourse of environmental ethics as 
metaphor rather than as argument. It is an attempt to follow up Rorty’s notion 
that change does not come from objective arguments, but from suggesting new 
vocabularies, new ways of talking about the subject matter. My approach to the 
discourse of environmental ethics is parallel to Rorty’s approach to the discourse 
of foundationalist philosophy: Instead of discussing language use, values and 
perspectives in terms of justification, truth and foundations, I discuss their ability 
to promote practical aims. Rather than assessing the validity of sentences, I 
approach the vocabularies in which they are formed, asking where they are taking 
us, and what consequences they have for how we behave.  
The vocabularies of environmental foundationalism and environmental 
pragmatism are approached from another vocabulary, one which conceives of 
these as tools for the amelioration of the environmental crisis. My critique of 
these perspectives is that they, as tools, seem not to be working towards their 
intended goal. From this perspective, the introspective character of environmental 
foundationalism makes this discourse an idle tool – one which we cannot put to 
use for the challenge we have encountered. A tool that does not work is replaced 
with another. However, since there is no a priori criterion of tool-choice, 
acquiring the tool which works is a matter of trying out the ones that look 
promising until we achieve what we are striving for. This thesis is an attempt to 
suggest some tools which may work better than the ones we have tried so far.  
To my knowledge, a Rortyan perspective on environmental ethics which breaks 
with the vocabulary of foundationalism has not yet been fully worked out. The 
attempt to fill this void is motivated by the potential of this perspective to come 
up with better tools for coping with the challenges we face. This approach 
explains why the philosophical criticism of Rorty’s writings has not been 
prioritized in this thesis. The charge of relativism, or of self-referential 
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inconsistency, may be interesting to the discussion of epistemology and other 
philosophical topics, but they are not relevant to the project at hand. What is 
germane to this thesis is whether a Rortyan perspective on ethics and moral 
progress amounts to a way of talking which can help redirect our focus towards 
the practical problems of the environment.  
Admittedly, the readings offered in the first and second chapter of this thesis do 
not do justice to all variations of environmental foundationalism and 
environmental pragmatism. However, the point is not that all writings within 
environmental ethics are fruitless, but that the set of common premises which I 
describe as the assumptions of environmental foundationalism seem to be taking 
us away from practice instead of towards it. The selection of writers is an attempt 
to illustrate this tendency among philosophers that have had, and still have, a 
significant impact on the discourse of environmental ethics
1
. Consequently, the 
criticism of these various positions is not directed towards the arguments and 
propositions of each of them, but rather towards the common premises of the 
discourse in which they are expressed. These premises are not criticized for 
lacking justification or relying on invalid arguments, but because they constitute a 
way of talking which does not move us in the direction we aim for.  
This is also the case for the remarks on the Rortyan conception of social change, 
presented in chapter four. Here, the question is whether we can settle with hoping 
for the emergence of an environmental ethic, and with hoping that this ethic will 
lead us towards the changes we seek. Although Rorty is usually rather vague 
when discussing more concrete implications, he does emphasize the difference 
between moral progress and the challenge of achieving our cultural ideals. The 
notion, at the end of this thesis, that the tools that work towards moral progress 
are not sufficient on their own to ensure environmental protection, is a suggestion 
that we must supplement them with the use of other tools in order to achieve what 
they aim for.  
                                              
1 See for example Light & Rolston III (2009); Light & Katz (1996); Keller (2010) 
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In this thesis, I compare different vocabularies and perspectives with the aim of 
suggesting some of them as more promising tools than others. As such, it is more 
of a work of literary criticism (in the Rortyan, broad sense) than it is a work of 
philosophy. After all, even philosophy is a literary genre – a kind of writing2. As 
a literary critic, I do not approach the subject of environmental ethics with the 
epistemic authority of the philosopher, but with a familiarity with a range of 
genres and vocabularies, with a toolbox of suggestions as to how we could 
change our vocabularies. As an ironist, I treat different vocabularies not as closer 
to or further from reality, but as more or less helpful tools in the efforts to reach 
our common goals. Environmental foundationalism is a tool that I have 
abandoned. This thesis is an attempt to suggest some new ones in its place.   
Terminology 
In this thesis, the concept of “intrinsic value” is treated as parallel to those of 
“inherent value”, “value in itself”, “end value” and “value in the philosophical 
sense”. Although these concepts sometimes are used in different meanings, their 
use in this thesis expresses the value that an entity may have for the good of its 
own sake, i.e. not as instrumental value for the good of some other entity.  
The general concept of pragmatism is largely left undiscussed in this thesis. This 
is partly due to the controversy between various writers over what pragmatism is 
or should be. This debate is not particularly relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
The distinction by which Rorty is contrasted with other writers in this thesis is 
that between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. For practical reasons, I 
refer to Rorty mainly as an anti-foundationalist rather than as a pragmatist or a 
neo-pragmatist. I do not offer a definition of pragmatism as such. Instead, I 
approach environmental pragmatism and Rortyan anti-foundationalism as two 
ways of perceiving ethical theory and moral progress. This choice has no 
                                              
2 See Rorty (1978)   
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connection to my opinions on what counts as pragmatisms, but simply has the 
practical advantage of avoiding complication of terms and definitions.  
Some of the words by which I characterize various philosophical positions and 
tendencies are less rigorous and categorical than one could expect from a 
philosophical paper. Instead of words like “unnecessary”, “erroneous” and 
“valid”, this thesis takes use of words like “uninteresting”, “unfavourable” and 
“helpful”. The choice of these words follows from the aim of this thesis to 
approach various environmental discourses as more or less helpful tools, rather 
than as more or less well-grounded theories.  
Overview 
The first chapter is an attempt to illustrate, through the reading of a selection of 
central texts, that the failure of environmental foundationalism to reach its 
practical goals is connected to its universalistic ambitions in the attempt to 
ground a new ethic. Diverse “centrisms”, along with philosophical arguments of 
validity, are presented as proposals for a new set of basic convictions, ready to be 
implemented in society. The project is that of reaching beneath mere perspective 
to discover value at a deeper level than our public discourses, hoping to resolve 
the debate with conclusive, objective answers. As this project constitutes the 
common frame of environmental foundationalism, I argue that its premises are 
connected to the stagnation of environmental ethics within the discipline of 
philosophy.  
The second chapter introduces the perspective of environmental pragmatism, a 
branch of environmental ethics which aims to break with the assumptions of 
environmental foundationalism in order to resolve the apparent stagnation. I 
argue, however, that their attempt to avoid foundationalism leads them to propose 
a new, pragmatic, foundation for environmental values. As such, their 
contribution fails to leave the stagnating discourse of environmental 
foundationalism. Therefore, this chapter introduces the basic ideas of Richard 
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Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, hoping that these may offer a new way of 
approaching environmental values. Rorty abandons the idea that values can have 
a foundation outside their vocabularies, along with the idea that ethical theory is 
an instrument of social change. Similarly, I abandon the project of environmental 
foundationalism, as well as the attempt to construe pragmatism as an 
environmental ethic. Both projects are attempts to connect human practices and 
values to metaphysical or philosophical foundations.  
The third chapter discusses the relation between literature and social change. It 
presents the Rortyan notion that moral progress is a matter of creating new 
vocabularies rather than increasing moral knowledge. I argue that environmental 
foundationalism, conceived of as theoretical attempts to assert distribution of 
value, offers no more than “thin” ethical descriptions – summaries – of cultural 
convictions which do not currently prevail. Furthermore, the progress towards 
such convictions depends not on theoretical summaries, but on the creation of 
new vocabularies in which nature and its relations to human beings attain other 
meanings and values. As this is a creative, and not philosophical, effort, I turn to 
the poetic and narrative writings of Wislawa Szymborska and Aldo Leopold in 
order to illustrate how creative literature might influence our environmental 
convictions. This section is also an attempt to illustrate how we, as literary critics, 
might contribute to this process. I conclude that environmental moral progress is, 
at least in part, a matter of ecological redescription.  
The fourth chapter is an attempt to connect the historicist conception of 
environmental moral progress with the philosophically neglected point that the 
environmental crisis is a practical problem. Finding its parallel in Rorty’s 
Achieving Our Country, this chapter starts with the observation that the 
environmental values and ideals which we in fact have attained do not seem to 
make much difference in our concrete policy and practices. I argue that the 
solution to the environmental crisis cannot be attained through environmental 
moral progress alone, but requires that we work towards achieving our new 
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ideals. Drawing on Rorty’s conception of languages as tools, I suggest that the 
tools for attaining environmental moral progress should be distinguished from the 
tools of achieving our common ideals and convictions. Arguing against Timothy 
Morton’s insistence on treating the environment as a hyperobject, I propose that 
one way of getting closer to achieving our environmental values is to simplify the 
descriptions of the environmental problems in the public discourse, and aim to 
make our concerns and efforts more local and concrete.   
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1. Foundations in environmental philosophy 
1.1 Introduction 
The emergence of the environmental crisis has led writers from a number of 
disciplines and traditions to search for ways to change our destructive patterns of 
behavior. Within the discipline of philosophy, this effort has gradually brought 
about a new philosophical discourse – one in which such change is sought 
through a replacement of the values which constitute our moral outlook. This 
chapter offers a perspective on environmental foundationalism, approached not as 
a set of philosophical arguments and propositions, but as a philosophical 
discourse distinguished by a shared self-conception and a certain way of 
approaching social and ethical problems. Proponents of environmental 
foundationalism share the aim of providing a solution to the environmental crisis 
by taking our values to a deeper, philosophical level of unbiased and perspective 
free insights. Although this branch of philosophy incorporates a vast range of 
philosophically diverse ideas and concepts, it is unified by the common project of 
providing ethical foundations to questions of the environment.  
The environmental discourse to which these writers seek to contribute is a 
complex discourse where a number of opposed parties uphold conflicting values 
and opinions on practical environmental issues. As with most occurrences of 
value conflict in society, various parties normally advocate opinions and solutions 
that are profitable for their own cause, or from their own perspective. As we will 
see from this chapter, the foundationalist response to this complex situation of 
value-disagreement is to attempt to provide a set of values that is perspective 
free, and that as such goes beyond the realm of opinions, points of view or 
particular interests. The thought that philosophy can offer unbiased foundations 
for norms, moral intuitions or truths presupposes a philosophical viewpoint on 
morality and knowledge which is privileged with an epistemological authority. In 
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a word, philosophy is the attempt to reach a view from nowhere. While 
conflicting parties of the environmental debate can only advocate what has value 
in their own perspective, environmental philosophers can solve conflicts of 
interests and values by going beyond mere perspective and discover what really 
has value, and what is really true.  
In this chapter, we will see that foundationalist environmental philosophy 
emerged as an attempt to solve environmental problems by offering a set of 
unconditional truths about the value of nature. We will see that although this has 
been attempted in different ways, the contributions within environmental 
foundationalism have all been preoccupied with philosophical principles rather 
than with practical environmental problems. I will argue that this focus has led to 
a situation in which philosophical ideas are bounced back and forth within 
philosophy departments, without approaching the original goal of contributing to 
the solution of environmental problems. The explicit goal of environmental 
foundationalism to contribute to an environmental solution is impeded by its own 
common premises. As it turns out, various environmental foundationalists have 
different perspectives on what the perspective free ethic should look like. The 
assumption that there is one final answer to the question of value in nature is 
challenged by the existence of various “centrisms”. John Dewey once wrote that 
ethical theory had been trapped in the search for the one ultimate truth on which 
to determine the moral worth of our actions, and that the common assumption 
that such a truth exists led them to continue this perpetual philosophical endeavor 
(Dewey 2004: 92-93). In this chapter, I argue that Dewey’s description fits 
environmental foundationalism well, and that their presuppositions about 
philosophical knowledge and moral insight lead them in an unfavorable direction.   
In the following sections of this chapter, I will offer a reading of the ”new 
problem” of philosophy as it is framed by Richard Routley, along with his 
interpretation of the problem and its possible solutions. I argue that the 
foundationalist character of environmental philosophy is present already in 
Routley’s way of framing his call for a new ethic. As Routley’s call is a challenge 
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to philosophy as a discipline, this chapter discusses some of the most notable 
attempts to answer this call. Although I will briefly discuss some similarities and 
differences among these theories, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the 
foundationalist project shapes the discourse of environmental ethics. The 
discussion of the conflicting positions within foundational environmental 
philosophy also illustrates how foundationalism helps to isolate environmental 
ethics in an introverted and scholastic debate within philosophy departments, 
rather than contributing to the public debate with new perspectives. I end the 
chapter with some remarks about foundationalism and why environmental 
foundationalism may not have had the influence its proponents had hoped for.  
1.2 From practice to theory – Richard Routley 
Richard Routley was one of the first philosophers to address the increasingly 
problematic relationship between human beings and their natural environment. 
As such, he is an important part of the process by which the cultural challenges of 
the environment have become a question of providing an environmental ethic. 
Many of the later contributors to the philosophical debate refer explicitly to the 
perspective and challenge laid out in Routley’s paper “Is There a Need for a New, 
an Environmental, Ethic?” (2009). As we will see in this chapter, the discourse of 
environmental foundationalism can be read as an attempt to follow up Routley’s 
opening line: 
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in 
need of a new ethic […] setting out people’s relations to the natural environment 
(Routley 2009:47).  
Routley embraces Aldo Leopold’s view that ethics must deal with our relation to 
non-human nature, and asserts that an environmental ethic is one that can 
determine maltreatment of land and interference with wilderness as morally 
wrong, even in cases where there are no repercussions for fellow human beings 
(Routley 2009:47). Having established a defining feature of an environmental 
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ethic, Routley now goes on to discuss how philosophers can cope with the task of 
supplying such an ethic. The first question he poses is whether the existing 
ethical theories can be extended and modified so as to transform into an 
environmental ethic, or if they rather must be replaced by completely new ethical 
theories that incorporate non-human nature in a satisfactory way (Routley 
2009:47).  
Although Routley has not, at this point of the paper, presented his arguments or 
opinions on the subject, certain premises and ideas are evident in his introduction 
of the problem. The framing of this new need indicates a certain way of 
conceiving the problem at hand. We have to assume that a need for a new ethic 
has its roots in the fact that various ethically blameworthy practices and actions in 
the social world could be different. Otherwise, a call for a new ethic would hardly 
be appropriate. If we were to take these practices and actions as the subject for an 
essay about environmental problems, we might imagine asking questions like 
“what practices should we change, and how do we change them?” Routley 
implicitly answers these questions by declaring the need for a new ethic. To him, 
changes in these practices are seen as dependent upon changes in the ethical 
domain. However, it is still open what such a change in the ethical domain could 
look like, and how it could be attained. The notion of ethics here is used in a 
special sense, and the way Routley approaches it tells us something about his 
perspective on what role philosophy should assume in sorting out our relations to 
non-human nature.  
A commonsensical reading of the “need for a new ethic” could be something like 
“we need to start taking non-human nature into account when we act”. This claim 
would probably harmonize quite well with the attitudes of most environmentally 
concerned persons, and does not demand any special justification. Although our 
societies are comprised of different people with different dispositions, it is not a 
philosophically complicated matter to suggest plainly that we all stop 
“maltreating land” and “interfering exceedingly with wilderness”. Routley, 
however, is not interested in general suggestions of changes in practices or 
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commonsensical ideas about what we should do; he is after something more 
specific. The affirmation of the need for ethical change leads him not to a 
discussion about what people should do, but about what philosophers should do. 
The focus of the paper is not whether, or in what ways, we need to adapt our 
multitude of practices and ethical dispositions so as to improve our treatment of 
non-human nature. Routley is rather asking if we need a new ethic, a new 
foundation for values, rights or imperatives that we should incorporate in our 
practices. Providing such an ethic is not a task suited for everyone – it is the 
classical task of the foundationalist philosopher.  
Routley continues by assessing the prospects of our current ethical theories in 
order to figure out if an environmental ethic is already available. After a swift 
examination of the attitudes towards nature in what he calls “the Western super 
ethic” (the broad common premises of today’s ethical frameworks), Routley 
rejects the whole picture. He does this on account of its tendency towards what he 
calls “human chauvinism”, i.e. the principle that human beings may do as they 
please as long as they refrain from harming others or themselves (Routley 
2009:49). To Routley, an ethical system that allows human beings to ruthlessly 
exploit and destroy non-human nature is fundamentally flawed, as such actions 
are “to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally 
impermissible” (Routley 2009:50). Since none of the human-non-human relations 
available within this framework are viable roles for human beings who maintain 
an environmental ethic, he affirms the need for a new ethic (Routley 2009:48-50).  
Fortunately, Routley does not leave us with this challenge without offering some 
indications of what this new ethic should look like. His rejection of human 
chauvinism, presented as a basic feature of our current ethical systems, leads him 
to realize that profound changes in our ethical frameworks are required. Routley 
argues that, since -  
a radical change in a theory sometimes forces changes in meta-theory […], an 
environmental ethic compels reexamination and modified analysis of such 
characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and the relations of 
obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of such 
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notions as value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist 
assumptions (Routley 2009: 51)    
By asserting that we need a new, environmental ethic, Routley means to 
introduce the philosophical project of providing a new ethic. The concepts of 
rights, duties values and other meta-ethical notions must be revised and 
synthesized in a non-chauvinistic manner, and new environmental concepts such 
as conservation and pollution should extend the borders of our ethical systems 
(Routley 2009:51). Furthermore, the new ethic must be sufficiently detached 
from human interests and preferences, since these are “far too parochial to 
provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable” 
(Routley 2009:52).  
Routley’s way of conceiving the problem, as well as the criteria for its solution, 
had significant influence on the emergence of environmental foundationalism. 
Routley observes that certain changes in human practice are necessary in order to 
cope with the environmental challenges, and that these should be addressed 
through an account of their ethical presuppositions. He presumes that the task of 
supplying us with a legitimate ethical framework is a philosophical one. 
Furthermore, he shows us that the ethical frameworks embraced in our current 
societies share features that are not compatible with an environmental ethic – i.e. 
an ethic that does not fall under human chauvinism. He shows us that to avoid 
this pitfall, the new environmental ethic must find its grounding in revised 
versions of concepts like value, right and duty, and that it must not let human 
desires and preferences affect its distribution of vices and virtues.  
A simplified description of Routley’s assumptions might be as follows: 1. Human 
beings cause unsustainable harm to non-human nature. 2. We must find a way to 
reduce this tendency. 3. This can be done by making people change the way they 
behave. 4. We can change the way people behave by providing a new ethic. 5. 
Philosophers can provide this new ethic, legitimizing actions and practices that 
are in tune with the environmental ethic, and proscribing the ones that are not. 6. 
This will make people change the way they behave, and thus prevent them from 
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causing non-human nature unsustainable harm. In this overview, the first three 
steps are relatively uncontroversial, while the three last steps introduce a 
particular way of conceiving ethics and moral progress. Taken together, they 
constitute what we may call the foundationalist direction of environmental ethics: 
The idea that that we can change society and solve practical problems by offering 
ethical theories that rest on philosophical foundations.   
Routley’s approach to the problem of environmental degradation reveals that a 
special role within the environmental discourse is reserved for philosophical 
theory. The observation of an ethical shortcoming within our practical lives leads 
him to presume that there is “grounding” work for philosophers. Accordingly, 
Routley frames the practical matter of environmentally unfavorable practices as a 
philosophical matter of supplying a new theory of the goodness of practices. In 
other words, he requests a philosophical means of improvement for our practical 
dealings with non-human nature. Arguably, this request encourages a certain kind 
of philosophy – one which aims at improving society through discovering its 
foundations. In the following, I will offer a reading of some prominent attempts 
to answer Routley’s challenge. I do not intend to engage in philosophical 
discussion with these theorists, but to discuss them with the aim of clarifying how 
the various environmental philosophers conceive of their own role in the solution 
of the environmental crisis.  
1.3 Environmental foundationalism and the centrism-
debate 
In Routley’s paper, philosophers are encouraged to come up with an ethic that 
can replace our prevalent chauvinistic ethical frameworks. Although Routley 
himself does not provide a clear outline for such an ethic, some features are 
outlined. He argues that an environmental ethic must proscribe destructive 
behavior towards non-human nature, and that the value of the latter must be 
established independently of human interests and preferences. Routley (2009:52) 
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cautions that we must be free of species bias when formulating an environmental 
ethic. These requirements have been accepted by many writers on the topic, 
particularly throughout the various versions of non-anthropocentrism.  
In the decades following the publication of Routley’s paper, a considerable 
number of philosophers have taken up his challenge, eventually comprising the 
new branch of environmental philosophy. His caution against species bias is 
generally incorporated, and resonates within various environmentalist positions. 
Arguably, the caution against species bias is reflected in the tendency of 
environmental philosophers to take the location of value in nature as the center of 
their task. If human interests and preferences are not to be given weight in the 
moral consideration of nature, then something other than our interests and 
preferences must constitute the baseline of an environmental ethic. Such an ethic 
must accordingly break with the tradition which sees human beings as the only 
holders of core value, as well as with the tendency to associate value with human 
preferences and interests. While it is clear that value must be philosophically 
located in non-human nature in order to provide an environmental ethic, it is not 
so clear where in non-human nature the value-core of environmental philosophy 
should be placed. In this section, philosophical positions with different loci of 
non-human natural value will be approached and read as variations of the project 
of establishing an environmental centrism as an alternative to anthropocentrism.  
Paul Taylor is a prominent advocate of non-anthropocentric ethical theory, and 
argues for biocentrism, a life-centered ethical position. The concept of 
biocentrism is central to predominant positions of environmental ethics, and 
constitutes a central idea also among the advocates of deep ecology (Næss 2009: 
264). In Taylor’s paper “The Ethics of Respect for Nature” (2009), he introduces 
what he calls the attitude of respect for nature. The core argument is that all 
individual living organisms – not merely the members of the human species – 
have value, simply by virtue of carrying the attribute of life. In a biocentric ethic, 
all living things are “appropriate objects of the attitude of respect and are 
accordingly regarded as entities possessing inherent worth” (Taylor 2009:76). 
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Thus, while by an anthropocentric ethic, an action is deemed right or wrong in 
accordance to favorability for human beings or consistency with human rights 
norms, by a biocentric ethic we are also obliged to respect individual plants and 
animals for their own sake, as they have a good on their own (Taylor 2009:74).  
Taylor has an Aristotelian perspective on the question of how such a “good on its 
own” among all living things should be understood. To him, the good of a non-
human organism can be thought of as “the full development of its biological 
powers. Its good is realized to the extent that it is strong and healthy” (Taylor 
2009:75). The moral worth of our actions, then, is to be determined in accordance 
with the consequences for the strength and healthiness of all biological entities.  
Taylor emphasizes the point, borrowed from ecological science, that all living 
things are interdependent in an “organically unified order whose balance and 
stability are necessary conditions for the realization of the good of its constituent 
biotic communities” (Taylor 2009:75). The biocentric outlook sees human beings 
as members of the earth’s community life, sharing a relationship to the earth that 
resembles that of other species. Like other species, we depend upon the balance 
and stability of earth’s various ecosystems for our existence (Taylor 2009:77). As 
Taylor sees it, our difference from other species consists of the fact that our own 
ecological dependence is not mutual – the planet would be fine without the 
existence of human beings (Taylor 2009:78).  
However, although Taylor’s ecological worldview is holistic, his theory is not an 
instance of ethical holism. On the significance of holism, Taylor remarks: 
Its ethical implications for our treatment of the natural environment lie entirely 
in the fact that our knowledge of these causal connections is an essential means 
to fulfilling the aims we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for 
nature (Taylor 2009:78) 
Thus, it is not within species, ecosystems or the earth as a whole that he places 
the core value of his environmental ethic, but within each individual living 
organism. Every such organism is “a teleological center of life” (Taylor 2009:78), 
and thus bears the mark of inherent worth. To Taylor, the conception of teleology 
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in every organism allows us to take the perspective of every such individual. 
Since each of them is a “unified system of goal-oriented activities directed 
toward their preservation and well-being” (Taylor 2009:79), we can take their 
perspective in the sense of knowing what they value, so to speak, and thus 
determine what is good or bad for that individual organism. This ability of taking 
the perspective of another organism also helps us to get rid of the idea of human 
superiority: While human qualities are good from a human standpoint, the 
abilities and qualities of a given organism are directed towards its own well-
being, and so are equally good from the perspective of that organism (Taylor 
2009: 80).  
The differences in value between human beings and other organisms, Taylor 
continues, is a question of merit. Merit, however, cannot constitute the basis of 
inherent worth, as this would entail a stratification of human beings based on 
their successfulness in a given society (Taylor 2009:81). Asserting that such a 
position would be as intolerable as it would be philosophically unjustifiable, 
Taylor continues by refuting the conception of man as superior to the rest of 
nature. When we assess our relation to other species from the point of view of the 
biocentric outlook, he insists, we will understand them and their ecological 
conditions and relationships, and discover “a deep sense of our kinship with them 
as fellow members of the Earth’s community of life” (Taylor 2009:83). 
Furthermore, if we take seriously the holistic worldview of the biocentric 
outlook, in which humans and nonhumans are interrelated in a unified whole of 
individual teleological centers of life striving for their own good, we will 
discover that we have a moral relation to these organisms. (Taylor 2009:83). The 
crux of Taylor’s argument is that if we take seriously the biocentric outlook (the 
picture of earth as an organic system with teleological life in every organism) and 
accordingly abandon the thought of human superiority, we simply will come to 
consider our non-human co-inhabitants as bearers of inherent worth.  
Taylor’s substitution of biocentrism for anthropocentric chauvinism follows this 
line of argument: Appreciating the basic findings of ecological science lets us 
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view nature as an organic whole in which organisms strive towards their own 
goals of well-being and strength. If we take this insight seriously, we will see that 
from the perspective of a given being, certain things are good and certain things 
are bad even for flowers and bacteria. We will also realize that these value 
judgments are as good as our own judgments about human goods and evils. The 
image of human superiority vanishes through our process of stepping out of our 
own perspective in order to see the world and its values from a neutral 
standpoint.  
From this perspective, it is not only humans that have inherent worth, but every 
individual living organism, simply in virtue of carrying the attribute of life. To 
Taylor, the inherent worth of every individual living organism is ready to be 
discovered once we rid ourselves of the misguided assumptions of human 
chauvinism. These assumptions are refuted by the findings of ecological science, 
findings which, according to Taylor, these would be “found acceptable by any 
rational and scientifically informed thinker who is fully “open” to the reality of 
the lives of nonhuman organisms” (Taylor 2009:83). Thus, in Taylor’s view, 
every rational thinker will accept the biocentric outlook, and anyone who accepts 
the biocentric outlook seriously will discover inherent value in non-human 
nature. That means that every rational thinker who does not currently appreciate 
the inherent worth of non-human organisms fails to do so simply by virtue of her 
being insufficiently “scientifically informed” about the findings of ecological 
science, or by virtue of not focusing on the individual organism. In short, 
biocentrism is the only rational ethic available.  
Taylor’s environmental ethic is an attempt to supply inherent value to non-human 
nature without applying strict moral rules and principles. The foundations of his 
theory are found in scientific principles of ecological science and the assertion of 
an intuitive moral reaction to these principles when they are taken seriously. 
From these sources, he is able to infer that the feature of life in a given organism 
is a token of inherent value. Taylor’s way of answering Routley’s challenge is to 
construe a life-centered ethical theory, combining the interrelatedness of our 
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ecosystems and its members with the teleological individuality of each single 
organism. Taylor picks out individual life as the bearer of intrinsic value, and 
builds his theory around this entity, backing it up with its relatedness to the rest of 
the living world. His contribution is illustrative of the foundationalist tendencies 
of environmental philosophy: It (1) conceives the environmental problem as an 
ethical problem, and construes (2) the ethical problem as a philosophical puzzle 
to be solved by way of argument. The solution of the puzzle (3) is accordingly 
presented as a “new ethic” – a set of foundational principles for questions of 
moral deliberation, ready for implementation into policy and normative 
regulation. The perspective free and neutral approach of philosophy ensures the 
universality of arguments, and removes the contingencies of species biases and 
human interests. In short, Taylor’s biocentrism corrects our misguided beliefs 
about value and morality by discovering the real distribution of value and moral 
worth. Although his biocentric position is opposed by other environmental 
philosophers, the conception of environmental philosophy as a detached moral 
guide is not unique to Paul Taylor.  
In contrast to Taylor’s individualistic biocentrism, many writers on environmental 
ethics take a more eco-oriented approach, finding the baseline of intrinsic value 
not in the individual organism, but in larger entities like ecosystems and natural 
communities. One such writer is J. Baird Callicott, a prominent advocate of Aldo 
Leopold’s writings. In his paper, “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land 
Ethic”, Callicott addresses the philosophical implications and presuppositions of 
Leopold’s land ethic, and accounts for a Darwinist theory of moral development. 
Callicott affirms Leopold’s view, supported by anthropological studies, that the 
“boundaries of the moral community are generally coextensive with the perceived 
boundaries of society” (Callicott 1989:80). He illustrates this view by referring to 
today’s global humanism as a “response to a perception […] that mankind 
worldwide is united into one society, one community” (Callicott 1989:81). To 
Callicott, the universal humanistic ethic is merely the presently last step in the 
process of extending our ethical boundaries by expanding our concepts of 
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community. The next step of this process is the conceptualization of land as a 
biotic community, and a corresponding ethical extension – the land ethic – in the 
collective cultural consciousness (Callicott 1989:83).  
In his “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics”, Callicott 
(2005:74-75) elaborates on what he calls the Darwin-Leopold ethical theory, and 
connects it to the Humean picture of morality as ultimately connected to 
sentiments. In support of Leopold’s land ethic, he asserts that although value is 
always grounded in human sentiments and thus anthropogenic, moral sentiments 
are in their nature “other-oriented”, and thus not anthropocentric, i.e. not directed 
only towards human beings. In reference to Leopold’s theory of ethical 
expansion, Callicott notes that we are now in a time where the whole of the earth 
has been included in our sentimental reach, allowing us to value the community 
of the planet as intrinsically valuable (Callicott 2005:75). The maxim of the land 
ethic reads:  
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1987:224-225) 
As Callicott notes, there is nothing in this maxim proposing a responsibility to or 
inherent value of individual natural entities. According to the land ethic, then, it 
is the consequences for the biotic community as a whole that determine the moral 
worth of our actions. This ethical holism, Callicott asserts, is consistent with the 
Darwinist picture of ethical development because it integrates the findings of 
ecological science. The ecological relationships within species and ecosystems, 
and not individual organisms, are ethically primary, since the latter depends on 
the former for its adaptive behavior and form (Callicott 1987:200). As a 
philosophical position, the land ethic of Leopold and Callicott supplies non-
human nature with intrinsic value, or “value in the philosophical sense” (Leopold 
1987:223), by virtue of the relationships within biotic communities that enables 
the existence of organisms. Given the primacy of the ecological relationships in 
nature, it is the whole of the biotic community, and not individual organisms, 
which has intrinsic value. As such, the land ethic constitutes an ecocentrism, 
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where the intrinsic value is located in the general ecological system rather than 
within its individual members. 
In contrast to Taylor’s biocentrism, the philosophical core of the land ethic is not 
the attribute of individual life, but the ecological primacy of the whole. The two 
philosophical theories, however, are far from antithetical: The aim of both 
theories is to provide a foundational environmental ethic that proscribes actions 
that undermines the wellbeing of non-human nature. The method of providing 
such an ethic is also strikingly similar: Both theories attempt to find a link 
between perspectives from ecology and the intrinsic value in non-human nature, 
thus providing us with a moral maxim that breaks with the doxas of human 
chauvinism without simply asserting groundless alternatives.  
As Callicott remarks, Leopold’s writings would be nothing “more than a fine 
nature book had its author not […] been a philosopher” (Callicott 1987:8). In 
other words, environmental philosophy is not about suggesting that non-human 
nature has value. It is about providing safe, neutral foundations for such value. 
Both Callicott’s land ethic and Taylor’s biocentrism approach this task through 
linking established knowledge from ecological science with ethical assertions, 
not about what we should value, but about the values we will discover. Taylor 
asserts that through accepting the biocentric outlook and being open to the 
uniqueness of individual non-human organisms, we will also discover their 
intrinsic value. Callicott’s foundational transition is parallel. He asserts that when 
we comprehend insights of ecological science – and its conception of the natural 
world as a biotic community – our ethical dispositions will turn ecocentric simply 
in virtue of better matching our new perception of community.  
In spite of these similarities, the conclusive maxims of Callicott and Taylor are 
sharply divergent. While Taylor applies the ecology-argument and concludes that 
only individuals can have intrinsic value, the land ethic takes the same road and 
ends with ethical holism. The difference lies in what we might call a foundational 
move – the argument by which a phenomenon becomes the foundation of a 
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theory. Ecological insights are central to both biocentrism and ecocentrism, but 
the way they are linked to ethical principles are different. Callicott’s foundational 
move is the implication of a Darwinian evolutionary theory about how ethical 
dispositions take form. This insight allows him to say that insofar as ecology’s 
insights are accepted, we will evolve to incorporate them in our ethical 
dispositions. The only natural incorporation of these insights has the form of a 
land ethic in which the biotic community has intrinsic value by virtue of its 
relations. Taylor, on the other hand, links ecological insights with biocentric 
principles through the notion of organic teleology and the ability to step outside 
our own perspective. Since all living organisms are a center of life with an aim, 
or a meaning, and since we are capable of taking this meaning into account, we 
will discover that all living organisms have intrinsic value in themselves.  
By applying a set of scientific insights as a starting point, and linking them with 
accounts of how human beings and values are composed, Taylor and Callicott 
aim to avoid empty axiomatic philosophical assertions. They both see their own 
arguments as placing fixed intrinsic value in non-human nature, and conceive 
such an establishment of fixed values as vital for the future well-being of non-
human nature.  
The common project of Callicott and Taylor is to replace the prevailing ethical 
convictions with non-anthropocentric convictions. This ambition, however, is 
also shared by activists, politicians and concerned citizens of our societies. What 
distinguishes Taylor and Callicott’s approach as environmental foundationalism 
is their attempt to replace our convictions by way of rational reconstruction of 
value, based on arguments that are not subject to opinion, human interests or 
subjective bias. In other words, they seek to tidy up the multifaceted debate about 
the location and distribution of value – a controversy of perspectives – with an 
ultimate perspective which settles the debate and provides basis for concrete 
prioritization. This project is the environmentalist version of philosophical 
foundationalism.   
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1.4 Environmental foundationalism without intrinsic 
value in nature 
In spite of the non-anthropocentric dominance within environmental philosophy, 
there are some foundationalist contributions that retain an anthropocentric basis. 
As we will see, the scope of foundationalism is not limited to the re-distribution 
of intrinsic value. In complete opposition to the non-anthropocentric ethics of 
biocentrism and ecocentrism, Bryan Norton (2005) introduces the concept of 
“weak anthropocentrism” as a theory of environmental ethics that leaves human 
beings as the locus of intrinsic value. Norton agrees with non-anthropocentrists 
that human preferences cannot reasonably stand as the only measure of moral 
worth. However, instead of extending our ethics to non-human nature by 
asserting intrinsic value in nature, Norton proposes that we rather extend the 
human locus of value so that it includes both human preferences and human 
ideals. In this view, we can assess the moral worth of actions on the basis of 
whether it is in accord with “the ideals which exist as elements in a worldview 
essential to determinations of considered preferences” (Norton 2005:83). Thus, 
while non-human nature is left only with instrumental value, its value can be 
instrumental both to human preferences, say to our desire to eat meat, and to an 
ideal, for example, of living in harmony with nature (Norton 2005:83). 
Maintaining that weak anthropocentrism can fill the same ethical role as non-
anthropocentrism, granted that we take human ideals and interests to be 
sufficiently long and broad, Norton argues that weak anthropocentrism is a more 
attractive philosophical position, since it avoids the complications of grounding 
the intrinsic value of non-human nature (Norton 2005:86).  
Norton seems to embrace what Routley denounced as human chauvinism, albeit 
expanding its contents. At first glance, his approach to environmental values is in 
stark opposition to that of Taylor and Callicott, as he takes non-human intrinsic 
value out of the equation. However, the intrinsicality of nature’s value is based, 
both in Leopold’s and Taylor’s views, on the adoption a certain worldview in 
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which natural objects, be it individual organisms or biotic communities, would be 
conceived as valuable in themselves. Norton points out that value can be 
determined by human worldviews, and there is nothing in his theory to suggest 
that this does not pertain to an ecological worldview. Rather, what Callicott and 
Taylor would call intrinsic or inherent value might coincide well with what 
Norton would call value by virtue of supporting an ecological worldview. For 
him, Taylor’s intrinsic nature is simply value that is instrumental to the 
intrinsically valuable ideals of a given worldview.  
Therefore, it seems that Norton manages to avoid the conceptual need for a new 
foundation of environmental ethics, while still meeting the requirement of 
providing an environmental ethic. He reframes the notion of value in nature to 
incorporate Routley’s demand to base ethics on something else than human 
desires and preferences, but without trying to ground it in non-human desires and 
preferences. His theory is philosophically anthropocentric, but practically open-
ended, since non-human nature is still prone to value-ascription with support 
from various worldviews. The logic of the argument resembles that of Callicott, 
whose “descriptive” approach to ethics makes a point of the tendency of today’s 
societies to be ethically engaged with non-human nature. Callicott appears to be 
saying that, given the adaptive nature of our ethical dispositions, the ecological 
worldview of today brings about intrinsic value in nature. Likewise, Norton could 
say that given the ecological worldview of today, and given the view that we 
should live in harmony with nature, non-human nature has value beyond our 
human desires and preferences. True, they depend on that particular (or some 
other) worldview for that value, but so does the intrinsic value upheld by 
Callicott, since his argument – the foundational move – depends on it. Callicott’s 
intrinsic value is only intrinsic insofar as it is intrinsic to someone. To Norton, 
this implies that it is this someone that carries intrinsic value, not the object that 
this someone values. As long as an object has value to something, then it is only 
this last something, the last point of the value-chain, that has value intrinsically.  
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Accordingly, the difference between Taylor’s and Callicott’s non-
anthropocentrism and Norton’s anthropocentrism seems to be a matter of 
definitions rather than of substance. Norton’s point is that his own way of 
defining value in nature is less demanding, and less philosophically complicated. 
The principle of theoretical parsimony leads Norton to favor the theory with the 
simplest and the fewest assumptions. However, the assumptions that Norton 
refutes are outnumbered by the ones he shares with Taylor and Callicott. The 
basic assumptions of philosophical foundationalism are equally present in all 
three theories. The difference is that instead of grounding environmental ethics 
through intrinsic value in nature, Norton finds its final justification in the intrinsic 
value of human ideals. However, both non-anthropocentrism and Norton’s weak 
anthropocentrism are grounded in a revision of intrinsic value. Taylor, Callicott 
and Norton all approach the field by redefining value in ways that incorporate 
non-human nature in our ethical dispositions. Although they offer quite different 
arguments for their theories, all three apply a foundationalist strategy to construe 
their environmental philosophy: They approach the environmental crisis by 
attempting to ground values in nature. As such, they express the foundationalist 
philosopher’s urge to do what ordinary people, politicians or activists cannot: To 
discover the perspective free locus of intrinsic value, so that we can make our 
environmental prioritization on solid, universal ground.  
In spite of their philosophical disagreements, these philosophers are all part of the 
foundationalist discourse on the environment. A basic premise of this discourse is 
the idea that the value of nature is something that philosophers can discover 
through rational reconstruction or argumentative reasoning. Following this 
premise, environmental foundationalists find it natural to treat values (in nature 
or otherwise) as an attribute that depends on philosophical justification. This is 
the logic behind Norton’s main argument: Revising anthropocentrism is 
preferable to replacing it with non-anthropocentrism, not because it is far from 
our current convictions, but because the philosophical grounding of non-
anthropocentrism is philosophically complicated. This illustrates how the 
 35 
preferability of a given ethical position is more or less unrelated to our 
established convictions and outlooks, and ultimately connected to the rules of 
justification and argument within the philosophical discourse. The question is not 
what we could agree on as a society, but for what we can provide the most solid 
philosophical foundation.   
1.5 The self-image of environmental foundationalism 
These attempts to answer Routley’s call for an environmental ethic, spanning 
from the late 70’s to the early 90’s, have certain common presuppositions that 
pervade the decade-long dispute within environmental philosophy. They share 
conceptions about what philosophy is, and in particular what role philosophy can 
play in our attempts to face the growing environmental challenges. The 
environmental foundationalist takes on the job of grounding the right values in 
the environmental debate through connecting these values to one or another 
metaethical or metaphysical axiom. This practice of value-grounding assumes a 
perspective-free access to the domain of moral value. These philosophers thus 
reaffirm the traditional role of the foundationalist philosopher, not merely 
through the application of philosophical arguments, but through a particular way 
of conceiving and approaching the problem at hand. The philosophical perception 
of, and approach to, the new environmental problem can arguably be summarized 
as follows:  
As environmental concerns become part of the public debate, philosophers 
acknowledge the problem, and start deliberating on how their own discipline can 
contribute. Since technical and political solutions are already available, but not 
popular, philosophers have an intuition that their own role in this must be one of 
providing philosophical backup to these solutions. These philosophers think that 
the best way to offer philosophical backup to environmental solutions is to take 
environmental values to a deeper level through grounding them in metaethical or 
otherwise philosophical principles. They aim to offer a way out of the 
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controversy of conflicting perspectives and opinions. Presenting neat and clear 
descriptions of which entities among non-human nature have intrinsic value, they 
hope that their theories will be somehow transform people’s opinion or common 
law. Arguably, however, the result of this approach to environmental issues is 
that the discourse of environmental foundationalism has become (with some 
exceptions) a continuous intra-disciplinary debate about the localization of value. 
Opposing philosophical theories and arguments are reflected in opposing 
environmentalist positions expressed through various “centrisms”.  
The practice of environmental foundationalism is based on the assumption that 
the truths and values that we embrace as a society have a “deeper level” which is 
prior and foundational to the contingent and shallow convictions that guide us in 
our daily, practical lives. This assumption amounts to what Kristian Bjørkdahl 
(2002) calls the vertical gaze of environmental ethics. Since Plato and his 
allegory of the cave, philosophers have taken the job of correcting our values and 
truths so as to align them with the real values and truths that are beyond the reach 
of ordinary people. Their aim is not merely to discover Truth and Goodness, but 
to enlighten the public and bring our opinions and convictions closer to the Truth 
and Morality that is available only to the privileged few. Although the 
environmental problem is, from the outset, a practical and concrete problem, 
environmental foundationalists aim to solve it by reference to the ahistorical and 
unbiased world of philosophical Truth. Perhaps it is this special access, and the 
assumption that such deep discoveries will move up the system and transform our 
convictions and practices, that amounts to the immodest self-image among 
certain environmental philosophers:  
So who can lift the world out of the environmental crisis? Everybody has to do 
what they can, but the most important and fundamental job falls to us 
philosophers. It is our job to dig up, expose to view, and subject to criticism the 
flawed ideas about the nature of nature, human nature, and the proper 
relationship between humans and nature that we have inherited from the past. 
[…] Being a world saver is a hard job. (Callicott 2010: 34-35) 
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There is no doubt about the commitment of Callicott and his fellow world savers. 
The question is, however, if their efforts have had the consequences they 
intended. Since the common presuppositions of environmental foundationalism 
leave room for different philosophical ideas and principles, different philosophers 
end at different conclusions on the question of values in non-human nature. As a 
consequence, the debate within environmental philosophy has tended to revolve 
around philosophical disagreements about where to place intrinsic value – 
whether it is in animals, ecosystems, parasites or in humans only. Arguably, a 
branch of philosophy which started with the ambition to contribute to society’s 
solution of environmental challenges has grown into a scholastic practice from 
which society has difficulties to profit on a practical level. The situation within 
this branch of environmental ethics thus conforms to John Dewey’s description of 
“ethical theory”:  
Ethical theory ever since has been singularly hypnotized by the notion that its 
business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme 
law. This is the common element among the diversity of theories. […] They 
have been able to dispute with one another only because of their common 
premise (Dewey 2004: 92-93) 
Like the theories that Dewey is criticizing, the various theories of environmental 
ethics have been chasing the one, final, intrinsic value in (or outside) nature, in 
order to supply us with the necessary foundations for univocal value judgments in 
environmental issues. Although such foundations have been suggested in many 
variations, environmental philosophy has – so far at least – failed to provide a 
unanimous philosophical position. This lack of unanimity may seem natural and 
insignificant, but poses a significant threat to a discipline which aims to 
overcome limitations of perspective. It challenges an axiom of environmental 
foundationalism – the assumption that there is a final answer to the question of 
value in nature.  
There are few indications that these philosophical platforms have made any 
significant contributions to the practical solution of environmental challenges. 
Arguably, this is partly due to the scholastic character of the texts in which they 
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are presented, as most such contributions seem to be written for a philosophically 
trained audience. The aim of contribution to the practical problem of the 
environment has become secondary to the aim of establishing philosophical 
consensus. The lack of philosophical influence on our practices, therefore, does 
not indicate a lack of environmental interest and concern in the public. An 
interest in environmental issues or environmental ethics does not, after all, 
necessarily involve an interest in philosophical propositions about intrinsic values 
in nature.  
1.6 A carte du jour of intrinsic values 
This chapter began with Richard Routley’s call for a new, environmental ethic 
that would be better suited to cope with the growing challenges of the planet’s 
resources and well-being. Forty years after his essay, much have changed in the 
social and political world, both generally and environmentally. Technology has 
offered solutions to many issues, and climate change has been put on the political 
agenda. Environmental foundationalists are still concerned with Routley’s 
challenge and his way of framing the problem
3
. The reason for this may be that 
philosophers agree with Routley on what a philosopher is, and on what a 
philosopher should spend her time doing. That may explain why the 
philosophical discourse on the environment, in spite of considerable changes in 
society, has not changed. From the perspective of philosophical foundationalism, 
philosophy is not parallel to technology, politics and public opinion, but 
foundational to it. They precede it, because they have the foundational and 
timeless advantage of an ahistorical perspective. The classical ahistorical 
endeavor in environmental ethics has been that of establishing an intrinsic value 
in nature, independent of perspective, political change and social circumstance, 
which can stand as an irreducible ground upon which our actions may always be 
                                              
3 See Samuelsson (2010); McShane (2007) 
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evaluated. Norton’s anthropocentric break with this position is a break only with 
the concrete principle applied to provide the demanded “new ethic”. The 
similarities outnumber the differences. The task is to ground values in nature, and 
this is still done by reference to an intrinsically valuable entity. A foundation is 
provided. The philosophers aim beyond the perspective of socially integrated 
human beings, beneath mere opinion, and into the perspective free, ahistorical 
domain of philosophical insight.  
Foundationalist philosophy aims to be foundational in two ways: First, it 
approaches its problems by going beyond practice and backing it up with 
philosophical authority. Second, it does this by asserting claims that are universal 
due to their “grounding” in universal insights about the world, human beings, or 
the real nature of nature. Applied philosophy grounds practice, and theoretical 
philosophy grounds applied philosophy. Foundationalist philosophy aims to work 
as a bridge between the eternal world of ideas, and the concrete problems of 
today’s society. In the case of environmental foundationalism, the bridge fails to 
reach the mainland.  
The perpetual theoretical level of the debate suggests that environmental 
foundationalism is far from attaining a solution to Routley’s challenge. The 
debate seems to have stagnated in the dead-end between common assumptions 
about philosophy and divergent intuitions about the nature of value and the value 
of nature. It has become a dead-end because the philosophers do not treat their 
intuitions as intuitions, but rather as truths which, in the manner of new scientific 
discoveries, should be accepted by all literate and informed human beings. Like 
the ethical theories criticized by Dewey, the diversity of environmental theories 
share common presuppositions that allow them to bounce back and forth in a 
seemingly perpetual debate about which version is the right one.  
It may also be the case that society’s demand for what philosophers have aim to 
supply is decreasing. After all, foundationalists do charge a lot for their thoughts. 
They require a reader that is ready to value whatever is declared by the 
 40 
philosopher to be intrinsically valuable. They require a reader that accepts 
philosophical authority without question, servilely acknowledging that the eternal 
and absolute is the arena for the few and privileged. It might be that most readers 
read not in order to discover the one Truth, but in order to experience other 
peoples’ perspectives on various subject matters, such as how we value or might 
value nature.  
In any case, the foundationalist approach appears to have had little of the 
intended effect on our shared convictions and practices. Arguably, the desire to 
go beneath and beyond the concreteness, contextuality and practical frameworks 
of our convictions, in order to change our practices, is an attempt to change 
practice by intentionally disregarding it. The abstract principles and universal 
arguments seem largely out of tune with the common convictions of our societies. 
This might be because people tend to be motivated by other kinds of sentences 
than philosophical ones, or simply because people tend not to read philosophical 
dissertations and articles. It might also be because people do not attribute to 
philosophers the authority and special access which they claim. The idea that an 
ethical system, discovered in the depths of philosophical inquiry, will transform 
our patterns of actions by itself seems outmoded and unrealistic.  
The image of a deeper, philosophical level of value and insight is the common 
assumption and driving force behind environmental foundationalism. As it turns 
out, this image seems to lead its subscribers in directions which do not serve their 
announced purposes. I suggest, therefore, that we leave this image behind. The 
remaining chapters of this thesis constitute an attempt to approach environmental 
ethics in terms of a non-hierarchical and anti-foundationalist perspective on 
knowledge, truth and morality. The following chapter opens with a discussion of 
a previous attempt to do just that, that of the anti-foundationalist perspective of 
environmental pragmatism.   
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2. Anti-foundationalism and environmental 
ethics 
2.1 Introduction  
The critical points raised in the preceding chapter are not new to environmental 
ethics. The core of foundational environmental ethics has been forcefully 
challenged by proponents of environmental pragmatism. They offer a forceful 
critique of theorized and foundationalist environmental ethics on the grounds that 
its debates have become “intramural” and void of practical impact. As 
pragmatists, they take as the first demand to environmental ethics that it 
addresses the environmental crisis on a practical, problem solving level. 
Suggesting that theoretical dogmatism is part of the problem rather than the 
solution, the environmental pragmatists seek an anti-foundationalist perspective 
on environmental ethics, and as such comprise a countermovement to the attempt 
to ground an environmental ethic in the concept of intrinsic value. In this chapter, 
I discuss the extent to which environmental pragmatism’s perspective breaks with 
the assumptions and tendencies of environmental foundationalism.  
The core argument of environmental pragmatism is that the foundationalist 
ambitions of environmental ethics delay the philosophical contribution to 
practical environmental solutions. This point amounts to a practical argument 
about how the discipline should best approach its aims. However, notable 
proponents of environmental pragmatism approach environmental ethics not only 
from a practical viewpoint, but also from a distinctively philosophical viewpoint. 
They argue substantively against the distinction between instrumental and 
intrinsic value, and reject the idea of establishing a particular “centrism”. As 
pragmatists, they emphasize the role of human experience in value formation. 
And according to environmental pragmatism, experience shows us that all value 
is interconnected with other values in a given context. Thus, there is no room for 
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one particular ethical intrinsic core to which other values might be instrumental. 
Through this insight, the environmental pragmatists substitute a theory of 
“multicentric pluralism” for the hierarchy of values within any given 
environmental “centrism”. From this perspective, the interrelations between 
human beings and other entities are an ontological precondition of our existence. 
Accordingly, the notion of the special, intrinsic value of certain entities is 
considered misguided. In its place, environmental pragmatists conceive the 
various relationships of our experience as bearers of value, since they are 
necessary constituents and preconditions of whatever entity we might value. 
Accordingly, environmental pragmatism offers an environmental ethic which 
ascribes value in nature, not by virtue of a special feature of certain entities, but 
by virtue of the interrelatedness of all entities.  
I argue that this perspective amounts to a theory which differs from 
environmental foundationalism in substance, but not in form. The metaphysical 
accounts of value borrowed from classical pragmatism amount to a “ground” for 
value in nature, and thereby a foundation for environmental ethics. Although the 
intention of these writers is to overcome the stagnation and scholasticism by 
returning to environmental practice, their arguments and conclusions fail to evade 
the language of foundationalism. They break with the monism of environmental 
centrisms, but not with the foundationalist approach of environmental 
foundationalism. Accordingly, environmental pragmatism relapses into the 
philosophical debate as merely another theoretical position.  
In this chapter, therefore, I turn to the writings of Richard Rorty for a perspective 
which breaks not only with moral monism, but with the whole discourse of 
foundationalist philosophy. While the environmental pragmatists reject moral 
monism and the distinction between intrinsicality and instrumentality, Rorty 
abandons the idea of theorizing value all together. Where environmental 
pragmatism retains the idea of value as something philosophers must sort out, 
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism leaves us no such sorting out to do, since it 
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abandons the idea of a foundational layer of value beneath the normative 
judgments of socially integrated human beings in a given context.  
From a Rortyan perspective, environmental ethics cannot reach beyond our 
vocabularies on the environment, since there is no vocabulary that is not just 
another vocabulary, with its own rules and standards of objectivity. Inasmuch as 
philosophers, be it foundationalists or pragmatists, aim at providing a general 
theory about values in order to underwrite or debunk evaluative claims, they 
mistake their own, contingent vocabulary for a privileged access to something 
that is “really out there”. An environmental anti-foundationalism would lead us 
away from the goal of discovering, sorting out and grounding values in nature. 
From this viewpoint, environmental pragmatism is not anti-foundationalist. I 
argue that its break with traditional foundationalism rather consists of substituting 
a different set of philosophical foundations. Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, on the 
other hand, opens up for a new, non-hierarchical way of approaching the topic of 
environmental ethics, one which might help us out of the discursive dead-lock.  
This chapter introduces the basic ideas of Rorty’s epistemological behaviorism, 
which amount to a perspective from which environmental foundationalism and 
environmental pragmatism are discussed. I do not offer a philosophical defense 
of Rorty’s writings, in the sense of arguing that they are sounder, more objective 
or more justified than their counterpart. Rather, I treat them as a new perspective 
which might take us in other, more fruitful directions. Rorty’s anti-
foundationalism is not a set of arguments that can be debated within the 
framework of foundationalism, but an attempt to abandon this very framework. 
The value of Rorty’s ideas is not considered in terms of their philosophical 
justification, but of their ability to suggest a more useful perspective on 
environmental ethics than that of environmental foundationalism and 
environmental pragmatism. Whether they can is the question of the entirety of 
this thesis. This chapter addresses that question by discussing the Rortyan break 
with the ideas which have not worked so far – the assumptions of philosophical 
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foundationalism. Taking this perspective into account, this chapter offers a 
Rortyan critique of the prevalent directions of environmental ethics.  
2.2 Environmental pragmatism and anti-foundationalism 
The pragmatist perspective on environmental ethics has gradually formed into a 
distinct alternative to the mainstream thinking of non-anthropocentrism. In 1996, 
Andrew Light and Erik Katz published their work Environmental Pragmatism, an 
anthology of texts constituting a new, pragmatic, perspective on environmental 
ethics. The impetus of this publication is the realization that although 
environmental philosophy has offered thorough theories of environmental value 
and our responsibility to nature, it seems to have had very little practical effect on 
practice and environmental policy. Light and Katz propose that in order to elevate 
its work from the philosophical institutes, environmental ethics must give up the 
search for philosophical certainty about values in nature, and redirect its attention 
towards specific and practical “problems of humanity’s relationship with the 
environment” (Light & Katz 1996:2).  
The anthology includes, and is partly inspired by, Anthony Weston’s paper 
“Beyond Intrinsic Value – Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics” (1996). In this 
paper, environmental ethics is conceived of as stymied in the pursuit of 
philosophical consensus on intrinsic value, and therefore incapable of 
contributing to practical solutions. Weston confronts the tendency in 
environmental ethics to “ground” environmental values by providing special 
justification to intrinsic value in nature. He argues that environmental ethics has 
adapted a highly specific and demanding notion of intrinsic value, carrying with 
it metaphysical abstractions and requirements of special justification to the degree 
that “non-anthropocentric environmental ethics may simply be impossible” 
(Weston 1996:291). As a starting point for environmental pragmatism, this 
practical concern about the efforts of environmental ethics has inspired a number 
of pragmatists to contribute to the field.  
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2.2.1 Pragmatism and the nature of value 
Anthony Weston is skeptical not only to intrinsic value in nature, but to the 
concept of intrinsic value as a whole. Adapting Dewey’s holistic value theory, he 
rejects the philosophical necessity of “final goods” towards which instrumental 
values must always aim. To Weston, all value is instrumentally connected in a 
“weblike way”, each value justifiable by reference to other values (Weston 
1996:293). In contradiction to theories of intrinsic value, this perspective 
conceives justification as circular. There is no ultimate, final reference value 
from which other values can achieve validity. According to Weston, the 
justification of a given value is about revealing “its organic place among our 
others” (1996:293), and so cannot be obtained by reference to some particular 
absolute value. Citing Dewey that the idea of something having value 
intrinsically is a groundless misinterpretation, Weston refutes the basic intuition 
of foundationalist environmental ethics as a misunderstanding of the concept of 
value.  
The rejection of intrinsic value makes the interconnectedness of value central to 
environmental pragmatism. Seemingly, this move lets Weston avoid the necessity 
of grounding value in nature, what Norton conceived of as an unnecessary 
philosophical detour. The difference between the two, however, is that Weston’s 
pragmatic argument does not merely exclude intrinsic value from non-human 
nature, but refutes the whole concept. Thus, while Norton depends on the 
intrinsic value of human beings as end-value for his theory of value in nature to 
work, Weston’s perspective contains no end-value foundation whatsoever. All 
value, that of human beings included, depends on its relationships with other 
entities and values.  
To reject the concept of intrinsic value is not merely to refute a value category. 
To Weston, it implies the positive affirmation of the instrumental, or 
interconnected, nature of all value. This redefinition of value is the basis for the 
contribution of pragmatism to environmental philosophy. All things that have 
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value, be it a human being or an ecosystem, do so by virtue of them being 
connected with other entities and values. As Weston notes in the abstract of his 
article,  
It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural 
environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, 
once the demand to establish intrinsic value is removed (Weston 1985: 321)  
Weston’s rejection of intrinsic value leaves him in a position to emphasize the 
essentially interdependent structure of values, an interdependency that devaluates 
any given “centrism” in environmental philosophy: if there cannot be one 
particular entity or group which holds intrinsic value, than no particular entity or 
group can have special ethical status. In other words, Weston’s effort to establish 
a non-anthropocentrism is based, not on a special value in nature, but on the 
absence of a special value in any entity.  
2.2.2 Pragmatism and the value of nature  
Weston’s refusal of a stable hierarchy of values renders the foundationalist 
project of localizing value in some particular feature of nature irrelevant. Instead, 
environmental pragmatism embraces moral plurism as a metaethical position. 
Kelly Parker (1996: 32) takes the basic ideas of pragmatism to engender a 
moderate moral pluralism, in which different ethical situations involve different 
entities and different goods, not always apt for philosophical categorization. 
Parker explains:  
[…] pluralism is a fact countered in experience. Value arises in a variety of 
relationships among differing parts of the experienced world. Each situation 
must be appraised on its own distinct terms (Parker 1996:33).  
To paraphrase Parker and Weston, the interconnectedness of values is revealed to 
us in experience, and does not leave room for any particular “centrism”. For 
Parker, this insight has implications for the role of environmental philosophers. 
As environmental ethicists, we are left with the task of balancing different goods 
and perspectives in each ethical situation, without being able to prioritize 
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between these on the basis on their intrinsic or instrumental value. As principles 
of priority, however, Parker proposes that we promote “the sustainability and 
diversity of experiences made possible by a course of action” (Parker 1996:32), 
whenever an ethical dilemma is faced.  
Although value is conceived as anthropogenic (“anthropometric” is Parker’s 
term), the focus on human experience does not make environmental pragmatism 
an anthropocentric ethic. Pragmatism is ethically pluralist, given the openness to 
the points of view and ethical loci in a given situation. The emphasis on human 
experience in environmental pragmatism springs from the idea that, although 
human experience is not the only locus of value, we cannot value that which we 
do not experience. According to Parker, therefore, value arises in the 
relationships of the experienced world (1996:33).  
According to Sandra B. Rosenthal and Rogene A. Buchholz (1996), this insight 
implies that pragmatism is an environmental ethic. Drawing on Dewey’s thoughts 
about experience, they argue that human beings are ecologically connected with 
the biological and cultural world, and that our development and growth involves 
a “deepening and expansion of perspective to include ever widening horizons of 
the cultural and natural worlds” (Rosenthal & Buchholz 1996:42). Since all parts 
of nature can constitute relational contexts of value, and since experience of 
value is about the “value ladenness of relational context within nature”, value in 
nature exists wherever our valuable experiences emerge or may emerge in a 
natural context (Rosenthal & Bochholz 1996:43). We cannot detach value in 
human beings from value in the environment, because it arises in the relation 
between the two, and never in the human subject alone. By conceiving value as 
an “emergent contextual property of situations” (Rosenthal & Buchholz 1996: 
44), Rosenthal and Buchholz seem to have established a new locus of the 
environmental ethic: Rather than locating value in natural entities or systems, like 
Taylor and Callicott, or in human beings, like Norton, pragmatism locates value 
in the relations between human beings and their environment. This conception 
undercuts the division between objects of intrinsic and instrumental value, 
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because all value arises in the relations between such objects, and not in any 
particular one of them. To Rosenthal and Buchholz, pragmatism is by itself an 
environmental ethic, because it regards human beings as always interconnected 
with their environment, and value as a property of these interconnections.  
In the above section I have described a line of thought which begins with the 
observation of practical impotence in environmental ethics and a rejection of the 
foundationalist project, and which ends with the establishment of a new locus of 
environmental value and thereby a new foundation for environmental ethics. The 
starting point of the environmental pragmatists is pragmatic: They perceive 
environmental philosophy to be disconnected from practice and overtly theorized 
as a discipline. They apply the pragmatic principle of directing the question “what 
difference does it make” towards the notion of intrinsic value, a concept that 
seemingly blocks the road for philosophy’s practical contribution. Up to this 
point, the environmental pragmatists maintain the practical, non-foundationalist 
perspective.  
However, when they reject the concept of intrinsic value in favor of pragmatic 
concept of value, it is not because the former makes no practical difference, but 
because they support a pragmatic theory of value. Using this theory of value, they 
argue that every value and act of valuation emerges in the interconnectedness of 
objects in a particular situation. Thus, values are located in the relationship rather 
than in the objects. In other words, the value of a human being is always 
simultaneously the value of the environment to which the human being is related. 
It seems, therefore, that by construing pragmatism as an environmental ethic, 
Rosenthal and Buchholz have answered Routley’s call, and delivered their own 
version of the new, environmental ethic.  
In fact, their version of an environmental ethic is arguably not significantly 
different from some of those discussed in the first chapter, where natural entities 
are ascribed intrinsic value on account of them being constitutive of the eco-
system. The novelty of Rosenthal and Buchholz’ theory consists in the relational 
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(rather than intrinsic) nature of the value in nature. Consequently, we may 
conceive this branch of environmental pragmatism as a version of foundationalist 
environmental ethics, rather than a break with it. The main foundationalist 
features that we saw in the first chapter are indeed present: A particular locus of 
value (relations in experienced nature) is backed up by a particular philosophical 
conception of what value, and nature, really is. The localization of value grounds 
an environmental ethic.  
From this perspective, Rosenthal and Buchholz share the self-image of the 
foundationalists: As philosophers, they aim to reach beyond mere perspective and 
contingent convictions, and discover the real value of nature. The role of 
environmental philosophers is to apply this knowledge to inform the public that 
nature really has value. With its passage from a practical starting point to 
axiomatic theory, environmental pragmatism resembles the very beginning of 
environmental ethics itself: Where Routley called for a solution to the 
environmental problem, Weston, Light and Katz call for a refocusing of 
environmental ethics towards the actual problem. And where Callicott, Taylor, 
Norton et.al respond by taking the environmental problem safely into the 
corridors of philosophy departments, Rosenthal and Buchholz foster this isolation 
by offering new theories and new foundations.  
It appears that although the environmental pragmatists have abandoned the 
project of establishing a “centrism”, they have not abandoned the ambitions of 
foundationalist philosophy. They share with foundationalist philosophers the 
assumption that philosophy can tell us something general about what human 
beings and values really are, and what this implies for our practices. Their 
distance from foundationalist philosophy does not concern the scope of 
philosophy, but amounts to a disagreement of which philosophical theory should 
be applied. Environmental pragmatism rejects the assumption that there are 
certain morally prior intrinsic values out there, and substitutes a theory that there 
are no such morally prior intrinsic values, only a web of interconnected values. 
The connection, however, between the metaethical value-theory and the ethical 
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implications professed is quite similar in both cases. Where foundationalist 
ethicists construe the intrinsic value of a given entity as foundational for 
environmentally ethical practice, the environmental pragmatists’ conception of 
value’s relational character serves the same purpose. Environmental 
foundationalism tells us that there is inherent value in nature, and environmental 
pragmatism tells us that there is value spread across the context and environment 
of all our actions.  
In these sections I have offered a description of environmental pragmatism in 
light of its motives and the consequences of its philosophical conceptions. 
Although the inspiration of environmental pragmatism is a reaction to the 
foundationalist self-conception within environmental ethics, we have seen that its 
counterarguments are directed to the particular foundations rather than at the way 
of practicing environmental ethics. Rather than offering an anti-foundationalist 
approach to environmental ethics, the environmental pragmatists propose an anti-
monist argument in the debate. Refusing to ground the value of some natural 
entities by virtue of a concept intrinsic value, environmental pragmatism grounds 
the value of all natural entities by virtue of a pluralist conception of 
interconnected value. The difference from foundationalism is not primarily about 
foundationalist presumptions, but the tendency to take one particular part of 
nature as its starting point. Metaphysical pluralism of values is still metaphysics.  
Environmental pragmatism fails to break free of the philosophical stagnation and 
isolation for which they criticize environmental ethics. It breaks with certain 
metaethical principles and their moral consequences, but not with the idea of 
construing metaethics as a foundation for moral consequences. This thesis aims 
for a perspective on environmental ethics which breaks not only with certain 
theories, but with the entire idea that a theory of value can provide an answer as 
to whether we should care about the environment. In the following, I turn to the 
anti-foundationalist writings of Richard Rorty for a perspective that may help us 
abandon the language of environmental foundationalism.  
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2.3 Richard Rorty’s anti-foundationalism 
The decade that saw the emergence of foundationalist environmental philosophy 
also saw the publication of Richard Rorty’s anti-representationalist magnum 
opus, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). In this book, Rorty frames the 
self-image of philosophical as that of a “tribunal of pure reason, upholding the 
claims of the rest of the culture” (Rorty 1979:4). To Rorty, the history of 
philosophy constitutes an attempt to replace religion as the domain in society 
where one “touched bottom”, and thus where the foundations of all other 
intellectual life could be discovered. Rorty conceives of traditional philosophy as 
a discipline with a foundational mandate: Through the discussion of eternal and 
inevitable problems, philosophy’s role is to endorse or debunk knowledge claims 
within science, religion and the humanities. As such, philosophy occupies a 
special and foundational position in society, positing a deeper and more primary 
insight than that of other disciplines. On the self-image of philosophy, Rorty 
comments:  
[…] it understands the foundations of knowledge, and it finds these foundations 
in the study of man-as-knower, of the “mental processes” or the “activity of 
representation” which make knowledge possible (Rorty 1979:3).  
Thus, while various different disciplines advance a diversity of different truths, 
these statements are all subject to, and dependent upon, a philosophical theory of 
what it really is for a statement to be true. In other words, they depend on a 
theory of knowledge. Since knowledge, on this view, is identical with accurate 
representation of the world, a theory of knowledge is identical with a theory of 
representation (Rorty 1979:3). Accordingly, philosophy’s conceived role in 
society is to offer a general theory of representation that allows us to “divide 
culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less 
well, and those which do not represent it at all” (Rorty 1979:3).  
To Rorty, this picture of philosophy has its sources in the writings of Descartes, 
and Kant. The foundationalist self-image of philosophy originates in the coupling 
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of the Cartesian idea about absolute truth through introspection with Kant’s idea 
that this truth shapes the possibilities of empirical knowledge (Rorty 1979:8-9). 
Taken together, these ideas create an arena for philosophy to occupy in which a 
priori truths, independent and prior to scientific knowledge, comprise the subject 
matter. Although he observes that the particular foundations embraced by 
philosophers have changed over the last centuries, Rorty maintains that the 
philosophical self-image has been persistent. The philosophical attempt to 
“escape from history” prevails, as philosophers are still working to provide 
eternal and universal foundations for our knowledge (Rorty 1979:3, 8-9).  
It is precisely this escape from history that Rorty wants to reverse. In this section, 
I will present Rorty’s perspective on philosophy and its foundationalist self-
image, and offer a Rortyan critique of environmental foundationalism. If we take 
his perspective, the project of foundationalist environmental ethics appears as an 
outmoded and uninteresting project, preoccupied with achieving consensus 
within its own vocabulary.   
2.3.1 From representation to conversation  
To Richard Rorty, philosophy’s self-image as foundational to society is traceable 
back to some fundamental concepts and assumptions in the history of philosophy. 
He conceives of modern epistemology as a result of the effort to establish 
philosophy as a unique discipline with its own subject in the study of knowledge. 
The core of epistemological philosophy is the assumption that at their best, our 
minds, thoughts and utterances are capable of mirroring nature. It is this 
representational gateway between our practical coping and the “real” world that 
gives philosophy its raison d’être, and which establishes philosophy as 
foundational to other disciplines. Since philosophy understands the foundations 
of knowledge and the activity of representation, it has a position from which 
knowledge claims from other disciplines are prone to affirmation or deflation 
(Rorty 1979: 3). All knowledge is subject to a general theory of knowledge, since 
such a theory sets out to determine what counts as knowledge. Analogously, all 
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values and ethical convictions are subject to a general theory of goodness which 
transcends expressions of contingent norms and egoistic purposes, and discover 
what it really is for something to be good or right (Rorty 1998a:171). Rorty gives 
Kant much of the credit for the philosophical foundationalism of the past 
centuries, inasmuch as he (1) provided philosophy with a priori certainty, (2) 
distinguished philosophy as a foundational science with access to the “formal” 
features of human life and (3) grounded morality in epistemology rather than in 
metaphysics. In short, Kant established for philosophers the position of a tribunal 
of pure reason from which all other human perspectives can be objectively 
measured (Rorty 1979: 139). This foundationalist self-image, writes Rorty, has 
been hard to shake off: 
[…] most philosophers have remained Kantian. Even when they claim to have 
“gone beyond” epistemology, they have agreed that philosophy is a discipline 
which takes as its study the “formal” or “structural” aspects of our beliefs, and 
that by examining these the philosopher serves the cultural function of keeping 
the other disciplines honest, limiting their claims to what can be properly 
“grounded”. (Rorty 1979:163) 
Epistemological philosophy and its foundational self-image are ultimately 
connected to the idea of accurate representation of the world, subscribing to the 
conception of knowledge as “mirroring” nature. In order to maintain its 
foundational position amongst other disciplines through “rational reconstruction” 
of knowledge, philosophy depends on a division between the contingent and the 
necessary. The idea of necessity is linked to the assumption that rationality, 
knowledge and morality are constrained by ahistorical rules (whether in the form 
of metaphysical objects or of transcendental principles) that are discoverable by 
philosophy as a universal framework for human actions and beliefs (Rorty 
1982:164-165). The distinction between the necessary and the contingent is 
parallel to that between “the given” and that which is “added by the mind”, and 
marks the line between science as the study of content; and philosophy as the 
study of formal epistemological structure – of how we come to know things 
(Rorty 1979:169,170). Epistemology accordingly puts philosophy in the position 
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to determine what we “may say”. If our assertions are justified by reference to 
accuracy of representation, and if philosophy has epistemological authority as the 
discipline that understands representation, then the justification of our assertions 
depends on philosophy.  
To Rorty, the attempt to find a point outside the web of beliefs, words or actions 
with which our assertions might correspond expresses what he calls “the 
philosophical urge” – the desire to escape the contingency of current practices, 
beliefs and morality, and reach the absolute bottom point of knowledge, the 
ahistorical and necessary constant in a world of contingency and change (Rorty 
1982:165). His epistemological behaviorism, however, inverts the picture. 
Drawing on Quine, Sellars and Wittgenstein, Rorty suggests that we see the 
acquisition of knowledge not as learning to represent the world correctly, but as 
learning the rules of a language game. If one accepts this perspective and see 
language, rather than experience, as the frame of knowledge, one will see 
justification as social rather than epistemological (Rorty 1979:170).  
Rather than perceiving epistemology as determining the justification of our social 
practices, this view frames epistemology’s assertions as dependent on what 
society lets it say. Epistemological behaviorism reinterprets the discipline of 
epistemology as “just the study of certain ways in which human beings interact” 
(Rorty 1979:175). Consequently, its concepts are reinterpreted as matters of 
social justification: The certainty of a statement is no longer a matter of accuracy 
of representation, but rather of social consent to its contents, and the necessity of 
a truth is simply an affirmation that no interesting alternatives have been voiced. 
Rorty sums up his perspective as follows: 
It is merely to say that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what 
we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our 
language so as to find some test other than coherence. (Rorty 1979:178) 
Rorty’s epistemological behaviorism is not a theoretical alternative to 
correspondence theory, and neither is it an attack on its basic concepts. It is 
simply the suggestion that we try to resist this urge, and refrain from looking for 
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justification outside society. Justification within society is still justification, and 
words like “true”, “certain” and “necessary” can still have meaning. However, 
these concepts are no more profound or foundational than other words. If we 
accept that justification is social, and that obtaining knowledge is about learning 
the rules of a language game, the concept of “grounding” becomes uninteresting. 
The grounding of some truth or value usually refers to giving it an objective 
status and thereby removing it from the domain of mere opinion. Rorty writes, on 
the concept of objectivity:   
[It] should be seen as conformity to the norms of justification (for assertions and 
for actions) we find about us […] and it becomes dubious and self-deceptive 
only when seen as something more than this – namely, as a way of obtaining 
access to something which “grounds” current practices in something else. Such a 
“ground” is thought to need no justification, because it has become so clearly 
and distinctly perceived as to count as a “philosophical justification”. (Rorty 
1979:361)  
The basic point for Rorty is that attempts to ground assertions, whether 
metaphysically or epistemologically, are never more than just another set of 
descriptions. What we conceive of as objective is simply what we currently agree 
to. To perceive objective inquiry as ahistorical grounding is mistaking the normal 
(what we accept) for the necessary (what we just have to accept because it is 
True). Furthermore, it presumes the commensurability of all statements in a given 
discourse. That is, it presumes that all propositions across various discourses are 
subject to a set of rules which constitute a common ground, whether by virtue of 
a metaphysical conception of “what really exists”, or of necessities of “what it 
really is to contribute in a discourse”. Such common ground makes it possible to 
provide justification across and between discourses, independently of the social 
context in which they occur, and thereby to solve potential conflicts and 
disagreements with reference to the outside of the discourse (Rorty 1979:316-
318).  
Rorty suggests that we abandon this search for common ground and give up on 
commensurability all together. He proposes that we substitute hermeneutics for 
epistemology, and a conversational perspective on discourse for an 
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epistemological one. The conversational conception of discourse is one in which 
speakers converse in hope of reaching agreement. Rather than indicating the 
existence of some common ground, this hope is simply the hope by different 
speakers with different backgrounds that the conversation ends well, without 
discursive constraints “save conversational ones” (Rorty 1982:165). Rorty 
combines the conversational view of discourse with the holistic conception that 
we cannot understand the parts of a discourse, or of a society, without an 
understanding of the whole, and vice versa (Rorty 1979:319). In this 
conversational conception of society, the epistemological division between 
commensurable (objective knowledge) and incommensurable (subjective 
opinion) is reframed as a hermeneutical division between two kinds of 
conversation: “Normal discourse”, in which speakers share some basic 
assumptions about how and with what to contribute to the conversation, and 
“abnormal discourse”, which arises when a speaker contributes without 
familiarity with these assumptions (Rorty 1979:320).  
In other words, Rorty reframes degree of objectivity, in all branches of society, as 
degree of familiarity. While epistemology conceives of society as a structure set 
on foundations, and agreement as possible by virtue of some common ground 
outside the given discourse, Rorty conceives of culture as a conversation in which 
agreement itself is the common ground. Nothing other than agreement within a 
vocabulary may constitute objectivity: 
[…] there is no way to step outside the various vocabularies we have employed 
and find a metavocabulary which somehow takes account of all possible 
vocabularies, all possible ways of feeling and judging. (Rorty 1989: xvi) 
The aim of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is to confront a tendency which 
Rorty conceives of as a potential threat to our cultures and societies. To him, the 
philosophical tendency to eternalize certain vocabularies as ahistorical and 
neutral vocabulary threatens to “freeze up” culture and consequently 
“dehumanize” us (Rorty 1979:377). He criticizes philosophy for constantly 
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approaching moral and existential questions with attempts to find new systematic 
objective truths that will stand as viable answers for all of time. Rorty writes:  
Since the time of Kant, it has become more and more apparent for 
nonphilosophers that a really professional philosopher can supply a 
philosophical foundation for just about anything. This is one reason why 
philosophers have, in the course of our century, become increasingly isolated 
from the rest of culture. Our proposals to guarantee this and clarify that have 
come to strike our fellow-intellectuals as merely comic. (Rorty 1982:169) 
In Rorty’s view, the extent to which a philosopher is an interesting participant in 
a given discourse is not a consequence of her epistemological insight into the real 
meaning of truth, value or morality. Rather, it depends on her familiarity with the 
topic and its historical background, one that may or may not seem relevant and 
prove useful as a contribution to a particular discourse (Rorty 1979:393).  
If it is the case that philosophers’ substitution of foundations for familiarity plays 
a part in its inability to influence the public, it is arguably germane for the 
practice of environmental ethics in particular. In the subsequent section, I will 
reconsider the perspectives of environmental foundationalism and environmental 
pragmatism in the light of Rorty’s anti-foundationalism. I argue that both 
environmental discourses construe their own contributions to the environmental 
discourse as “deeper” than non-philosophical contributions, and that neither 
breaks with the theorizing tendencies of foundationalist philosophy.  
2.3.2 Rorty and environmental foundationalism 
From the perspective of epistemological behaviorism and its conception of 
philosophy, the environmental theories presented in this thesis provide solid 
examples of a kind of philosophy it is time to abandon. If we do not see 
philosophy as a gateway to a deeper and more objective access to morality and 
truth, and if we abandon the conception of perspectives and vocabularies as 
something we may go beyond, then the efforts of environmental foundationalists 
seem futile and misguided. What Callicott, Taylor, Norton and other 
foundationalist ethicists have in common is exactly the assumption that 
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philosophy can bring us neutral insights about value and morality, and that the 
contextuality of norms and values can be overcome in a philosophical voyage 
beyond mere convention. This is the basic assumption, embraced by all of these 
philosophers, of the call for philosophy to provide a new ethic, and thereby to rise 
above the controversy of values and opinions in the public environmental 
discourse.  
Since such a new ethic cannot merely express the opinion of the philosopher, it is 
sought in objective inquiry into the concepts like value and human beings. As 
epistemologists (in the Rortyan sense), environmental foundationalists 
presuppose the commensurability of the various perspectives in the 
environmental debate, as well as their own unbiased access to the common 
ground to which these perspectives are subject. Just as epistemology presumes 
the dependency of knowledge on a philosophical theory of knowledge, 
environmental foundationalism presumes the dependency of environmental 
values on a philosophical theory about environmental values.  
In their confrontational approach to environmental values, foundationalists fail to 
see the conversational and social character of justification and objectivity. To the 
extent that they reach the coveted objectivity, this merely expresses the extent to 
which their theories are coherent with the “normal discourse” of their audience, 
the discourse of environmental foundationalism. Accordingly, while statements 
like “nature has intrinsic value” may be more or less objective within the 
discipline of environment ethics, depending on their conformity to intra-
discursive premises and assumptions, there is no universal reference point 
connecting the objectivity of this discourse to another, and thus to the public 
discourse of environmental debate.  
From a Rortyan viewpoint, the best environmental ethics can do is to challenge 
the normal discourse by introducing new perspectives that may or may not 
eventually become part of normal discourse. An obvious obstacle to this is the 
tendency to conceive moral justification as dependent on philosophical theory 
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rather than on social consensus. In their effort to establish justification for 
environmental values, the environmental foundationalists apply philosophical 
principles and arguments that are conceived as needless of justification 
themselves. Their theories, as efforts to justify or debunk the values of society by 
reference to philosophical theory, are themselves not socially justified outside 
their academic discourse. The failure to see this, and assuming that society, but 
not philosophy, needs justification, leads environmental foundationalism into the 
pitfall of epistemological arrogance.  
Another, related obstacle to the practical significance of environmental ethics is 
the fact that environmental foundationalists write as though other environmental 
philosophers were their intended audience. Although there are exceptions, most 
environmental foundationalists do not try to enter into conversation with the 
people whose practices they wish to change. On a hermeneutical conception of 
conversation, different parties converse with the hope of agreement. 
Environmental foundationalism, however, does not aim at such conversation, and 
thus has no reason to hope for broader agreement. In practice, the agreement 
sought by these philosophers is exclusively a philosophical one. Their conceived 
relation to the rest of culture is not conversational, but foundational. They do not 
seek to contribute to the conversation about environmental issues, but to go 
beneath it and thus to provide it with objectivity and certainty. In other words, 
environmental foundationalism seeks to inform our regular vocabularies with 
insights from a perspective free vocabulary of certainty and objectivity. 
To Rorty, words like necessity, objectivity and certainty refer agreement within a 
discourse, and do not apply to vocabularies themselves. There is no common 
reference point outside these different vocabularies that may tell us which one of 
them is more certain, true or morally elevated. That is because concepts like 
“true”, “certain” and “morally elevated” are always related to the vocabulary in 
which they are used. Accordingly, there is no truth, meaning or value outside the 
discourses that discuss value in nature. The basic assumptions of environmental 
ethics do not express universal, undoubtable truths. Like other assumptions, they 
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are part of a vocabulary which is contingent, of a language which could have 
been completely different.  
What environmental ethics could hope for is challenging the public discourse by 
offering abnormal descriptions, and hope that these would gradually move from 
discursive abnormalities to changes in normal discourse. This is exactly where 
environmental foundationalism fails. The case of foundationalist environmental 
ethics is a good example of how social justification works in practice: 
Environmental ethics may justify or assert this and that value, but as long as its 
principles and premises are not shared in our public vocabularies, it remains futile 
as a contribution to practical improvements.  
2.3.3 Rorty and environmental pragmatism 
The Rortyan insistence on breaking with foundationalist philosophy is explicitly 
shared by the environmental pragmatists. As we have seen, they set out to re-
focus environmental ethics towards the practical problems that motivated 
Routley’s call for a new ethic, and away from the theorized debate that followed 
it. Their shift of focus is manifested in a rejection of the distinction between 
intrinsic and instrumental value. This rejection, however, does not merely imply a 
pragmatic divorce from a concept which we have no use for, or from a term that 
complicates rather than ameliorates the debate. The environmental pragmatists 
seem to aim for a more substantial philosophical critique. They want to show us 
that there is really no such thing as an intrinsicality of values which distinguishes 
some values from others. They reject the distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental value by virtue of a metaphysical argument about the basic 
interconnectedness of human beings, nature, and value.  
In refusing to ground natural values with a concept of intrinsic value (or its 
conceptual division from other value types), environmental pragmatism retains a 
new metaethical framework from which an environmental ethic may arise. They 
discover that the negation of ethical intrinsicality indicates a universal 
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instrumentality of values: If no value is absolute and on its own, then all value is 
interconnected with its value-environment of natural and human entities. When 
the environmental pragmatists argue that intrinsic value does not exist, that it is 
the same as instrumental value, or even that all value is intrinsic – they, too, are 
telling us what value really is. The fundamental relatedness of value becomes a 
foundation for the ethical consideration of all things that are connected with what 
we experience.  
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, however, does not spring from insights about the 
wrongness of philosophical theories. It starts with the idea that if we conceive 
language as a tool rather than as a medium for mirroring reality, and knowledge 
as learning the rules of a given language, we will also conceive different 
languages, discourses, values and opinions as social phenomena rather than 
representational media. From this perspective, there is no point of view outside 
these languages and discourses, except from another language or discourse. Such 
an outside, a “view from nowhere”, is what is needed in order to provide 
commensurability across different vocabularies, and thus in order for one 
vocabulary to be “foundational” to another. To be foundational in this sense 
means to be able to give universal, discourse-independent evidence from the 
outside, to values or opinions that are held on the inside. It implies the ability to 
see something “as it really is”, extracted from all contingent beliefs, norms and 
conventions of regular discourse participants. To Rorty, this tendency is present 
in the writings of Plato, Kant, Habermas, and many other prominent 
philosophers. They see philosophy as in grasp of something universal and 
necessary, something with which one can disclose how things really are, or oblige 
all of mankind to a certain pattern of behavior. Environmental foundationalism 
shares this self-conception, and displays it in its attempts to solve the 
environmental problems by providing values to which we are all subject, or by 
proposing moral principles to which we would all consent if we act rationally. As 
for environmental pragmatism, although the imperative style is left out, the 
philosophical self-conception is the same. They seek to enlighten the 
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environmental debate by showing us how the world is really comprised, and what 
values really are. Rorty writes:  
To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing 
which nobody else knows so well would be to drop the notion that his voice 
always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the 
conversation. (Rorty 1979: 392) 
In the context of environmental ethics, this is the same as saying that 
philosophical statements about the intrinsicality, the interconnectedness or the 
pluralism of values are merely sets of descriptions capable of being accepted or 
rejected in the social contexts in which they are presented. The difference 
between such a philosophical statement and a statement such as “it is important to 
protect the environment”, is that the latter is presented as a statement, while the 
former are presented as necessary conditions to which such statements must 
subscribe in order to be justified. Thus, although we could consider 
environmental philosophy’s insights as contributions to a general discourse about 
the environment, such conversational contribution is not what it aims at. It aims 
at going beyond the conversation about the environment and resolving the debate 
by reference to its own, undebatable insights.  
2.3.4 Rorty and the limits of philosophy 
Rorty’s break with epistemological philosophy is an attempt to abandon the self-
conception of philosophy as a view from nowhere from which we may extract 
universal justification. His conversationalism leaves no special role for 
philosophy to occupy in society, since there is no privileged access to reality for it 
to retain. There is no view within a given discourse that can be given justification 
from the outside of that particular discourse. This does not imply, however, that 
every such view is as good as all other views. It implies that when opposed views 
in a discourse are confronted, we choose between them not by virtue of the 
philosophical principles to which they may conform, but by reference to their 
concrete and contextual advantages over each other (Rorty 1982:168).  
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Although it has been a frequent point of criticism, Rorty does not accept the 
charge of “relativism” and “subjectivism” as a characterization of his writings. 
To Rorty, these concepts presuppose the very philosophical dogmas he is trying 
to abandon. The distinctions between the subjective and objective opinions and 
values, between the finding and making of knowledge, between the relative and 
particular and the absolute and universal, are dichotomies which make sense 
within the vocabulary of metaphysics and epistemology, wherein there is 
something absolute that philosophers may discover and present as universal truths 
(Rorty 1999: xviii). Thus, the charge of relativism comes from within the very 
vocabulary which Rorty is asking that we stop using. As an ethnocentrist, 
acknowledging the inability to step outside of his own contingent vocabulary, 
Rorty cannot reply to such critique from any other place than within his own 
vocabulary, one within which these distinctions are abandoned.  
In this vocabulary, the connection between our beliefs, values and norms with an 
“outer world”, is not a representational, but causal relation. An outspoken 
Darwinist, Rorty acknowledges that the values and beliefs we hold are instances 
of the process of adapting and adjusting to the contingencies of the world which 
we inhabit. On this naturalist conception of knowledge and language, human 
beings are “complicated animals” rather than elevated beings in power of 
representing the world independently of interests and contingent discourses 
(Rorty 1998a:48). Our language, accordingly, is not a medium for representation 
of the world out there, but rather a tool for the facilitation of this adjustment and 
adaption. Philosophical language is no exception.  
Seeing language as tool use (Rorty 1999: xxiii) does not in itself rule out the 
potential significance of environmental ethics. Such ethics may be conceived 
simply as the attempt to provide a new vocabulary that better enables us to cope 
with some new features of the world we inhabit. The environmental philosophers, 
however, do not share this conversational description of what they do, and do not 
seek to offer a more efficient vocabulary. They seek to correct our values and 
beliefs towards conformity to principles, to a philosophical basis that should 
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serve as common ground for all views within the environmental discourse. They 
assume that customs, practices and norms of a particular society or discourse are 
subject to justification through the application of philosophical principles. With 
Rorty’s view on justification as a social phenomenon, this assumption is turned 
around, as the general theories of philosophy turn dependent upon the beliefs and 
values within the society which it addresses. The refusal of environmental 
foundationalism to take part in the environmental conversation leaves them little 
space to influence our practices.  
In this chapter, I have discussed some basic assumptions of environmental 
foundationalism and environmental pragmatism from the perspective of Richard 
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism. Referring to Rorty’s description of foundationalism 
as an attempt to dominate by virtue of philosophical authority, I have described 
environmental foundationalism as an attempt to circumvent public debate and 
difficult prioritization by grounding environmental values in unbiased 
philosophical principles. The assumption that our contingent values have a “real” 
counterpart on a deeper level, which can be discovered by way of rational 
reconstruction, becomes irrelevant if we conceive all vocabularies simply as 
vocabularies. If we do so, we might see that the interesting feature of the 
philosophical perspective on environmental ethics is not its special authority, but 
its failure to conceive itself as a discourse among other discourses.  
If it is the case that the environmental crisis can be solved by changes in our 
values and ethical convictions, it seems that we must seek elsewhere for the 
required inspiration. The next chapter discusses the relation of theory to social 
change with reference to Rorty and Stanley Fish, among others. I argue that the 
Rortyan conception of social justification challenges the belief in theory as an 
engine of social change. Therefore, the last part of the next chapter turns to other 
genres for inspiration towards environmental values.  
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3. Environmental ethics after Rorty 
3.1 Introduction: Nominalism and historism, criticism 
and change 
If we take Rorty’s anti-foundationalism into account, the task of attaining ethical 
and practical changes by way of philosophical foundations can be abandoned. 
This chapter is a discussion of how we can approach the matters of social change 
and moral progress without foundations.  
If we say that learning the rules of a given language, instead of correctly 
representing reality in itself, is the best description of what it is to attain 
knowledge about something, we are also saying that the rules of truth and 
goodness lie within such a language, and that no there is no knowledge or 
morality to be found on the outside. The world is indeed “out there”, but truth is 
not (Rorty 1989: 5). The world is out there in the sense that human beings have a 
world to which they strive to adapt through the use of various tools and patterns 
of action. Truth, however, does not relate to “the world”, but rather to sentences 
within a given language. Language is conceived of not as a medium of accurate 
representation of the world, but rather as a tool with which we equip ourselves in 
order to cope with the world.  
From Rorty’s viewpoint, the world may well cause us to hold beliefs once we 
have attained a given language, but it cannot help us decide which language to 
speak. This is the baseline of Rorty’s nominalism: Words refer not to physical 
objects in the world, but to other words and rules in a given language. His 
historicism is the conception of language as an historical contingency, as the 
result of long-lasting and continuous change in a culture’s habits of speaking 
(Rorty 1989:4-6). With this perspective, the idea of providing a new ethic on 
universal ground can be abandoned. Having left behind environmental 
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foundationalism, this chapter turns to the question of how we can approach 
environmental ethics without it.  
Whether a given sentence is true depends on the social rules of justification in the 
given vocabulary within which it is expressed. This perspective has consequences 
for how we conceive theory. As we have seen, philosophers are not distinguished 
by a privileged access to the world, but by the use of a certain vocabulary, one 
that differs from those used by the larger public. A mark of this vocabulary is that 
it generalizes “thin” and general concepts on the basis of “thick” and concrete 
opinions and values in society. Given the social character of justification, such 
“thin” generalizations will be accepted by a broader audience only if they 
expressed opinions and values which that audience already complies with. In this 
chapter, therefore, I argue that theories of environmental ethics are not efficient 
tools for attaining ethical change.  
To Rorty, change is not a matter of argument or discovery, but of redescription. It 
is about creating new ways of talking about ourselves and the world. Change is 
related to metaphorical, “abnormal” language use rather than argumentative 
exchanges within the rules of a given vocabulary. Accordingly, moral progress is 
not a matter of increasing our moral knowledge, but rather of extending the 
boundaries of loyalty by experiencing new kinds of suffering. The thin 
generalizations of ethical theory are not suited to offer such experiences. Rather, 
if literature has significance for moral progress, it is through the thick and 
detailed descriptions of narrative and poetic literature. This chapter, therefore, 
ends with a reading of the narrative writings of Aldo Leopold and the poetic 
writings of Wislawa Szymborska. Reading these as redescriptive efforts to 
increase our sensitivity and loyalties towards nonhuman nature, I argue in this 
chapter that our chance of attaining an environmental ethic depends on creative 
and narrative nature-writing rather than well-justified theories.    
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3.2 Metaphor, theory and social change  
In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty discusses the consequences for social 
criticism of accepting historicism and nominalism. The acknowledgement of the 
contingency of our language, leads him to turn away from concepts such as 
intrinsic nature or intrinsic value, not because they are invalid, but because they 
are expressions that “it would pay us not to use” and which have “caused us more 
trouble than it has been worth” (Rorty 1989:8). Drawing on Davidson’s and 
Wittgenstein’s concept of languages and vocabularies as tools, Rorty places the 
metaphor in the center of changes in social and intellectual history. 
Developments in science, politics and philosophy are not results of discovering 
the words which accurately represent reality, but rather of inventing new 
vocabularies which happen to do certain things better than the old tools we have 
available (Rorty 1989:19). A change in the history of language involves 
metaphorical language use, in the sense that words (noises and marks, in 
Davidson’s words) are used in an unfamiliar way, breaking with the literalness of 
normal discourse. Using a metaphor, in this sense, implies uttering something that 
has no place in the language game within which the conversation takes place 
(Rorty 1989:18). Rorty writes:  
Nietzschean history of culture, and Davidsonian philosophy of language, see 
language as we now see evolution, as new forms of life constantly killing off old 
forms – not to accomplish a higher purpose, but blindly (Rorty 1989:19, my 
italics) 
Given that a sentence without a place in a language game cannot be determined 
by the rules of that language game, the chance of it becoming a part of normal 
discourse depends on the general willingness in society to “savour it rather than 
spit it out” (Rorty 1989:18), and the degree to which it becomes a linguistic habit. 
There is no necessity connected to the acceptance of a given metaphor. The 
languages we use, and those we replace them with, are contingent.   
The metaphorical character of changes within politics, science and philosophy 
points to the fact that such changes do not come about as a result of new 
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hypotheses that are testable and affirmable by the audience of an existing 
vocabulary. Rather, they are the result of holistic alternatives to the ways of 
thinking which we currently practice (Rorty 1989:9). Rorty’s own 
“revolutionary” contribution to philosophy – the suggestion that we abandon the 
Platonist way of thinking about knowledge – is an example of a new vocabulary 
being proposed as a pragmatic suggestion about how we might do things 
differently, rather than an argumentative attack on the prevailing theories. There 
is nothing “before” language to which language must be adequate, and no 
criterion outside language according to which some ways of talking are better 
than others.  
If there is no point of reference outside a vocabulary except another vocabulary, 
there is no direction in scientific or political development towards a universal 
truth about intrinsic nature, and no a telos towards which history has always 
progressed. From this viewpoint, cultural, intellectual and political change is a 
contingent conversion from one vocabulary to another, from one tool to another, 
bringing about new and different possibilities for cultural and intellectual 
practices. Accordingly, the role of science and philosophy is not to address 
questions such as “are we currently describing the world as it really is” or “are 
our practices really morally right”, but rather pragmatic questions like “is our way 
of describing this subject matter as good as possible” and “are our practices as 
good as they can be, or may there be another way of doing things”. In other 
words, scientific, ethical and political inquiry is not directed towards reaching 
unconditional truth, but towards adjusting to our environments (Rorty 1999:72).  
In the sphere of ethics, this perspective lets us review the concept of morality as it 
is understood in the traditions of philosophical ethics and environmental 
foundationalism. The philosophical distinction of the conditional from the 
unconditional, and of the categorical from the hypothetical, clears the ground for 
an absolute distinction between morality and prudence, a distinction materialized 
in Kant’s moral philosophy (Kant 1997). For Rorty, however, the distinction 
between morality and prudence is parallel to the difference between normal and 
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abnormal discourse. While prudence expresses an ability to behave usefully and 
adaptively within familiar circumstances, the notion of morality appears 
whenever an unfamiliar situation arises which needs resolution. This difference is 
not a difference in kind, but rather in degree, since “there is no distinction in kind 
between what is useful and what is right” (Rorty 1999:73). Rorty paraphrases 
Dewey’s thoughts on this distinction as follows:  
[… ] philosophers who have sharply distinguished reason from experience, or 
morality from prudence, have tried to turn an important difference in degree into 
a difference of metaphysical kind. They have thereby constructed problems for 
themselves which are as insoluble as they are artificial (Rorty 1999:75) 
For Rorty, the ideas of a domain of pure morality to be investigated by the ethical 
theorist, and of a perspective-free vocabulary from which all other vocabularies 
may be evaluated, are of little practical use. From a nominalist perspective, the 
degree to which an ethical theory is objectively right is parallel to the degree to 
which it is trivial, that is, the degree to which we already hold the beliefs 
professed by it. Since there is no foundation or starting point for such ethical 
theory other than the actual intuitions in society, the former is informed by the 
latter, and not the other way around.  
This perspective amounts to a redescription of ethical theory. Rorty proposes that 
we replace the image of moral philosophy as providing independent support for 
convictions and intuitions with an image of philosophy as summarizing our 
shared convictions and intuitions (Rorty 1998a:171). Human rights, on this view, 
will not be conceived as a set of moral laws rationally deduced from a 
philosophically accessible domain of moral knowledge, but rather as a general 
summarization of the moral intuitions which are more or less common to the 
societies that embrace them. Rorty mentions John Rawls as an example of a 
philosopher who takes on such a summarizing role, noting that his principles of 
justice are presented as a theoretical generalization of the ethical intuitions which 
pervade in liberal democracies (Rorty 1998a:171). Although Rorty does not 
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embrace all aspects of Rawls’ theory4, it serves as an example of a theory that 
takes cultural and social intuitions and norms as a starting point. In his paper 
“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Rawls writes:  
[…] as a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide a 
publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modern democratic 
state. The social and historical conditions of such a state have their origins in the 
Wars of Religions following the Reformation and the subsequent development 
of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of constitutional government and 
the institutions of large industrial market economies. These conditions 
profoundly affect the requirements of a workable conception of political justice. 
(Rawls 1985:225) 
In Rortyan terms, what Rawls is describing in this paragraph is the social 
character of justification, and the contingency of the final vocabulary in which 
moral theories may attain such justification. Rawls’ theory, then, is an attempt to 
offer a useful summarization of the common convictions of modern democracies. 
Although these convictions are contingent, they make up the frame for social 
justification of ethical theory: 
We can regard these convictions as provisional fixed points which any 
conception of justice must account for if it is to be reasonable for us. We look, 
then, to our public political culture itself, including its main institutions and the 
historical traditions of their interpretation, as the shared fund of implicitly 
recognized basic ideas and principles (Rawls 1985: 228).  
In other words, ethical and political theory is not a matter of converting universal 
truths to cultural practice, but rather of creating summary redescriptions of the 
common convictions of our historically constituted cultures. Human rights and 
the basic freedoms of a liberal democracy are expressions of the culture in which 
they emerge. We do not owe the emergence of human rights to the existence of a 
universal human nature with certain intrinsic inviolable rights and freedoms. We 
owe it to the human rights culture which happened to grow out of the last century 
(Rorty 1998a:170). As generalizations of the common points of our moral 
intuitions, the human rights, as well as the difference principle, are dependent on 
                                              
4 Rorty rejects the Rawlsian original situation because it presupposes a choosing self even when all talents, values 
and beliefs are subtracted. See Rorty 1983:585 
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these intuitions, not the other way around. Such principles do not “ground” our 
moral intuitions by pointing to the universality of their basic presumptions, but 
are themselves “thin” concept abstractions of our current “thick” conceptions of 
rights and freedoms.  
The idea that providing concepts of justice is a matter of discovering some 
universal core across humanity is the common assumption of foundationalist 
philosophy. On this view, morality starts “thin” with some pre-lingual concept of 
justice, derived from the faculty of reason or some other depth. Although this 
pure moral insight is clouded and “thickened” by cultural contingencies, we may 
still discover the pure intuition through rational reconstruction. This is the basic 
idea behind Kantian moral philosophy, clearing the ground for a distinction 
between prudence and morality. However, if we accept Rorty’s application of 
Davidson’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language, in which there are no beliefs 
prior to the acquisition of a vocabulary, the idea of pre-lingual moral intuitions 
becomes irrelevant. As Michael Walzer puts it,  
Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it 
reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned to 
specific purposes. (Walzer 1994:4) 
If morality is thick from the beginning, there is nothing foundational about thin 
morality. Moral philosophy’s distinction between morality and prudence or 
between justice and loyalty, and its ability to ground and edify society, depends 
on its descriptions to be different in kind from, and ontologically prior to, the 
thick conceptions of society. If the thin and the thick are only distinguished by 
degree, and if the latter is primary to the former, then the difference prudence and 
morality, justice and loyalty becomes a matter of degree, and theory becomes 
secondary (Rorty 1997). Accordingly, moral philosophy’s role as supporter and 
edifier of our moral intuitions becomes vapid. If ethical theory is a kind of 
“thinning out” of these intuitions, it has no role in shaping them. This is why 
Stanley Fish concludes that theory cannot guide our practices:  
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Theory cannot guide practice because its rules and procedures are no more than 
generalizations from practice’s history (and from only a small piece of that 
history), and theory cannot reform practice because, rather than neutralizing 
interest, it begins and ends in interest and raises the imperatives of interest – of 
some local, particular, partisan project – to the status of universals. (Fish 
1989:321) 
Thus, just as theory cannot provide independent support for the human rights, 
neither has it taken part in their creation. Our human rights culture is not a 
consequence of an increase in “moral knowledge”, but rather of an increase in the 
degree to which the members of that culture have been exposed to the sufferings 
and poverty of other human beings. The distinctive characteristic of this culture is 
not that it gradually abandons group loyalty in favor of universal justice, but 
rather that its members are loyal to increasingly larger groups of human beings, 
as they see more and more differences between themselves and others as morally 
irrelevant (Rorty 1997).  
The advantage of this view on morality is that it becomes completely 
disconnected from metaphysics, and is no longer subject to questions like “do we 
really have these rights?” or “do we really have a responsibility to help people in 
need?” Such questions presuppose that our moral development is somehow 
determined by an increase in ahistorical moral knowledge, a kind of knowledge 
that lets us distinguish between moral truths that are unconditional, and those 
who are merely conventional, social constructions. To Rorty, however, there is 
nothing of which we speak that is not a so-called social construction. Insofar as 
we speak of it, it is always part of the social construction of a language (Rorty 
1999:84-85).  
To Rorty, theorists that seek to answer the above questions attempt to fuse the 
public, the common discourse based on shared assumptions and premises; and the 
private, the metaphysical and theological striving for perfection. Foundationalism 
aims at merging the private and the public by locating a common human nature to 
which they must both correspond. The philosopher who grounds political and 
moral assertions in metaphysical or otherwise ahistorical principles is 
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synthesizing the vocabularies of self-creation and justice, two distinct tools with 
distinct purposes, which in Rorty’s mind need to be kept apart (Rorty 1989: xiii-
xiv). Rawls has a similar view:  
Given the profound differences in belief and conceptions of the good at least 
since the Reformation, we must recognize that, just as questions of religious and 
moral doctrine, public agreement on the basic questions of philosophy cannot be 
obtained without the state’s infringement of basic liberties. Philosophy as the 
search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I 
believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice 
in a democratic society. (Rawls 1985:230) 
To paraphrase Rawls and Rorty, the philosophical search for perspective free 
metaphysical or metaethical insight is a private project of self-creation parallel to 
the search for religious truth. Justification within the public debate about values, 
responsibilities and moral convictions, is another matter:  
Rather, justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it 
must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and 
others publicly recognize as true […] (Rawls 1985:229) 
While the philosophical search for universal truth is a private project of self-
creation, justification within the public debate is a matter of reaching agreement 
upon commonly accepted premises. The failure to maintain this distinction is the 
common mistake of both the environmental foundationalists and environmental 
pragmatists discussed in this thesis. Their common flaw, from a Rortyan point of 
view, is to identify the discussion of whether and how we should change our 
practices, with the discussion of what value really is, and what really has value. 
The assumption by such philosophers that to answer the latter will solve the 
former leads them in directions that have turned out to be unfruitful.  
In modern liberal culture, writings and propositions that are part of the public 
domain take their starting point in the shared vocabulary and convictions of our 
community. Their potential for criticism is the ability to reveal failures of our 
institutions to live up to these convictions through argumentative exchange. The 
vocabulary of self-creation, on the other hand, “is necessarily private, unshared, 
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unsuited to argument” (Rorty 1989: xiv), because it involves the aim of re-
creating oneself by being critical of the shared convictions of society. A 
historicist’s criticism of one’s own society, however, affirms the contingency not 
only of the convictions of society, but also of her own criticism. Someone who is 
nominalist and historicist to this degree is what Rorty calls an “ironist”. A liberal 
ironist, the utopian character of Rorty’s modern liberal democracy, is an ironist 
for whom the hope for less cruelty and more solidarity is among the most central 
of her ungroundable convictions.  
For Rorty, there is no contradiction in realizing one’s own contingency and being 
willing to die for a cause one believes in. We can hold our human rights culture 
to be superior to other cultures, without claiming that it is closer than its 
alternatives to some universal human nature (Rorty 1998a:170). Maintaining 
one’s beliefs while abandoning their universality amounts to what Rorty calls 
“ethnocentrism” – we privilege our own group and our own final vocabularies, 
even though we accept that there is no justification for such privilege outside the 
final vocabulary itself (Rorty 1991:29). The realization that our convictions are 
part of a culturally and socially constituted vocabulary has no necessary 
consequences for whether we believe in them or not. The ironist, however, is 
characterized by a doubt as to whether she has been taught the best language, or 
whether she could have been a better human being with a different final 
vocabulary. But since there can be no critique of a final vocabulary except from 
another final vocabulary, or of a culture except from another culture, there is no 
“criterion of wrongness” by which this doubt might be settled (Rorty 1989:75). 
Thus, the ironist’s strive for a different vocabulary is directed towards new 
metaphors which may replace the old ones, rather than a vocabulary that is closer 
to something outside the reach of vocabularies.  
The reason why such ironist critique is not a public concern is that it implies the 
attempt to abandon the final vocabulary in which it would be expressed. On 
Rorty’s view, the effort to change one’s final vocabulary is not a theoretical 
process. To the ironist, philosophical theories express the thinnest possible 
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generalizations of the final vocabulary in which they emerge. As such, they are 
platitudes rather than moral intuitions, platitudes which will change whenever the 
actual final vocabulary has changed. Thus, while the metaphysician conceives the 
history of philosophy as a chain of new discoveries that have guided society 
towards what it is today, the ironist conceives it as a series of summaries of 
European cultural practices in different periods in of history. Redescription, 
rather than inference from accepted premises, is the method of change, because it 
aims towards making new vocabularies rather than working within one (Rorty 
1989:76-79).   
The relation between vocabularies and theories described in the above paragraphs 
lets us abandon theory as an instrument for social change. If theories are 
generalizations, and if there is nothing on the outside of our vocabularies that 
they may generalize, theory has no other option than summarizing our shared 
convictions and finding useful platitudes which we may all consent to. Social 
change is a matter of making new descriptions about ourselves and our 
relationships to others. Environmental ethics, however, strives for social change 
by offering theories about ourselves and our relationships to others. With the 
provision of a new ethics through metaphysical insights, they seek to ground 
solidarity in objectivity. This idea is turned on its head in Rorty’s writings. The 
conception of objectivity as the broadest possible agreement in society makes 
objectivity dependent on solidarity, not the other way around (Rorty 1991). To 
the degree that environmental foundationalists provide theoretical summaries of 
shared convictions, these convictions are shared in the highly limited final 
vocabulary of environmental philosophers themselves. In relation to the public 
their theories are, at best, summaries of a possible future of shared convictions. 
As theories, however, they have little effect in obtaining that possible future.  
An ethic, conceived as the convictions we share about what we should and should 
not do as a member of our society, cannot simply be provided. A philosophical 
theory about how we might act if we were different from today is simply a theory 
about how some imaginable people would act in our situation. The problem, of 
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course, is that although it is future possibility, we are not currently this other 
imaginable people. The emergence of environmental values and convictions is 
not a matter of decision, but of gradual cultural change through continuous 
redescription. Arguably, philosophical theory is not an efficient tool for such a 
task. The remaining parts of this chapter address the question of what tools we 
might put in its place.  
3.3 Moral progress and larger loyalty  
Although the Rortyan distinction between morality and prudence is one of 
degree, the distinction is still relevant for the conception of moral progress. Given 
that our moral self-conceptions are comprised, among other things, by the 
relationships in our families, acting out of family loyalty is not a matter of moral 
choice, but of simply acting naturally. The word “moral”, on the other hand, 
points to a demand or choice which does not come naturally, but which may 
require an extension of the boundaries of loyalty. Moral progress is about 
extending the limits of our moral selves, in the sense of including more and more 
people, and groups of people, into our domain of loyalty. From this viewpoint, 
moral progress is a process of increasing sensitivity and responsiveness towards 
wider and wider sympathy, rather than reaching higher and higher towards certain 
moral knowledge (Rorty 1999:79-82).  
At first glance, this conception of moral progress might seem somewhat similar 
to Callicott’s reading of Leopold’s “extension of ethics”. As we saw in chapter 
one, Leopold envisions a continuous extension of our ethical boundaries, and 
conceives the inclusion of the land as a natural next step. Callicott takes this 
image into the vocabulary of philosophy, claiming its validity through a theory of 
ethical convictions as adaptation to the ecological worldview. Although Rorty’s 
writings are indeed parallel, with regards to both the idea of extension and that of 
ethical adaptation, he does not share Callicott’s conception of how moral 
progress can be attained. The ethical extensions by which we have attained our 
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culture of human rights have not come about without by themselves. The idea of 
ethical extension as an adaptive process does not amount to a foundation by 
which our values and opinions achieve perspective free justification. Most 
importantly, the assertion of these concepts in a philosophical theory does not 
lead us towards environmental moral progress. As we will see at the end of this 
chapter, Rorty’s perspective lets us turn away from the theoretical assertions of 
Callicott’s philosophy, and return to the narrative writings of his protagonist Aldo 
Leopold.   
If we see moral progress as extending our sympathies and widening our circle of 
loyalty, we no longer need to justify or argue for moral progress by reference to 
universal standards. If the aim is to extend our loyalties rather than our 
knowledge about morality, it is sufficient to redescribe more and more 
differences between people as morally irrelevant. In many cases, certain cultural 
groups have identified themselves in terms of contradictions to other groups. It 
seems unrealistic to convince them to accept their enemies by virtue of the 
philosophical reference to a common “human nature”. Rather than finding the 
one universal commonality amongst all human beings, we can focus our attention 
of finding a variety of numerous, different commonalities between various groups 
of people, commonalities which may take the place of moral relevance from the 
differences which currently prevail (Rorty 1999:87).  
Similarly, most people do not experience deep commonality with plants and bees, 
and so have problems accepting moral commandments which presuppose such 
commonalities. The various “centrisms” of environmental philosophy resemble 
Kantian moral philosophy in their effort to find the locus of true value and 
thereby determine what we may or may not do by reference to this locus. Such 
“discoveries”, however, has no consequence for our inclinations to act in any 
particular way. Insofar as such theories are discoveries, they are discoveries of 
thin generalizations of our already shared moral convictions. This is why Rorty 
prefers Hume’s and Annette Baier’s perspective on morality and moral progress 
to the Kantian alternative. On this view, moral progress is a progress of 
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sentiments, a sentimental education aiming towards “an increasing ability to see 
the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the 
differences” (Rorty 1998a:181). If we substitute sympathy for rationality as the 
source of morality and moral progress, we can conceive our human rights culture 
as the result of a diversity of differences, such as skin color, sex, nationality and 
religion, becoming morally irrelevant as a result of our experience of 
commonalities in their place. From this perspective, we can conceive the moral 
progress of the last two centuries,  
[…] not as a period of deepening understanding of the nature of rationality or of 
morality, but rather as one in which there occurred an astonishingly rapid 
progress of sentiments, in which it has become much easier for us to be moved 
to action by sad and sentimental stories. (Rorty 1998a:185) 
Moral progress is not achieved through theories and descriptions of moral truth, 
values or the intrinsic nature of human beings. It cannot be implemented or 
proscribed by philosophers or other intellectuals. Rather, moral progress 
continues as long as we experience the sorrows of new groups of beings. 
Therefore, it has less to do with knowledge than it has to do with imagination, 
less to do with discovering facts than coming up with redescriptions which put 
people, things and relations in a new light (Rorty 1999:87-88). This is Rorty’s 
description of what feminists do when they try to overcome the 
“phallogocentrism” of institutions, of what Martin Luther King did when he 
fought racial segregation in the United States, and of what animal rights activists 
are currently doing when they advocate for animal rights. Such efforts are not a 
matter of renewing our use of words through philosophical or etymological 
analysis, but rather of cultural politics. They are attempts to modify the way we 
use certain words, descriptions or whole languages and to change our cultural 
practices by actualizing “hitherto-undreamt-of possibilities” (Rorty 1998a:208; 
2007:3). Surely, there are numerous historical examples, ranging from civil war 
rhetoric to Nazi propaganda, of redescriptions that lead us away from the liberal 
aim of a wider sympathy. Rorty is not saying that all redescriptions are means for 
moral progress. In a liberal democracy, the redescriptions which contribute to 
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moral progress are those who make us prone to include more people in our ethical 
considerations, and less prone to cruelty. In Rorty’s liberal utopia, the citizens are 
ironist enough to face the contingency of their own beliefs, but still committed to 
increasing solidarity and extension of loyalties. In such a society, redescriptions 
towards moral extension make up the cultural politics, and have replaced religion 
and representationalist philosophy as forces of redemption and solidarity. Ironists 
such as Rorty hope that through a continuous redescription of our society and 
ourselves in the light of different literary and political vocabularies and figures, 
we may become better as a society and as human beings.  
In the process of working towards an environmental ethic, the view of moral 
progress as a process of cultural politics – of redescriptions and exposure to the 
sorrows of others – is arguably preferable to the image of ethical change as 
philosophical discovery. If one accepts moral realism and a conception of moral 
progress as increased moral knowledge, the future of nonhuman nature is 
dependent, so to speak, of the yet-to-be-clarified question of whether there is an 
environmental ethic to be discovered. This question is what drives the debate 
within foundationalist environmental ethics, and explains why it is so important 
to locate some intrinsic value in nature that cannot be denied. Environmental 
philosophers fear that if nature is left only with instrumental value, it might be 
gradually replaced by other “instruments” and thus lose its value, potentially 
allowing for overconsumption and misuse of a philosophically defenseless 
nature.  
The application of moral realism within environmental ethics faces two 
significant challenges. First, the assumption of moral realism, and the consequent 
search for certain moral knowledge, will not work well for environmental ethics 
unless the “discovery” of environmental value is not more or less unanimous 
within the discourse of environmental philosophy itself. This is part of the reason 
why environmental philosophy has turned into an intrinsic-instrumental debate 
and stagnated within the discipline. The assumption that there is one “right 
answer” to the question of value in nature makes it crucial for philosophers that 
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all philosophers agree on it. Second, even a complete consensus of intrinsic value 
within environmental philosophy would be subject to social justification. Even if 
we were to accept the assumption of moral realism, we would still have to face 
the challenge that the public does not tend to act upon it. Since a philosophical 
consensus on a given theory is not likely to change our ethical dispositions, the 
broader, social justification of that theory is not to be expected unless we become, 
by other means, a culture whose shared convictions may be thinned down and 
generalized to precisely these principles.  
An advantage of the historicist conception of moral progress is that it lets us 
conceive the progress towards an environmental ethic as conceptually 
unproblematic, as there are no “philosophical problems” to be solved. From this 
viewpoint, there is no difference in kind between an anthropocentric ethic and an 
environmental ethic, and thus there is no ethical revolution which needs 
foundation from new philosophical discoveries. All that matters is that we keep 
extending our loyalties. Accordingly, we can say that although it is going slower 
than we hoped for, we have already begun this process.  
Nevertheless, it seems unsatisfying to passively wait for liberal democracy to 
continue its moral progress. The question is how, if not through theoretical 
achievements, we can speed up this process and contribute to moral progress 
towards the inclusion of nonhuman nature. In the following, I will discuss 
Rorty’s perspectives on literature (in both broad and narrow terms) as force of 
sentimental education, and on literary criticism as intellectual contribution to 
moral progress.  
3.4 From philosophical theory to literary criticism  
As we have seen, Rorty conceives of social change as a matter of new metaphors 
becoming normalized, and of new redescriptions changing the ways we conceive 
of the world and ourselves. Moral progress in a liberal society depends on such 
metaphors and redescriptions to challenge the limits of our ethical considerations 
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– the boundaries of our solidarity. From Rorty’s viewpoint, increasing such 
solidarity is not a matter of argumentative persuasion, or of obliterating 
prejudices about people different from us. Solidarity is not about general or 
universal commonalities. Rather, it is created by “increasing our sensitivity to the 
particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people” 
(Rorty 1989: xvi, my italics). Increasing one’s solidarity is a process by which the 
unfamiliar becomes familiar, and in which that which we once ignored becomes a 
natural part of our concern, as it takes part in our moral and social identities. The 
level of detail and particularity required to give such redescriptions their moral 
force lets us abandon any theoretical efforts at moral progress. In contrast to 
ethical theories, which are general and abstract, redescriptions with moral force 
are expressed within genres that are concrete and particular enough to tell stories 
rather than explaining. Thus, the genres of moral change are narrative rather than 
theoretical. Rorty writes:  
This is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalist’s 
report, the comic book, the docudrama, and especially, the novel. […] The novel, 
the movie and the TV program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon 
and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral change and progress. (Rorty 
1989: xvi) 
The moral force of narrative genres lies in their ability to show us the sufferings 
of people we have been oblivious to, or the cruelties which are imaginable within 
our own culture. To Rorty, the writers of such contributions, in the form of 
fictional movies, newspaper articles or novels, are “serving human liberty” (Rorty 
1989:145).  
Since they deal with cruelty and solidarity, these writers are examples of what 
Rorty calls public writers. They are contrasted with private writers such as Proust, 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who write towards private perfection rather than 
solidarity. It is the former group of writers that are interesting in this chapter. 
Although a writer like Nabokov, a pronounced aesthete, stylist and apolitical 
writer, claimed little interest in the genre of political literature, Rorty sees in 
Nabokov’s most famous novel a warning against cruelty: “The moral [of Lolita] 
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is not to keep one’s hands off little girls but to notice what one is doing, and in 
particular to notice what people are saying. For it might turn out […] that people 
are trying to tell you that they are suffering” (Rorty 1989:164). What matters to 
Rorty in this context is not the stylistic or aesthetic quality of the literature in 
itself, but the fact that such novels, like the ones of Orwell, turned out to make a 
difference in how we conceive others, our social institutions and ourselves. They 
make a difference for our future. These achievements are the not results of 
philosophical or political arguments rapped in the framework of a fictional work 
of art, or of revealing the truth as opposed to our common misconceptions. 
Rather, these works become influential as redescriptions which let us see and 
adapt to a new perspective on our culture (Rorty 1989:170-174). They have force 
not because they correspond better to reality than competing descriptions, but 
because people read and are affected by their redescriptions, thereby increasing 
the chances of turning their metaphors into new vocabularies. 
Redescription is also the proper term for what Rorty himself is doing when he 
provides us with readings of these novelists. When he interprets Nabokov, Orwell 
and Dickens as writing to increase our “ability to see more and more traditional 
differences […] as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to 
pain and humiliation” (Rorty 1989:192), he joins the competition with alternative, 
incompatible descriptions of the same works. While other readers will interpret 
these writers as expressing philosophical assertions about the nature of reality, 
Rorty reads them as embracing the contingency of language without giving up on 
solidarity. An example of this kind of redescriptive disagreement is James 
Conant’s critique of Rorty’s reading of Orwell. Conant (2005) maintains that 
Rorty’s reading in no way expresses the political and philosophical opinions of 
Orwell. To Rorty, however, the point is not to be true to what Orwell “really 
means” or what his writings are “really about”. Orwell’s writings can be 
described in a number of ways, and Rorty’s description is as interpretive and 
foundation-less as that of Conant himself. What matters to Rorty is the use to 
which we put Orwell’s writings, not the intentions with which they were written. 
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Conant wants Orwell to warn us against the dangers of abandoning objectivity. 
Rorty wants Orwell to warn us of the cruelties that we are capable of.  
Such efforts to redescribe our culture through comparisons of different figures, 
writers and vocabularies amounts to what Rorty calls literary criticism. This term 
is not meant to denote written literature as the sole subject matter of criticism, but 
expresses the adaptation of the tendency of literary critics (in a more literal sense) 
to compare and contextualize their readings, rather than the tendency of 
philosophers to de-contextualize and analyze. Literary criticism seeks to revise 
our final vocabularies, and thereby our moral identities, by seeing old things in 
new contexts, and new things in old contexts. To Rorty, literary criticism does for 
the ironist what philosophy does for the absolutist. While the latter criticizes and 
compares with reference to something outside the domain of criticism, the former 
has internalized the contingency of vocabularies and accepts the absence of a pre-
linguistic measure for all languages.  
As philosophy may be useful in a metaphysical culture which is in need of new 
theories, literary criticism is useful in an ironist culture in which one has doubts 
about one’s current vocabulary. Its usefulness is not a matter of epistemic 
authority or freedom from perspective, but rather a matter of having read more 
books than others – of having an “exceptionally large range of acquaintance” 
(Rorty 1989:80). To Rorty, such a critic can contribute to our moral progress by 
suggesting revisions of our canons of moral heroes and antagonists, and thus 
“facilitate moral reflection” (1989:82). Contrary to the philosophical role in 
moral progress as conceived by metaphysicians, ironist literary critics see no 
point in guiding the public towards specific moral principles, or in providing 
theories about morality. When they are expected to do that, the expectations are 
part of a metaphysical culture rather than ironist culture (Rorty 1989:82).  
Moral progress in an ironist culture depends not on the generalizations of 
philosophers, but rather on thick, concrete and detailed descriptions of cruelty 
and suffering. As theorizing philosophers, we are limited to conventional 
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summaries of cultural convictions or attempts at private perfection. Literary 
critics who take part in the public discourse by comparing and discussing 
literature, however, can play a constructive role in the moral progress of liberal 
democracies.  
In the case of environmental ethics, literary criticism has the significant 
advantage that it is arguably more in tune with public expectations than their 
philosophical counterpart. The isolation of environmental philosophy from the 
public discourse indicates that the willingness of the public to be dictated by 
philosophical doctrines is decreasing. As discussed in previous chapters, this gap 
might have several causes. One of these may be that environmental philosophers 
tend to emphasize as vital what Rorty conceives of as an unfortunate mixing of 
tools, namely to ground ethics in something else than our common convictions, 
either by reference to philosophical principles, or to the proposal of a new 
“ecological self” constructed to provoke the needed ethical revolution. To Rorty, 
this mix of private and public discourses is fruitless. We might hope that a more 
ecological conception of the self might emerge in the light of continuous 
redescription of our relationships to nonhuman nature. Offering a theory about it, 
however, bears little practical significance.  
3.5 Literature and environmental ethics 
From a Rortyan perspective on ethical change, we can say that to the degree that 
the environmental crisis is a matter of moral progress, narrative and poetic 
redescriptions have more potential as tools for its solution that do ethical theories. 
Nonanthropocentric foundationalist philosophers, such as Paul Taylor and J. 
Baird Callicott, conceive of the environmental problem as a moral problem, but 
arrive at a different conclusion due to their unwavering belief in the abilities of 
their own discipline. They conceive of environmental problems as matters to be 
solved through the direction of our moral progress towards species-neutral and 
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life-centered ethical convictions, and assume the domain for such direction to be 
objective argument through philosophical reasoning.  
The conjunction of these two premises – that the environmental problem is a 
moral problem and that philosophy can “solve” moral problems – makes up the 
framework of environmental foundationalism as it has been practiced for several 
decades. In this chapter I have challenged the latter premise by arguing along 
with Rorty that the only problems for philosophers to solve are philosophical 
ones. As a generalized, abstract and detached form of writing, philosophy is not 
an efficient tool for cultural change, but rather for general descriptions of our 
ethical status quo. Theory does not “ground” our culture, it summarizes it. 
Philosophy does not change our cultures practices, but describes them in a 
particular manner.  
However, the premise that the environmental problem is a matter of moral 
progress should not as quickly be discarded. If we conceive “an ethic” as the 
prevailing cultural convictions about moral considerability, then to call for a new 
ethic is simply to say that if we were to share ethical convictions in which 
nonhuman nature enjoyed sympathy and consideration, we would have more 
motivation for minimizing nature-hazardous practices. As conceived by Rorty, 
moral progress is a sentimental process of inclusion which comes about when we 
experience the suffering of new groups of beings, and accordingly disregard the 
differences between us and them as morally irrelevant. Progress is moral when it 
consists of an extension of the prevailing ethical boundaries.  
On this view, Bryan Norton’s (2005) suggestion that we can come to terms with 
the environmental problems without the moral inclusion of non-human nature, is 
a suggestion that we can solve it without moral progress. Norton dismisses the 
call for a new ethic due to the difficulties of providing its foundation (on his 
view, anthropocentric ethics is already firmly grounded). For an anti-
foundationalist, however, there is no such foundation to be found for any ethics, 
old or new. Moral progress is not a matter of foundations, but of contingent 
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changes in our moral considerations, susceptible to influence from a number of 
angles. The question worth considering here is whether there are ways in which 
literature may help us attain an environmental ethic. This means accepting, for 
the time being, the approach to the environmental problems as a moral problem.  
If we take Routley’s call for a new ethic as encouraging us to include new groups 
of entities and creatures in our moral circle of loyalty, there is no conflict with the 
Rortyan conception of moral progress. The latter, however, is not compatible 
with the call for philosophy to provide us with a new set of values and beliefs that 
are proven superior. As we have seen, the Humean conception of morality as 
sentimental rather than rational leads Rorty to emphasize creative and narrative 
writings as significant to moral progress. The emergence of our human rights 
culture, social welfare, gender equality and increasing sympathies towards 
animals, have little to do with theories about their intrinsic value, and more to do 
with new stories about groups which we previously did not know so well. 
Analogously, the possible emergence of an environmental ethic in our culture 
depends less on philosophical claims of intrinsic value in nature than on narrative 
and poetic redescriptions of nature that provoke feelings and sympathy.  
However, the moral inclusion of non-sentient nature differs from previous moral 
extensions in certain ways that may indicate a challenge. Human beings and 
animals differ from non-sentient beings in the sense that they have concrete 
suffering and pain that may easily be “experienced” by a complete stranger. A 
tree or a green leaf may be living creatures, but as we currently conceive of them, 
they have no pain or agony, and are indifferent to whether they live or die. In 
addition, a human stranger or a caged fox differ from entities such as “the 
environment” or “the ecosystem” in the sense that the former are concrete beings 
for which our actions can have concrete consequences, while the latter are 
abstract and complex concepts. The degree to which beings are singular, sentient 
and expressive of pain, together with their degree of similarity with us, appears to 
have significance for the facility of including them in our moral community.  
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As our culture conceives them, abstract concepts such as “the environment” 
express complex webs of relations between multitudes of beings, lacking both 
singularity and sentience. Apparently, we are far from identifying with such 
entities, and currently fail to recognize any environmental suffering which is not 
sustained by living and sentient victims of environmental degradation. In short, 
the environment is intellectually complicated and morally distant. The task of 
bringing us closer to an experience of suffering among non-human nature is a 
challenging, complicated and time-consuming process of redescription. 
Environmental philosophy has attempted to circumvent such conversational 
moral progress by dictating the values that would turn this picture around. 
However, since this project has had little success, I suggest that we relieve the 
foundationalists of their burden, and instead place it on the shoulders of poets – 
creative and narrative writers who use redescription and metaphor in order to 
open up to new ways of conceiving and talking about the world. In contrast to the 
philosophical approach to the subject matter, these poets have no conceptual 
shortcuts at their disposal.  
The complexity of our natural environment and its relative distance from our 
traditional ethical convictions pose a significant challenge to nature-writers who 
aim at its moral inclusion. To experience environmental suffering requires us to 
reduce the conceptual and ethical distance between ourselves and nonhuman 
nature. Arguably, we need descriptions of nature as less different and distant 
from us, and at the same time less indifferent to our maltreatment of it. In the 
following section, I will discuss some literary works which aim to redescribe 
sentient nature so as to enable us to identify with it and experience a kind of 
environmental suffering.  
3.5.1 Poetry and the sentient nature – Wislawa Szymborska 
The Polish poet Wislawa Szymborska received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 
1996, for "for poetry that with ironic precision allows the historical and 
biological context to come to light in fragments of human reality" (Nobel Prize 
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2014). Although her poetic oeuvre is multifaceted
5
, she has been particularly 
noted for her ability to describe and relate to non-human nature in ways that 
break with both common sense and convention. In several poems, Szymborska 
imagines entering into conversation and discussion with non-sentient creatures 
such as plants and stones, reflecting on the relationship between instances of 
“silent nature” and herself as a human being. In “The Silence of Plants”, she 
writes, on the impossible and yet necessary conversation with what we conceive 
as non-sentient nature:  
We wouldn’t lack for topics: we’ve got a lot in common / The same star keeps us 
in its reach / We cast shadows based on the same laws / We try to understand 
things, each in our own way / and what we don’t know brings us closer too. […] 
Talking with you is essential and impossible / Urgent in this hurried life / and 
postponed forever (Szymborska 1998: 269). 
The notion of an “essential” and “urgent”, and at the same time “impossible” 
conversation with nature inevitably brings associations to the environmental 
problems that threaten the existence of plants and their habitat. Szymborska’s 
focus in this poem is the relationship between us human beings and the non-
human nature which the speaker addresses. By accentuating the similarities 
between plants and herself, she attempts to engage in the very conversation which 
is deemed “impossible”, thereby blurring the line between the sentient and the 
non-sentient. The emphasis on such similarities and the shared world of 
conditions and premises may be read as an attempt to redescribe plant life as 
closer to human life than we currently conceive of it. In lines like “We try to 
understand things, each in our own way”, Szymborska aligns our conscious 
activity (“trying to understand”) with that of the plant, challenging the mark of 
sentience that divide living creatures into the categories of the conscious and 
unconscious. This line of thinking is not presented as a metaphysical assertion 
about the nature of plants. It is the result of maintaining a poetic uncertainty, and 
                                              
5 See Brodal 1999 
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an embracement of the phrase “I don’t know”. In her Nobel Lecture, Szymborska 
writes:  
The world – whatever we might think when we’re terrified by its vastness and 
our own impotence or when we’re embittered by its indifference to individual 
suffering, of people, animals, and perhaps even plants (for why are we so sure 
that plants feel no pain?), […] we just don’t know; whatever we might think of 
this measureless theater to which we’ve got reserved tickets, but tickets whose 
life span is laughably short, bounded as it is by two arbitrary dates; whatever else 
we might think of this world – it is astonishing. (Szymborska 1998: xvi) 
As I read it, this paragraph introduces some interesting themes that can be 
recognized in Szymborska’s poetry. One such theme is the insistence to refrain 
from knowing, expressed in her lecture as a virtue of great scientists and poets. 
Her description of this virtue is reminiscent of Rorty’s description of facing up to 
the contingency of culture by treating one’s convictions with irony instead of 
certainty. For both writers, this attitude is valuable, not as a general trait of our 
culture, but as a disposition amongst scientists and writers whose job it is to 
continuously come up with alternative ways of seeing the world. While the 
majority of a society’s inhabitants will normally embrace the truths and 
knowledge of the final vocabulary into which they have been socialized, ironists 
have their domain in the boundaries between this vocabulary and new 
vocabularies which they attempt to create (Rorty 1999: 87). Szymborska 
describes this attitude as “a continuous ‘I don’t know’”, and construes poetry as 
literature which may help us progress by looking away from our established 
truths and worldviews (Szymborska 1998: xiii-xiv).  
The notion of a continuous dissociation from knowledge tells us that Szymborska 
holds no belief in the epistemological abilities of poets. Even when new 
knowledge emerges in opposition old knowledge, the new insights are as worthy 
of poetic dissociation as the old ones. The point is not that knowledge should be 
questioned in order to come closer to the right knowledge. Rather, it seems that 
Szymborska embraces a view of knowledge and truth quite similar to that of 
Rorty – as something which could always have been different, and therefore as 
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always worthy of questioning. Her belief in poetry, therefore, lies in its ability to 
treat established truths – our final vocabularies – as replaceable. Both Rorty and 
Szymborska acknowledge the need for final vocabularies, given the practical 
implausibility of a fully ironized culture. Since they also acknowledge the 
contingencies of such vocabularies, however, they find it crucial that writers and 
intellectuals treat them, as well as the vocabularies they create themselves, with 
irony.  
As I read Szymborska, the potential force of poetry lies in the relation of this 
contingency to how we carry out and justify our practices. The ways in which we 
treat (or mistreat) non-human nature are determined by the desire to fulfill our 
human needs. Our shared ethical and scientific convictions are largely in 
concordance with these needs, allowing our conscience to go along with our 
anthropocentric practices. To Szymborska, however, there is no necessity tied to 
these convictions – they could have been different. Her rhetorical question “why 
are we so sure that plants feel no pain”, and her insistence on upholding the 
impossible conversation with them, portrays a worry about the practical 
consequences of treating plants the way we do. The ways in which we inhabit our 
environments are justified by the worldviews and values we treat as truths. For 
Szymborska, the environmental consequences of our practices indicate that our 
current truths and values may have better alternatives.  
Since all vocabularies could be different, the ones that appear to justify and 
engender environmental degradation are worth a second look. This perspective is 
evident in the quoted passage from “The Silence of Plants”. In the midst of a 
conversation with a creature which in our established worldviews has no place as 
converser, Szymborska treats this creature as a conscious being. She does not 
assert that it has consciousness, but acts as though it did. As I read this poem, it 
shows us that the impossibility of “talking” with plants – of including them in our 
moral community and treating them with sympathy – is an impossibility only in 
so far as it is so construed in our final vocabulary, the same vocabulary in which 
conversing with a plant is not a viable option. Szymborska’s conversation with 
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the plant breaks with this final vocabulary, thus constituting what Rorty would 
call a metaphor – a concept without literal meaning, without a “fixed place in a 
language game” (Rorty 1999:18).    
Although this reading might sound more Rortyan than Szymborskian, it 
exemplifies a way of relating to literature that emphasizes its potential for 
influencing our worldviews and ethical convictions. Like Rorty’s readings of 
Nabokov and Orwell, it illustrates literature’s ability to expose us to new kinds of 
suffering, and to bring to light the potential cruelties we are capable of. 
Szymborska’s writings do this by challenging our predominant descriptions of 
nature, not with a definite counter-description, but with descriptions which are 
open to the question of sentience and consciousness. It might be the case that 
plants have feelings, and we might be better off by treating them as though they 
did. If we did, then our current practices might be considered cruel, as they cause 
plants unnecessary suffering.  
These descriptions, however, are not useful as attempts to grasp Szymborska’s 
poetry. They do not give justice to the poem, or disclose the meaning of the 
poem, because, as metaphor, the poem has no meaning. For it to have meaning 
depends on whether it becomes part of our vocabulary as literal language use 
(Rorty 1999:18). This process, however, is not aided by attempts to theorize the 
meaning of the poem by paraphrasing them in familiar terms – since there is no 
synonym or paraphrase with which it corresponds. As literary critics, all we can 
do is to promote the works of Szymborska as valuable literature, as descriptions 
that could make a difference if we adapted some of them and substituted them for 
some other ones.  
Justyna Kostkowska, an ecofeminist and an advocate of Szymborska’s writings, 
agrees with much of the above description, and hails the poet for her 
redescriptions of nature. Reading the poem “Conversation with a Stone”, she 
emphasizes the construed equality between human and stone, and conceives the 
human being’s lack of a “sense of taking part” as an ignorance to the insights of 
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one’s own body (Kostkowska 2006:150). Not unlike “The Silence of Plants”, this 
poem explores the notion of sentience and consciousness among creatures we 
normally conceive as non-sentient and unconscious, and the deficiencies of our 
own knowledge of ourselves and the world. Kostkowska’s reading, however, 
differs quite sharply from the Rortyan reading presented above. Her view of the 
poem and its author is interestingly expressed in the following paragraph:  
I propose [an] integrating perspective, where Szymborska’s ecological ethics 
(view of humanity and other species as equal), her epistemology (questioning 
and non-hierarchical thinking), and her formal practice (irony, humour, dialogic 
form, decentering of the human point of view) all function together as 
consequential, logically interdependent elements of an underlying philosophical 
system. This system has its foundation in ecofeminist multicentrism 
(Kostkowska 2006:151, my italics) 
I agree with Kostkowska that Szymborska challenges the hierarchical convictions 
of human chauvinism. I also agree that she questions established truths, and that 
she does this by applying irony and dialogic form. I am not so certain, however, 
that these characteristics are proof that Szymborska subscribes to a certain “ethic” 
and a certain “epistemology”. To conceive these poetic features not simply as 
poetic features, but rather as manifestations of an “underlying philosophical 
system”, amounts to saying that the poems are expressions of a theory, rather than 
the other way around. Thus read, not only can the poem be paraphrased, but is 
itself a paraphrase of the theory upon which it is dependent. As paraphrase, the 
poem represents something – there is something which it “really means”. Thus 
read, the novelty and creativity of Szymborskas poetry consists of nothing more 
than finding new ways of saying what is already established. This is the reason 
why the poem, in Kostkowska’s view, is in need of a foundation. From this 
perspective, poetry is about aesthetics. Its role is to find beautiful ways of saying 
things which are discovered in the field of philosophical theory.  
Kostkowska acknowledges and maintains the reluctance towards certainty, order 
and system expressed in Szymborska’s poems, concluding that “we must resist 
the tendency to reduce al experience to a moral, and firmly oppose the artificial 
(i.e. unnatural) simplification of life” (Kostkowska 2006: 161). Kostkowska sees 
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this resistance as an expression of multicentrism – the concept that the world 
consists of a “multiplicity of centers and frames” (Kostkowska 2006: 156), a 
concept which she opposes to anthropocentrism as a more ecological starting 
point for ethics. However, there seems to be a slight conflict in Kostkowska’s 
text. On the one hand, she encourages resistance to order, system and simplicity. 
On the other, she construes that resistance as resting upon the foundations of the 
“philosophical system” of ecofeminism. Furthermore, the “simplification of life” 
which is seemingly ascribed to by non-ecofeminists is judged “artificial (i.e. 
unnatural)”. This indicates that Kostkowska and her fellow ecofeminist are not 
merely proposing an alternative view of ourselves and nature, but have indeed 
discovered that our current convictions are wrong. There is a natural way of 
describing and relating to nature, and its name is ecofeminist multicentrism.  
This way of thinking aligns Kostkowska’s writing with the environmental 
foundationalism discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. It implies that there is 
a way things really are, and construes philosophical theory as a window through 
which that reality can be revealed. The construed dependence of poetry upon 
theory is indicative of a philosophical self-image for which no assignment is too 
large, and for which theory has a central place in the evolution of society. I argue 
that theory has no such place, and that the relationship between of dependence 
between theory and poetry should be reversed. I suggest that we treat 
Szymborska’s poetry as metaphor rather than as representations of a theory, and 
her reluctance to certainty as a salute to poetry rather than an expression of 
philosophical multicentrism. That way, we may conceive of her poems as creative 
redescriptions of the world rather than corrections of our current worldviews, and 
salute them for their novelty rather than for their correctness.  
From a Rortyan perspective, Kostkowska’s conception of ecofeminist theory 
implies a mixing of tools which work best while kept separate. The writings of 
both Szymborska and Kostkowska convey descriptions which break with 
established convictions, and accordingly comply with what Rorty calls private 
language use (Rorty 1999: xiv). Szymborska’s writings constitute a poetic and 
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metaphoric proposal of a new vocabulary, rather than arguments within the old 
one. Kostkowska’s theoretical writings, however, claim validity as literal 
language use. When such validity is not obtainable within our current final 
vocabulary, she turns her critique towards the latter, deeming it “artificial” and 
“unnatural”, thus claiming some sort of undistorted knowledge of the real and the 
natural. To put it in Rortyan terms, this perspective resembles the attempt to 
“find a metavocabulary which somehow takes account of all possible 
vocabularies” (Rorty 1999: xvi). As contributions to the field of ecocentric 
theory, Kostkowska’s writings can obtain validity to the extent to which peers are 
in agreement about their conception about “the real” and “the natural”. As 
arguments within the public debate, however, her writings have little weight. As 
arguments which share no common ground with the convictions of the public, all 
she can do is argue that we should replace our convictions. The public, however, 
does not share the convictions behind such replacement. Arguments are instances 
of public vocabularies, which presuppose a common ground upon which to argue. 
An confrontational attack on the common ground of the vocabulary one is trying 
to change is therefore likely to be in vain. There is no metavocabulary from 
which one might determine the “natural” vocabularies from the “artificial”.  
The poet, on the other hand, has the advantage of not asking for validity. She 
does not attack our final vocabularies on common ground, but writes in order to 
invent new final vocabularies in which things might look different. Although 
poetry is private in the sense that it does not make sense as part of our existing 
language, it has the possibility of being taken up in habitual use, thereby 
replacing our final vocabulary with a new one. Thus, while argumentative 
critique is constrained to the frames of a given vocabulary, metaphorical poetry 
(in the Rortyan sense) is the act of creating new vocabularies. Theory and critique 
are ways of coping with the shared convictions within such vocabularies. To the 
extent that the environmental problem is an ethical problem, and to which its 
solution depends on a new ethic, ethical theory is at best an inefficient tool for the 
task at hand.  
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Ethical theories that are embraced by the public are not thusly received because 
of their universal validity or philosophical authority, but because they are good 
expressions of the convictions we already hold. The contributions within 
environmental foundationalism are good examples of theories which lack such a 
relation to shared convictions. As private and intra-disciplinary writings, they fail 
to contribute to the public debate altogether. Whether they are accepted, declined 
or ignored by the public, ethical summaries are not likely to bring about new 
public convictions. The metaphorical character of Szymborskas Poetry, on the 
other hand, opens up the possibility of new vocabularies and perspectives in 
which different convictions might emerge.   
3.5.2 The vocabulary of the land – Leopold as poet 
In the introduction to A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There, 
Robert Finch asserts that if Leopold had stopped after the nature-descriptive 
essays of the book’s part 1, it would have been “a slim, minor classic of graceful 
and perceptive natural-history narratives” (Finch 1987: xix). I would like to 
extend this proposition by saying that if Leopold had stopped just before the 
introduction of his philosophical theory of the Land Ethic, his writings could be 
read as narrative redescriptions of nature rather than as mere illustrations and 
arguments for a philosophical position called “the land ethic”.  
Evidently, not all readers of Leopold consider him a theoretical ethicist with a 
preference for aesthetic illustrations
6
. However, the way his writings have been 
incorporated in the field of environmental ethics, notably by J. Baird Callicott, 
indicates a perspective for which nature-narratives are nice enough, but for which 
what really matters is the philosophical discovery that gives them ethical force. 
When Callicott takes on the task of elaborating and advocating the insights of 
Leopold, his project appears to be one of compensating for the philosophical 
shortcomings of A Sand County Almanac. He observes that in spite of the 
                                              
6 See Paul 1992 
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appearance of mere “miscellany”, the book does indeed embody a “distilled 
essence” which, due to the lack of philosophical training, is expressed as 
descriptions and illustrations rather than pure philosophical arguments (Callicott 
1989: 5). On Callicott’s reading, Leopold’s narrative descriptions are a 
“thoughtful amateur’s” layman attempts to express a philosophical idea for which 
he lacks the proper language: 
[…] precisely because Leopold’s acquaintance with the history and methods of 
philosophy was only that of a roundly educated gentleman, the metaphysical and 
axiological implications of ecology are incompletely expressed in his literary 
legacy, however true his insights. […] I wanted to flesh out the arguments which 
Leopold himself only evoked and to connect his ideas, especially his ethical 
ideas, with antecedents in the history of Western philosophy echoing his rich 
literary allusions. (Callicott 1989:5-6) 
Although Callicott champions Leopold’s ideas as insightful and valuable, he 
fears that the literary and unsystematic “miscellany” through which they are 
expressed will sabotage their significance as environmental critique. To Callicott, 
it seems, literary description is an unnecessary detour and a complication of what 
could be kept quite simple and clear. Because he is himself more than acquainted 
with the “history and methods of philosophy”, however, he can achieve the 
influence which the Almanac cannot attain on its own. Callicott’s project, 
therefore, is to purify Leopold’s position in philosophical terms, by substituting 
the contextual and narrative focus with philosophical arguments and validity 
claims.  
In this point, there is an evident parallel between the thoughts Callicott and 
Justyna Kostkowska. Both engage with literary works as though they were codes 
to be deciphered, or as though they were clumsy ways of stating what the 
philosopher could simply assert. Callicott confirms the foundationalist’s belief in 
theory when he announces that his project is “to build, from the ground up, new 
ethical (and metaphysical) paradigms” (Callicott 1989: 4). His own ethical 
paradigm is a theory in which Leopold’s land ethic is construed as an 
“ecocentrism” in which the value of singular entities are determined according to 
their relation to the whole of the ecosystem (Callicott 1989:28). The 
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philosophical elaborations of Leopold’s insights, then, amount to a systematic 
ecocentric theory in which all value is neatly ordered and categorized, seemingly 
ready for political ratification and popular acceptance. Callicott has spent several 
decades arguing for this theory in books, articles, debates and lectures. In this 
thesis I will leave most of his work uncommented, but simply remark the 
following: Although Callicott has been successful in building his new paradigm 
and spreading it across philosophy departments in many countries, very few 
people in the Western world have come to consider the value of persons, animals 
and other creatures as determined by virtue of their place in an ecological system. 
We have not seen a global shift of societies becoming ecocentric. Arguably, 
although he would sharply disagree, Callicott serves as a good example of 
theory’s lacking connection with social change. Because Callicott’s reading of 
The Sand County Almanac is just one amongst many, however, the case is not as 
grim for Aldo Leopold’s writings.  
Leopold’s advantage over Callicott (apart from the fact that his book has sold 
over two millions copies
7
) is similar to that of Szymborska’s over Kostkowska. 
Like Szymborska, he is concerned about the state of the planet, and troubled by 
the tendency to ignore such concerns in our craving for the bigger and the better. 
They both take the environmental problem (although none of them use this word 
in their creative writings) to be, at least partly, an ethical problem, and hope that a 
change in ethical perspective can be part of the solution. Lastly, they both hope 
that their writings can open up the mind of the reader to new ways of conceiving 
of nature, and to perspectives from which our current practices appear 
unreasonable and unwarranted.  
Unlike Kostkowska and Callicott, however, they do not present their descriptions 
as arguments and theories for which they claim validity. Leopold’s more 
“logical” essays in part 3 of his book are not presented as theoretical foundations 
of his literature, but rather as “some of the ideas whereby we dissenters 
                                              
7 See The Leopold Foundation (2014) 
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rationalize our dissent” (Leopold 1987: viii). This dissent, furthermore, is not 
presented as the outcome of some special insight or idea, but simply refers to the 
mindset of those who cannot “live without wild things” (Leopold 1987: vii). 
Leopold’s perspective stands sharply in contrast to that of his most eager 
advocate. While Callicott aims at the universal and absolute, and construes theory 
as the foundation of practices and literature, Leopold conceives his own theories 
as attempts to rationalize his dispositions and desires. In Rorty’s words, they are 
summarizations of the thick, detailed and integrated perspective of his nature 
writing. Whereas Callicott aims to solve the environmental crisis with 
philosophical method and argument, Leopold wonders whether “a shift of values 
can be achieved by reappraising things unnatural, tame and confined in terms of 
things natural, wild and free” (Leopold 1987: ix). Callicott prescribes values. 
Leopold offers redescriptions.  
Arguably, the most interesting redescriptions in A Sand County Almanac are 
those for which Callicott shows the least interest. In the first part of his book (the 
actual “almanac”), Leopold offers narratives descriptions which promote new and 
unfamiliar perspectives on nature. They constitute an attempt to further a 
“reappraising” of nature by which our values and convictions might change. The 
snow in January, for example, “falls in order that mice may build subways from 
stack to stack”, and “melts in order that hawks may again catch mice” (Leopold 
1987:4). In his little narratives about various animals and processes in nature, 
Leopold opens up perspectives and descriptions that are absent in the modern 
city. He fears that our modern world of greed and growth-fixation brings us out 
of tune with nature, and attempts to reintroduce the perspectives that have 
become lost in such a world:  
There are two spiritual dangers in not owning a farm. One is the danger of 
supposing that breakfast comes from the grocery, and the other that heat comes 
from the furnace. (Leopold 1987: 6)  
The spiritual danger he is talking about is our increasing tendency to distance 
ourselves from nature and the land, and to isolate ourselves in communities 
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exclusively for human beings. Leopold tries to compensate for this distance, for 
instance by writing extensively about the history behind every growth ring that 
appears when cutting a giant oak tree into firewood. He introduces us to the life 
and history that can be seen in nature, if one looks closely: “[…] he who owns a 
veteran bur oak owns more than a tree. He owns a historical library, and a 
reserved seat in the theater of evolution” (Leopold 1987: 30).  
The almanac is an invitation to reconnect with the detailed narratives by which 
nature can be conceived, but which are increasingly losing ground in the hasty 
consumer’s life of urban modernity. Without the perspective of the land, nature is 
reduced to objects of utility. Leopold’s aim is to offer descriptions of nature and 
ourselves, and ways of relating to nature, which might shift our focus and alter 
our dispositions. In the second part of the book, Leopold combines such nature-
narratives with stories of short-sighted and voracious human cultivation, 
illustrating the consequences of ecological ignorance and narrow-minded 
extension. In “Wisconsin”, a detailed and enthusiastic story of the march of the 
cranes is gradually interrupted by the story of how politicians and industrialists 
sabotage this habitat by adapting the land to human needs (Leopold 1987: 96-
101). The shift between Part 1 and Part 2 introduces a transition from descriptive 
nature-narrative to social and political criticism, without, however, leaving the 
narrative perspective.  
The three-part structure of Leopold’s book is interesting in the sense that it 
illustrates the significance that narratives and new descriptions can have for 
ethical changes. The first part can be read as the attempt to establish a new 
vocabulary – a land vocabulary – a way of seeing and describing the world in 
which the perspectives of the mouse, moose, geese and cranes are part of our 
narratives. In the second part of the book, human practices and their 
consequences are narratively redescribed, within this new vocabulary, as causes 
of ecological harm. In other essays, the vocabulary sheds new light on human 
discourse practices which, although they are not directly harmful, serve to 
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maintain the narrow perspective on nature which justifies ecological mistreatment 
(Leopold 1987: 153).  
Part three, consisting of diverse essays in which the narrative tone and 
perspective is less prominent, amounts to an ethical and cultural critique of our 
modern society and it’s relation to non-human nature. This section of the book 
arguably makes up a theoretical element of Leopold’s book, as it contemplates 
on, and criticizes, general cultural relations to wild life and the recreational 
transformations of wilderness (1987: 177-179, 192-193). The section ends with 
the famous “The Land Ethic”, an ethical essay in which an ecological moral 
imperative, together with notions like “ethical extension” and “ecological 
conscience”, is presented as an alternative to the prevailing convictions of 
anthropocentrism.  
There is no reason to disagree with Callicott that the Land Ethic amounts to an 
ethical theory. It seems, however, that Leopold himself would disagree with 
Callicott about what an ethical theory is. Leopold’s descriptions of his “more 
logical” writings as “some of the ideas by which we dissenters rationalize our 
dissent” (Leopold 1987: viii) is quite parallel to Rorty’s description of theory as 
thin summaries of the thick and narrative. Arguably, the structure of The Sand 
County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There constitutes a gradual “thinning 
down” of the thick, concrete and engaged narratives of the first part. Thus read, 
the theoretical and ethical reflections of the Land Ethic express a summary of the 
descriptions and convictions that appear in the vocabulary which emerges in the 
earlier parts of the book. Leopold’s hope is that reengaging with nature, and its 
multitudes of different perspectives, might provide us with an outlook from 
which our practices are given new light, and through which our ethical 
dispositions might change. His narrative focus is not the outcome, as Callicott 
would have it, of his lack of philosophical skills, but rather of the recognition that 
nothing starts with a summary. His own experiences with the wild and the land 
had inspired him to think differently, and so he wants to share such experiences 
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and encourage his readers to strive for the sensibility through which such 
thoughts arise.  
As I read Leopold, he hopes that sensibility to such experiences through a 
reappraisal of the land, and the substitution of a land vocabulary for the 
vocabulary of growth and consumption, can bring about an extension of our 
ethical boundaries, as expressed in the “Golden Rule”:  
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1987: 224-225)  
Contrary to Callicott, I suggest that we do not conceive this rule as a 
philosophical axiom, but rather as the most general and “thin” way to express the 
attitudes comprised in a certain perspective. Leopold does not believe that the 
proposal of such a rule will change our ethical convictions. Rather, the Golden 
Rule summarizes an attitude which he hopes to be the next step in the ethical 
progress of our societies. Leopold’s description of an ongoing ethical evolution 
as “intellectual as well as emotional process” (Leopold 1987: 225) resembles 
Rorty’s description of moral progress as “a matter of remarking our human selves 
so as to enlarge the variety of relationships which constitute those selves” (Rorty 
1999: 79). Like Rorty, Leopold conceives moral progress as an adaptive feature 
of our societies, and as a matter of increasing sensitivity rather than increasing 
moral knowledge through argumentative exchange (Leopold 1987: 203, Rorty 
1999: 81).  
From a Rortyan perspective, A Sand County Almanac is an attempt to establish a 
land-sensitive vocabulary in which concern for the wellbeing of the biotic 
community is a natural part, along with that of humans and animals. This 
vocabulary is sought in narrative redescriptions of animals, plants, ecological 
relations and human practices, which depart from the framework of our common 
descriptions and convictions. The notion of an ethical extension expressed in the 
theoretical parts of Leopold’s book is interesting because it summarizes the 
literary extension of perspective that takes place within its narrative chapters. 
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Thus conceived, the Land Ethic is not an attempt to “build” a new ethic, but an 
ethical summary of a new way of seeing the world.  
To the extent that the environmental crisis can be ameliorated by moral progress 
through ethical extension, we depend on poets and writers (and movie directors, 
journalists, and so on) to offer us new descriptions – new ways of conceiving the 
natural world – by which we may alter our ways of talking of and acting towards 
nature. This is the project of both Wislawa Szymborska and Aldo Leopold. 
However, although both take use of literary redescription in their attempt to 
contribute to the improvement of environmental conditions, their approaches 
differ with regards to style and focus. Szymborska directly addresses the ethical 
convictions which rationalize the environmental degradation by our societies. By 
posing the question, are you really sure that these plants and stones have no 
feelings, and by construing a perspective in which they indeed do, she challenges 
the rationalizations of our nature-exploitative culture. Her ethical extension 
consists of widening the concept of suffering – a concept which is central to our 
society’s moral convictions.  
Leopold, on the other hand, is less directly ethical in his literary descriptions, and 
relies on his readers to engage in detailed, narrative descriptions of the members 
and relations of the land. Leopold’s extension is one of sensitivity to processes 
and relations to which we are becoming ignorant in our predominantly 
consumptive society. These authors are not asking us to embrace a new 
philosophy or a new theory of values, but rather to join them in the exploration of 
new perspectives and vocabularies which might enable and inspire us to change 
our practices.   
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4. Vocabularies of the environment 
4.1 Introduction: Literary hopes and practical aims 
Throughout the preceding chapters of this thesis, the environmental crisis is 
approached in terms of a moral problem concerning our ability to appreciate and 
care about nature. This amounts to a discussion of how we can understand the 
proclaimed need for a new ethic, and of the ways in which such a process might 
be brought about. The preceding chapter is an attempt to fill the void that appears 
after abandoning the idea that philosophy can provide the required changes by 
way of argument. The turn towards environmental narratives and poetry is 
inspired by the Rortyan idea that moral progress is about sentimental experiences 
of new kinds of suffering, and the thought that narrative literature carries the 
ability to give us such experiences.  
Where the environmental foundationalists aim to provide new insights and 
values, writers such as Leopold and Szymborska offer new perspectives, 
experiences and vocabularies. They have the potential to awake new sympathies 
and thereby to change the way we conceive ourselves and our relations to nature. 
As such, these writers are environmentalist versions of Rorty’s ironic protagonist, 
“[hoping], by this continual redescription, to make the best selves for ourselves 
that we can” (Rorty 1989: 80). Rorty’s substitution of poetry and narratives for 
theory and philosophy is closely connected to the substitution of hope for 
knowledge. Giving up on philosophy as engine of social change implies giving 
up on the certainty and predictability of moral progress. Since we cannot argue 
for the perspectives of Leopold and Szymborska, we are left with the hope that 
their metaphors will turn into new moral vocabularies, and that these 
vocabularies will be better tools for attaining environmentally sustainable ways of 
life.   
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However, there is a sense in which the ironic hope of new and better vocabularies 
seems unsatisfying to our aim of acceleration of environmental solutions. 
Presuming that hope alone will not change the world, it is tempting to say that 
neither will moral progress, unless we find ways to connect them to our concrete 
actions and practices. Although we cannot be certain about moral progress, and 
that there is no point in trying to justify the directions we want it to take, there 
may still be ways to promote its practical realization. Although Rorty himself 
rarely goes beyond the ironist hope of the literary critic, there are passages in 
which he addresses the risks of leaning too heavily on cultural changes and new 
ideals. In these passages, Rorty points out that our convictions must not only be 
changed, but also achieved.  
In this chapter, I discuss this issue with reference to the perspective of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, and to the relations between environmental convictions 
and environmental practice in Norway. As such, this chapter is an attempt to 
bridge a Rortyan conception of environmental ethics with a broader, practical 
understanding of the environmental crisis. I argue that we should distinguish the 
tools for moral progress that are directed at the extension of communities and 
moral selves, from tools aim at achieving our ideals and convictions. While the 
former are a matter of attaining cultural change by virtue of creating new 
vocabularies, the latter are a matter of practical change through making our 
vocabularies more efficient.  
4.2 Achieving our ideals  
In Achieving our Country, Rorty addresses the tendency of the American cultural 
left to pursue profound cultural change while losing the focus on concrete policy 
(1998b:78). Rorty notes that while legislation on discrimination and on what he 
calls “sadism” has not changed since the sixties, the cultural left has had 
significant success in creating less discriminating vocabularies:  
 105 
This change is largely due to the hundreds of thousands of teachers who have 
done their best to make their students understand the humiliation which previous 
generations of Americans have inflicted on their fellow citizens. By assigning 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved instead of George Elliot’s Silas Marner in high school 
literature classes, and by assigning stories about the suicides of gay teenagers in 
freshman composition courses, these teachers have made it harder for their 
students to be sadistic than it was for those students’ parents. (Rorty 1998b: 81) 
At first glance, the anti-sadistic cultural work by the American cultural left 
appear to illustrate quite well what we need in order for writers such as Leopold 
and Szymborska to obtain the changes we hope for. It exemplifies how 
experiences of new kinds of sufferings can change our vocabularies and 
convictions, and appears to fuel the hopes of establishing environmental 
convictions through literary work and distribution. However, Rorty’s description 
has another side:  
During the same period […] economic inequality and economic insecurity have 
steadily increased. It is as if the American Left could not handle more than one 
initiative at a time – as if it either had to ignore stigma in order to concentrate on 
money, or vice versa. (Rorty 1998b:83) 
The environmental parallel to this point is that deep cultural changes in the way 
we conceive and value nature constitute no guarantee for sustainable practice 
through policy changes. Arguably, the discrepancy which Rorty describes 
between cultural attitude-changes and concrete policy changes has its parallel in 
the environmental domain. Although it has become commonly accepted that the 
climate changes are connected to human practices, and that something must be 
done to stop them, the concrete changes are few and feeble.  
This contrast is particularly evident in Norway, where a majority believe global 
warming to be a serious problem, and are concerned about pollution and 
degradation of ecosystems and species (Listhaug & Jacobsen 2008), while 
consumption rates and emissions show no significant decline (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå 2014; Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2013). Across discourses within politics, 
business, media and education, environmental issues and values appear to be 
stable parts of the general dialogue, and there are few public organizations or 
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parties which do not conceive environmental problems as a vast and 
anthropogenic crisis. In short, the Norwegian public seems to have integrated (at 
least some) environmental values and perspectives into its common convictions, 
indicating that we have attained at least some of the moral progress towards 
which we are aiming. Environmental values have attained a place even in the 
Constitution of Norway, where §110b reads:  
Everyone has the right to an environment which ensures healthiness, and to a 
nature whose production capability and diversity is preserved. The use of natural 
resources should be administered in agreement with a long-sighted and 
comprehensive consideration which attends to this right for common generations 
as well as for contemporary generations.  
In order to ensure their right stated in the preceding section, citizens are entitled 
to knowledge of the state of the natural environment and of the consequences of 
planned and initiated interventions in nature.  
The government will specify regulations for the executions of these principles. 
(NOU 2000, my translation) 
At first glance, this paragraph appears to exemplify what Rorty’s cultural left has 
failed in attaining, namely an enactment of our convictions through changes in 
policy and regulation. The paragraph arguably accords well with the Norwegian 
attitudes described above. It determines as an individual right, both for current 
and future generations, a diverse nature and a healthy environment, and 
proscribes that all use of natural resources be in accordance with these criteria. 
However, the question is whether these principles are apt to transformation into 
actual policy. Although they specify a requirement of shared information, the 
paragraph is too vague and abstract to have practical effect. Without practical 
regulations, incentive structures and concrete directions, this enactment arguably 
has no practical significance other than as a “thin” summary of our environmental 
convictions. Accordingly, this law is more of an instance of ethical theory (in the 
Rortyan sense), than it is policy regulating our environmental practices.  
The existence of this paragraph, and the results from public surveys noted above, 
is undoubtedly a sign that we are on the right track. Environmental concerns 
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amongst politicians, researchers and the majority of the Norwegian public 
indicate that the direction of our recent moral progress has been environmentally 
favorable, be it the result of literature, public campaigns or educational reforms. 
Nevertheless, the continued level of consumption, oil production, and nature 
intervention reveals that this progress has yet to be reflected in practice. The gap 
between environmental convictions and environmental action indicates that 
although moral progress may be effective and possibly even necessary, it does not 
on its own ensure concrete changes in practice and policy.   
Along with metaphorical works of poetry and literature aimed at creating 
environmentally sentient vocabularies, it is crucial that we maintain pressure on 
the public debate on policy and economy. In addition to the poetic cultural 
engineering, and the efforts by teachers, journalists and others to introduce new 
vocabularies, we must also maintain the environmental perspective in 
argumentative contributions, and work towards concrete improvements of our 
practices. In other words, it is vital that we manage to do two things at once. As 
we continuously redescribe ourselves and our ideals, we must also continuously 
work to achieve the self-descriptions and ideals which we embrace.  
Although Rorty addresses this aspect in some of his works, his perspectives on 
moral progress rarely touch upon the challenges that must be dealt with on the 
inside of our vocabularies. Arguably, the history of the human rights culture 
which Rorty describes (1998a:170) is not only a history of moral progress, but 
also of the continuous, challenging process of institutional, practical and political 
adaptations to new moral convictions. Although women in western societies may 
have achieved moral equality, they are still fighting against barriers such as 
unequal salaries and informal hierarchies which do not automatically change in 
accordance with moral inclusion. Women have won their legal and moral 
equality, but they are still fighting to achieve their practical equality. Similarly, 
environmentalists are struggling against rhetorical, institutional and political 
obstacles from the reduction of carbon dioxide and ecological degradation. This 
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struggle is less of a debate over moral convictions than it is a matter of practical 
implications, normative hegemonies and political prioritization.  
Among environmentalist authors that have influenced policy by challenging our 
concrete practices, Rachel Carson is especially noteworthy. In her Silent Spring 
(1991), she offers a thorough and well-written description of the consequences of 
using chemical substances as a means to control and manipulate nature. This 
book is interesting because it has made a significant impact on the public debate 
and pesticide policy (Murphy 2005), and because although she sharply criticizes 
the image of the earth as made “for the convenience of man” (Carson 1991: 257), 
her book is not primarily an attack our ethical convictions. Silent Spring is an 
attempt to bring to light the complex and long-term consequences of human 
practices which are motivated by short-term benefits. As such, Carson’s attempts 
to ask us if we are willing to endanger so much for the sake of shortsighted 
economic gain. It is an attempt to inform our existing ethical convictions with 
new insights, and accordingly provoke change by establishing as knowledge that 
which is unacceptable to our convictions. She writes:  
If we would divert to constructive research even a small fraction of the money 
spent each year on the development of ever more toxic sprays, we could find 
ways to use less dangerous materials and to keep poisons out of our waterways. 
When will the public become sufficiently aware of the facts to demand such 
actions? (Carson 1991:141) 
Carson’s aims to increase such awareness, and thus hasten the demand for policy 
change. To embrace her call for action does not require a particularly 
environmental ethic. As human beings, we represent the top of the food chain, 
and are amongst the most affected by irreversible toxic emissions on land and 
seas. This feature gives Carson an advantage over many environmentalist writers, 
who share the tendency of environmental philosophers to demand a shift in our 
basic convictions. To alter our accepted knowledge about pesticides and 
insecticides, on the contrary, has little, if anything, to do with overturning basic 
convictions.  
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Arguably, Carson’s criticism is not aimed at our ethical convictions, and does not 
primarily address the conscience and responsibility of the individual reader. 
Although she wants her readers to react, she does not expect them, as consumers, 
to simply stop using pesticides and insecticides where these are now necessary 
means of sustenance. Rather, her aim is to provoke the public to demand policy 
changes. As such, Carson’s contribution is argumentative rather than 
metaphorical, and directed towards our policy rather than our convictions. 
Arguably, this is part of the explanation of Silent Spring’s influence on concrete 
policy changes. This is not to say that the works of writers such as Szymborska 
and Leopold have no part to play. To the extent that Carson’s influence has to do 
with the ethically uncontroversial nature of her writings, her efforts cannot be 
aligned with those of Leopold or Szymborska. They have a different aim and are 
using different tools. As environmental poets and narrators, they use the tool of 
metaphorical redescription in order to offer new vocabularies which may give rise 
to cultural changes, parallel to that of the cultural left.  
However, in addition to the cultural engineering of new vocabularies and 
convictions, we need scientists, activists, journalists and others to point out 
discrepancies between our current convictions and our actual practice. Such 
efforts are not a matter of creating new vocabularies or extending our loyalties, 
but rather of working to achieve our common convictions and making our 
vocabularies more efficient. Silent Spring is an example of literature which 
addresses concrete policy and institutional change with the hope of shortening the 
distance between our convictions and our practices. It is an attempt to promote 
the achievement of our convictions by improving the practical efficiency of our 
normal discourse – the public discourse on the environment.  
4.3 The environment as “hyperobject”  
Arguably, Carson’s influence on our practices is partly due to her ability to 
express the pressing nature of the problem at hand without paralyzing us with its 
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grandeur and complexity. Although she describes the ecological consequences as 
complex, critical and extensive, she does not overload her readers with the weight 
of these problems, but keeps the political precept quite simple: If we change 
policies and regulation regarding pesticide use, many of these problems will at 
least stop accelerating. However, the features of Carson’s writings which allow 
for this simple and pragmatic attitude are not so simple when the topic of 
pesticide use is replaced with problems such as global warming. One difference is 
the role of human beings both as sources and as victims of the problem at hand. 
In the case of pesticides, human beings are among the most exposed to the 
consequences of environmental poison, and the consequences may be soon to 
appear. In the case of global warming, on the other hand, the consequences are 
disputed, complex and distant in time. Its causes are manifold, complicated and 
related to a considerable part of our current practices. A second difference is that 
while improvement to pesticide practices were readily available in the form of 
technological progress and small scale restrictions, the solutions to global 
warming seem to require long-term and radical changes in the core practices and 
habits of human life on earth. Although the consequences of pesticides are indeed 
complex, they are both visible, concrete and impending compared to the 
consequences of carbon emissions. Arguably, the use of pesticides and its 
consequences constitute only small part in a complex web of interrelated 
processes and consequences – the vast aggregation of events we refer to as the 
environmental crisis.   
Perhaps it is the vastness and complexity of the environmental crisis that 
engenders the apparent gap between our attitudes and practices, the discrepancy 
which stands in the way of achieving our environmental ideals. This gap, referred 
to as a value-action gap or an attitude-behavior gap, is the focus of various 
research projects on environmental behavior, reaching from anthropology to 
psychology. Stewert Barr (2006), for example, observes a clear gap between 
intentions and willingness to reduce waste, on the one hand, and the habits of 
consumption and recycling on the other:  
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The occurrence of a series of environmental crises and sustained governmental 
campaigns to increase environmental action have resulted in a steady rise in 
public awareness of environmental problems. Yet the transformation of such 
consciousness into action clearly relates to more than awareness. […] 
Consequently, waste reduction, despite being an aspiration of the general public, 
has yet to become normative behavior. (Barr 2006: 51) 
As Barr notes, our ability to change our behavioral patterns and practices depend 
on more than environmental convictions and ecological knowledge. One 
difference between waste reduction and pesticide reduction is that the latter is a 
matter of concrete changes with concrete results, while the former requires 
changes in consumption patterns amongst large groups in order to have effect. 
While Carson’s project of pesticide reduction requires only political support and 
technological efforts while offering a safer environment for current generations, 
waste recycling requires individual efforts, and may at its best make life better for 
generations in a distant future, provided that everyone contributes. The story of 
poisoned drinking water is simple and near. The story of a less habitable planet 
some centuries ahead is unclear, distant and difficult to grasp.  
The vastness of the climate changes is what makes Timothy Morton categorize 
them as a “hyperobject” – a thing that is so big, complex and different from what 
we normally conceive as an object, that it evades our normal understanding of 
things (Morton 2010). Morton writes:  
Plutonium is truly astonishing to contemplate. We think of light as neutral or 
benign. Radiation is poisoned light. We think of “objects” as passive and inert, 
as “over there.” Just by existing, this hyperobject affects living tissue. […] 
Humans have manufactured materials that are already beyond the normal scope 
of our comprehension. (Morton 2010: 130-131) 
Morton’s point is that our current ways of thinking, especially about nature and 
the environment, are not adapted to the emergence of hyperobjects in our 
collective consciousness. Although we talk about them, our present ways of 
dealing with the world in general and the climate in particular, fall short in the 
face of the vastness and complexity of a hyperobject. In other words, while our 
thoughts and actions are local and contemporary, the important issues of today 
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are global and perpetual. His criticism of environmentalists, politicians, 
philosophers and consumers seems to be that their their various ways of talking 
about nature and environment (both concepts which he wishes to abandon) are 
attempts to transform them into normal objects – of construing hyperobjects in 
phrases and images which make them comprehensible in our existing 
worldviews. Rather than adapting the descriptions of hyperobjects to our frames 
of understanding, Morton upholds that we must rather adapt our thoughts to the 
hyperobjects, thinking bigger and digging deeper into the ecological thought:  
Far from rubbishing deep ecology as a religious objectification, we should take 
its claims more seriously than it takes them, and go even deeper, deeper into the 
mesh. We are only just beginning to think the ecological thought. […] The 
ecological thought can be highly unpleasant. But once you have started to think 
it, you can’t unthink it. We have started to think it. In the future, we will all be 
thinking the ecological thought. (Morton 2010: 134-135) 
Although the scope of Morton’s undertaking, as expressed in these paragraphs, is 
arguably well adapted to the dimensions of hyperobjects, the objective of his own 
writings seems somewhat unclear. On the one hand, a radical critique of 
environmental discourses is directed towards the insufficiency and lacking depth 
of our vocabularies. On the other hand, his aim of a profoundly ecological 
culture, one in which we comprehend and cope with the hyperobjects we have 
created, is construed as a historical necessity. It is possible that this apparent 
contradiction is simply an assertion of the slowness and patchiness of social 
change. Nevertheless, Morton’s confined perspective on deep and radical cultural 
changes displays a lack of willingness to, or a disbelief in, addressing the climate 
change as a practical problem which can have practical solutions. Perhaps it is 
this confinement to deep cultural patterns that leads him to conclude in a kind of 
hopeful semi-determinism. If one accepts Morton’s premises, however, his 
hopefulness seems more far-fetched than his cultural dissatisfaction.   
Fortunately, we need not accept all of Morton’s premises. We can appreciate his 
descriptions of climate change and environmental crisis as hyperobjects, and 
agree with him that we are far from adapting to these ethical and conceptual 
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challenges. In fact, his conception of ecological progress is quite similar to what 
writers such as Aldo Leopold and Wislawa Szymborska are aiming to bring 
about. Morton’s proposal to think bigger and deeper implies describing 
environmental problems as more complex and vast, thus approaching the 
hyperobject of climate change in its fullest possible form. I agree that the new 
challenges of global warming and environmental degradation call for an 
extension of our perspectives on our lives and our relations to the rest of the 
planet, and we may well conceive of such progress as the development of “the 
ecological thought”. However, since these changes imply the emergence of new 
vocabularies, perspectives and values, their establishment depends on tools other 
than that of argument and theoretical critique. Developing the ecological thought 
towards understanding, and coping with, the magnitude and complexity of 
hyperobjects could be a description of Leopold’s intentions in A Sand County 
Almanac. As I have argued, Leopold’s ecological extension of ethics is 
subsequent to an extension of our perspectives on and vocabularies of nature. In 
Rortyan-Mortonian terms, such extension could be construed as a matter of 
redescribing nature as a hyperobject, leaving our simple and anthropocentric 
descriptions of nature behind.   
However, I disagree with Morton’s premise that the hyper-character of these 
problems renders them unapproachable within a culture that is not thoroughly 
ecological in its basic perspectives and convictions. Although it might be the case 
that our current vocabularies, discourses and practices are not prepared to cope 
with hyperobjects, it is also the case that the description of these challenges as 
hyperobjects is only one among many possible descriptions. The invention of 
deeper and more ecological vocabularies is a poetic and metaphorical process, 
and not a matter of public debate. On the contrary, it seems that the orientation of 
our public debates towards hyperobjective cluster concepts such as “global 
warming” or “environmental crisis” may be too hyper in order for us to relate 
them to our daily practices.  
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Although there are no necessary limits to the perspectives, worldviews and moral 
convictions we can achieve, there are certainly practical limits to what we 
actually value and comprehend. We may hope to evolve towards a culture where 
the complexity of ecosystems is internalized within common sense, and in which 
our sympathies have reached beyond the nearness of family, the human race and 
the recognition of physical pain. However, asserting that the environment is 
really a hyperobject is the same as saying that ecosystems really have intrinsic 
value. Instead of working towards a new vocabulary, Morton attacks our current 
final vocabularies with arguments about the inadequacy of its conceptions. Since 
his arguments do not share the premises of our public environmental 
vocabularies, however, they have little value as a contribution to the public 
discourse. I suggest we take the ironist’s approach to criticism, and give up the 
attempt to change our final vocabularies by way of argument. Since we have not, 
at least so far, become a culture which understands and manages to cope with the 
hyperobjective environment, it makes sense to construe our problems, efforts and 
goals within the framework and perspective of our current vocabularies.  
As we have seen, cultural changes in the form of moral progress or increased 
awareness are no guarantee of practical changes. Cultural and moral progress 
towards “the ecological thought” does not ensure the ecological transformation of 
our policy and practices. And even if it did, our communities currently seem to be 
far from thinking it. Perhaps it would be more efficient, and more practical, to 
leave the hyperobjective depths and grandeur of the environment to poetic 
writers, and address the public discourse on the environment with less global, less 
complex and less unintelligible descriptions. Rorty makes a similar point:  
[…] our sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is 
expressed are thought of as "one of us," where "us" means something smaller 
and more local than the human race. That is why "because she is a human being" 
is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action. (Rorty 1989: 191) 
As I read Rorty, his point is not that we can never be motivated to sympathy or 
benevolence simply by the commonality of being human. Rather, he is saying that 
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while we extend our boundaries of loyalty and sympathy, it will still be the case 
that some members of our moral communities are closer to us than others. The 
“we-intentions” of my own family, the smallest and nearest of all my moral 
communities, are stronger than those of my city, country or common human 
beings (Rorty 1989: 194-195). Although there are no pre-given limits to the 
future of our moral communities, moral motivation will be stronger in the small 
and more local communities than in the global communities of humanity, living 
organisms, or ecosystems. Since we arguably do not, as yet, perceive ourselves as 
members of the eco-community of life on earth, it is hard to see how we are to be 
motivated by such conceptions. Arguably, although the hyperobjective 
environment may be conceivable as an intellectual idea, it will take more 
redescription, more cultural adaptation, before it can prompt us to action.  
Developing the ecological thought is a matter of changing our ideals. Achieving 
our ideals, however, is a matter of choosing the descriptions that are close and 
local enough in order to motivate. Redescribing the problems at hand in terms 
that are local, concrete and thematically limited might reify our convictions and 
thus lessen then gap between them and our practices. The next section is an 
attempt to suggest some ways of achieving practical reification of the 
environmental crisis through pragmatic adjustments of our environmental 
vocabularies. This section is not about attaining new environmental ideals, but 
about achieving those which we already embrace.  
4.4 Environmental vocabularies and the achievement of 
our ideals 
The public debate about the environment is characterized by a multitude of 
different perspectives, opinions and levels of abstraction merged into a single 
discourse. The technical and academic language of the Climate Panel is mingled 
with vague and confrontational political statements, solemn environmental 
organizations, and the self-righteousness of “green” business-leaders, all pointing 
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fingers at each other and rarely leaving us less confused. The complex and 
impersonal nature of the environmental crisis is boosted by daily revisions of 
yesterday’s facts and diverse debates over which environmental problem is the 
most grave and urgent. In fact, the situation is similar to the philosophical debate 
about the environment which has continued since the 1970’s, with the exception 
that the latter, perhaps fortunately, is upheld without full public exposure. As I 
have argued in this thesis, the philosophical debate over the environment has 
stagnated in its attempt to answer the question of value in nature, presuming that 
such an answer will provide us with a solution. Similarly, scientists, activists and 
journalists are continuously fuelling the public environmental discourse with new 
information, moral arguments and perspectives, with the hope of bringing us 
closer to environmental practices.  
However, it may seem that this project of environmental enlightenment is what 
establishes the environment as a hyperobject in our public discourses. It is not 
unlikely that the complexity and grandeur of our environmental descriptions, the 
knowledge gaps between professional and public environmental discourses and 
the apparent incommensurability of the various environmental purposes 
(wilderness preservation vs. wind power, etc.), are simply too much to digest for 
the individual newspaper reader. Although the environmental crisis is alarming, 
and its solution pressing, there is a chance that the way we construe it is 
passivizing rather than engaging. Potentially, the hyperobject of the environment, 
although conceived of as both alarming and pressing, ends up not concerning us, 
our habits and actions. Perhaps our concern for the hyperobjective environment is 
becoming more of an intellectual idea than a sentimental reaction.  
The public debate is an arena for discussing and achieving our ideals rather than 
inventing new vocabularies. It could be prudent, therefore, to take use of 
descriptions of the environmental crisis that are smaller, more local, more 
concrete and less confusing. If our current vocabularies and perspectives are not 
capable of dealing with hyperobjects, our public environmental discourse could 
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be more efficient if we replaced the hyperobjective description of the 
environmental crisis with descriptions we can relate to without turning to 
emotional dissociation. Perhaps, if we could combine descriptions of the 
environmental crisis which are less complex and despairing, with more local, 
concrete and optimistic descriptions of how we can face it, we would be better 
suited to grasp and respond to the defining challenge of our time.   
One way of doing this is to take some of the environmental complexity out of the 
public debate. Rather than discussing details about the degree of human blame in 
global warming, we could stick to the story that since global warming is 
occurring, and human emissions probably play a part in that process, we should 
aim towards reducing emissions. And rather than discussing the advantages of 
diesel over gas engines (or vice versa), we could stick to the simple point that it is 
a good thing if we reduce our car use. The details can be left to the expertise of 
scientists and bureaucrats.  
Furthermore, instead of addressing car users and consumers with new demands 
and personal responsibilities, we can learn from Rachel Carson and focus on the 
policy changes that may provoke the desired effect. It is easier to vote for car use 
reduction that it is to reduce one’s personal car use. After all, we are no longer in 
the 1950’s, and the sense of common goals has arguably decreased over the last 
decades. Individual actions are perceived less as parts of common practices and 
more as efforts to diverge from the common. Perhaps this is part of the 
explanation of the weak connection between concern about common practices 
and individual effort to change. The decreasing sense of community may have to 
do with the vast dimension of the “community” of the common projects of today, 
a community completely different from that of a worker’s organization of the 
50’s. Achieving a “green planet” requires the collective effort of several billion 
people towards a common goal. A possible consequence of this globalization of 
the environmental community is that common efforts and responsibilities become 
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as hyperobjective as the climate crisis itself – too abstract to be related to our 
personal contribution.  
Therefore, it could be an idea to let researchers and novelists worry about the 
hyperobject described in IPCC reports and Morton’s writings, and direct our 
public focus towards the environmental improvements within smaller 
communities. The notions of “green” cities, neighbourhoods or schools might be 
far more encouraging and effective in terms of normative pressure and personal 
motivation. This is not to say that we can ignore or abandon international 
cooperation for a greener planet. It is to say that if the public debate focused more 
on local efforts and consequences, environmentalism could become more of a 
local community project and less of a globalized paralysis. Ecological science 
and nature-writing are tools that deal with the hyperobjective environment, and 
which aim to change, in the long run, our ways of talking about nature and 
ourselves. In the public discourse, however, the tools we need are those which 
simplify and speed up the application of ideals and awareness into actual practice.  
Since these distinct tools are used for different purposes, there is no contradiction 
between them. The solution of the environmental crisis requires change in a 
number of aspects of our societies. For the continuance of moral progress and 
long term “ecologization” of our worldviews, narrative literature, poetry and 
ecological science are probably among the efficient tools. For the achievement of 
our ethical and cultural convictions, on the other hand, we need other tools. To 
this end, I suggest that we turn seek redescriptions in which the environmental 
problems are construed as local, comprehensible and assailable practical 
problems.   
An example of the effect of smaller environmental communities is the emergence 
of eco-trends and other social phenomena which we can call environmental 
packages. The internet is abundant with magazines and blogs about “returning to 
nature” through simple living, ecological farming and wilderness experiences. 
Such phenomena are sometimes criticized for disguising egoistic self-realization 
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projects as environmental activism, and consequently conceived of as misguided 
environmental efforts. However, if it turns out, as it sometimes does, that these 
bloggers and trend-subscribers in fact change their consumption patterns, and 
perhaps even inspire others to do the same, such criticism is pointless as 
contribution to the public debate. Whether or not they value nature “for its own 
sake” is a matter of private philosophy, and should be irrelevant to all but hard-
core deontologists. What matters in practice is that such phenomena exemplify 
how small communities manage to achieve their common ideals in practice. The 
intentional background does not make any practical difference. It would be great 
if everyone replaced their car with public transportation because of concern for 
global warming, but it does not make any practical difference if they do so rather 
out of economical reasoning or in order to improve the air quality of their city.  
The development of environmental ideals and vocabularies is the demanding task 
of creative writers and poets who hope, in the long run, to find a better, 
ecological, “us”. To achieve our environmental ideals may require that we adopt 
descriptions of ourselves, our practices and our ideals that lessen the gap between 
intentions and actions. We need to describe ourselves as people who practice 
what we preach. I have argued that in the public debate on the environment, 
hyperobjective grandeur and complexity contributes to paralysis rather than 
inspiration. On the contrary, we need descriptions that construe the alarming and 
pressing nature of global warming as something intelligible and surmountable. 
My suggestion is to do this by replacing this grandeur and complexity with 
descriptions which are closer – smaller and more local – to those we wish to 
inspire to action. Some might object that this implies embracing an unrealistic 
and incomplete picture of the problem at hand, and that its gravity will be lost 
with the big perspectives. However, such grandeur, complexity and gravity are no 
good if they leave us in resignation and paralysis.  
The anticipation of a new, environmental ethic is a matter of hoping for new 
ideals. It is hoping that our current convictions and vocabularies will gradually 
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succumb to ways of conceiving, valuing, and describing the world, which bring 
us closer to non-human nature. Although such cultural change is a slow and 
unpredictable process, we can work towards it by continuing to redescribe human 
and non-human nature in new ways, narrative or poetic, which increase our 
awareness and sensitivity to the natural world. Arguably, this process has already 
started. However, the urgency and gravity of the environmental crisis leaves us 
too little time to let moral progress run its unsteady and protracted path. The 
ecologization of our societies will be of little use if it is outrun by the 
consequences of today’s growth and consumption.  
New values and perspectives do not necessarily entail new practices. This insight 
is largely ignored by the proponents of environmental philosophy, be it 
foundationalists or pragmatists. In Rorty’s writings, it is at best vaguely 
mentioned, and for the most part undiscussed. Perhaps this is due to his efforts to 
promote revolutionary changes in the discipline of philosophy, and the 
consequent lack of interest in what goes on within it. However, while 
revolutionary science and redescription of moral boundaries can offer new ways 
of talking and perceiving, they are not as useful when it comes to changing our 
ways of acting. Practical change in the form of implementation, policy and the 
substitution of common habits, depend on the efficiency of the tools which our 
normal discourses make use of in order to transform our common premises into 
action. New ways of talking are of no use if they fail to bring about new ways of 
acting. The work of creating new vocabularies must be complimented by the 
work of making them efficient.  
It is crucial that we find ways to narrow the gap between ideals and practices, 
speeding up the process of achieving our environmental ideals. In addition to 
reframing the problem at hand and breaking it down into intelligible and 
approachable aims, we need descriptions of ourselves which bridge the gap 
between individual action and common practice. In short, we need to replace the 
stories and descriptions which paralyze and frighten us with stories that engage 
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us and inspire us to make other choices. The environmental enlightenment project 
is already pervasive in politics, media and public conversation. The magnitude of 
the environmental crisis suggests that an even heavier pressure is appropriate. 
What matters, however, is that we manage to direct and distribute this pressure in 
ways that promote positivity, motivation and, ultimately, action.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis is motivated by the apparent stagnation of foundationalist 
environmental philosophy, and its consequent failure to contribute to our 
common efforts towards environmental solutions. Various efforts have been 
made to change and refine the discourse of environmental foundationalism, but 
although these efforts have brought about new perspectives, they have failed to 
resolve the standstill. The aim of this thesis, therefore, has been to abandon this 
entire discourse in order to try out another one.  
The Rortyan perspective on languages as tools constitutes a vocabulary in which 
we can construe new descriptions, both of the stagnation of environmental 
foundationalism, and of the prospects of attaining an environmental ethic. From 
this perspective, environmental foundationalism is a language game with rules of 
language use that are distinct from other vocabularies. Reaching objectivity for 
an environmental foundationalist is a matter of attaining agreement for her 
arguments within this vocabulary. If such objectivity were to emerge, it would 
still be internal to the vocabulary of environmental foundationalism. The Rortyan 
conception of language lets us see the difference between various languages, 
disciplines and discourses, as horizontal rather than vertical.  
The notion of providing a foundation depends on the degree to which certain 
ways of using language amount to “deeper” insights than others. The 
philosophical version of this notion aims towards insight to the necessary and the 
unconditional. To Rorty, however, “the necessary” and “unconditional” nature of 
certain propositions denote nothing more than the broad acceptance of these 
propositions on the inside of a language game. There is no necessity on the 
outside of language, and accordingly no criterion of choice between vocabularies 
which does not itself originate in a vocabulary. By aiming beyond the realm of 
socially integrated opinions and perspectives, environmental foundationalism is a 
vocabulary which refuses to be a vocabulary. I have argued that this refusal, 
 123 
along with the failure to attain discursive agreement, amounts to part of the 
reason why environmental foundationalism has failed to reach its goal of 
contributing to our common environmental efforts. Environmental 
foundationalism is a way of talking which, as it turns out, has not brought us 
closer to the goals it was aiming for.  
Rorty’s conception of theories as summaries places ethical theory on the inside of 
a historically and socially situated vocabulary. It lets us conceive of theory as a 
particular way of relating to the common convictions and accepted knowledge on 
the inside of a language game, namely by summarizing its broadly accepted 
assumptions and normative convictions. Theories which are accepted as objective 
are successful attempts at providing such summaries. They are successful not by 
virtue of representing the “real world out there” to us, but by virtue of describing 
our own descriptions and convictions in a generalized manner. As theory rests on 
agreement, it is not by itself a tool for social change. Although theories can surely 
be enlightening and enhance consciousness of our own convictions, they are not 
means to provide us with new values and convictions. As I have argued, the 
theories within environmental foundationalism are theories which do not express 
our common convictions and values. Although they may summarize the 
convictions internal to their own vocabulary, they fail to relate to the convictions 
of the public.    
The environmental foundationalists aim to construe and establish a new ethical 
system which would push our practices and actions in an environmentally 
sustainable direction. They conceive of our failure to face environmental 
challenges as a sign that we need to change on a “deeper” level. In this thesis, I 
have abandoned the system-approach to ethics, but kept the idea that changes in 
ethical convictions can be a valuable part of our efforts towards environmental 
solutions. I have abandoned the question of how we can justify environmental 
values, and substituted the question of how we can work towards environmental 
values. Without foundationalism, attaining an environmental ethic becomes a 
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matter of breadth rather than depth, and of thickness rather than thinness. 
Abandoning the search for foundations lets us accept that we can work towards 
practical solutions without a unanimous platform of universal validity on which 
to ground these efforts. It lets us avoid the stagnation which appears when we 
require the premises to be unconditional and uncontested. If we agree on what 
practical changes we are working towards, we can replace the question of 
whether we really should work towards it, and on what grounds, with the 
question of how we should work towards it.  
The Rortyan picture of moral progress is one of wider sympathies and extension 
of loyalties being promoted by detailed and contextual “thick” descriptions of the 
suffering of new groups. Ethical change does not depend on increased moral 
knowledge, but rather on our ability to sympathize with new groups of beings. 
Since this kind of change is an open-ended process, there are no fixed limitations 
as to what kinds of entities we might include in our moral communities. On this 
view, attaining an environmental ethic is a matter of extending our sensitivity to 
non-human beings, and of increasingly considering their non-humanity as morally 
irrelevant. Consequently, I have suggested that the kinds of literature we should 
look to for contributions to environmental moral progress are poetic, narrative 
and metaphoric rather than analytic, theoretical and argumentative. Callicott may 
be right that Aldo Leopold’s philosophical ideas can be given a more precise and 
theoretical description. However, the moral force and the potential to contribute 
to environmental moral progress lie in the narrative descriptions in Leopold’s 
works.  
To abandon environmental foundationalism is also to abandon the picture of a 
stable and fixed ethic which guides our actions and practices. In this thesis, I have 
argued that the relation between our environmental convictions and our concrete 
practices is not an automatic process. Rather, I have described the achievement of 
our environmental ideals as another environmental challenge, distinct from that 
of attaining environmental moral progress. The challenge of realizing 
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environmental convictions is another task, and accordingly a matter of using 
other tools. This aspect of social change is largely overlooked by environmental 
foundationalists, and only lightly touched upon by Rorty. I have argued that 
descriptions by which the environmental challenge becomes a hyperobject in our 
public discourses – a problem that exceeds the limits of our practical grasp – are 
inefficient tools for the aim of achieving our ideals. Since the practical 
achievement of our environmental convictions is a common and public challenge, 
it is not a matter of metaphor or revolutionary science, but of normal discourse.  
As normal discourse, the efficiency of our public discourse on the environment – 
the ability to transform common convictions into actual practice – depends on our 
ability to reach agreement upon common premises and conceptions. To the degree 
that the hyperobjective environment is a common conception of the public, it is 
seemingly one which does not instigate practical change. I have argued that 
within our current normal vocabularies, the grandeur and complexity of the 
environment has a paralysing rather than motivating effect. As such, it is an 
inefficient tool for the achievement of our common environmental ideals.  
Attaining an environmental ethic is a gradual, long-sighted process of coming up 
with new descriptions by which we consider non-human nature as less morally 
different from ourselves. Achieving the convictions we already have, and those 
we attain along the way, is a matter of using descriptions which narrow the gap 
between ideals and practices. The tools which are useful for one of these aims are 
not necessarily useful for the other. The ecological narrations of Aldo Leopold, 
and perhaps even the critical writings of Timothy Morton, may be useful tools for 
the long-sighted moral and discursive process of including nonhuman nature in 
our moral communities. As such, they are tools that may, in the long run, help us 
to grasp and cope with descriptions of the complexity and grandeur of the 
environment. As tools, they aim at creating future vocabularies in which such 
descriptions would be useful for our purpose of sustaining nature.  
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I have argued, however, that we do not currently respond very well to such 
descriptions. They are not useful in our current public vocabularies. Our ability to 
act out our increasing environmental ideals through concrete practical changes 
appears to be hindered by the ways in which we describe the challenge at hand. I 
have argued, therefore, that our public discourse on the environment could be 
more efficient if we toned down the hyperobjective descriptions, and substituted 
descriptions which are more local and practical. If we abandon foundationalism, 
we no longer need to choose our descriptions according to the degree of 
correspondence to reality. Instead, we can choose our descriptions according to 
their efficiency as tools for a particular aim. By construing the environmental 
crisis as a range of pressing, yet solvable practical problems which concern our 
local communities, we can create ways of talking which narrow the gap between 
our environmental ideals and their practical realization.  
In this thesis, I have suggested an alternative way of approaching environmental 
ethics and vocabularies. The approach to our environmental vocabularies as tools 
with practical purposes is an attempt to change the focus from justification to 
consequences, and from theory to practice. Foundationalist philosophy is the 
attempt to talk about our vocabularies with reference to something on the outside. 
Although the reference to an outside has become obsolete, the need to talk about 
our vocabularies has not. Ironist literary criticism is a matter of talking about our 
vocabularies with reference to the practical purposes they are intended to 
promote.  
Accordingly, the suggestions put forward in this thesis do not amount to a 
solution of the environmental crisis. I do not share the philosophical ambition to 
solve the environmental challenges by providing new values and worldviews. 
However, as an ironist literary critic, I have doubts about the whether the 
language of environmental foundationalism is a good way to promote 
environmental solutions. I also have doubts as to whether our predominant public 
descriptions of the environmental problem are useful for promoting practical 
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change. Therefore, I have suggested some other ways of talking about the 
environment, our values and ourselves, which could promote the emergence of 
more useful environmental vocabularies.  
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